The issue of whether we make decisions freely has vexed philosophers for millennia, Resolving this is vital for solving a diverse range of problems, from the physiology of how the brain makes decisions (and how we assign moral responsibility to those decisions) to the interpretation of experiments on entangled quantum particles. A deterministic model of free will is developed, based on two concepts. The first generalises the notion of initialisation of nonlinear systems where information cascades upscale from the Planck scale, exemplified by the chaology of colliding billiard balls, and featured in the author's Rational Quantum Mechanics. With `just-in-time' initialisation, such Planck-scale information is only initialised when it is needed to describe super-Planck scale evolution, and not e.g., at the time of the Big Bang. In this way determinism does not imply predestination and a system with finitely many degrees of freedom can shadow a system with infinitely many, over arbitrarily long timescales. The second concept describes the upscale control of such Planck-scale information on super-Planck scales and is illustrated by reference to stochastic rounding in numerical analysis. Using these concepts, a deterministic model is proposed whereby freely-made decisions are made by using past experiences to control the impact of noise in the low-energy brain. It is claimed that such a model has evolutionary advantages, not least preventing paralysis by analysis and encouraging rational risk taking. It is concluded that humans have free will, determinism notwithstanding. The model is applied to study the foundational issue of free choice in quantum physics experiments: it is shown that violating the Measurement Independence assumption does not invalidate the free-will conclusion above.
The issue of whether we make decisions freely has vexed philosophers for millennia, Resolving this is vital for solving a diverse range of problems, from the physiology of how the brain makes decisions (and how we assign moral responsibility to those decisions) to the interpretation of experiments on entangled quantum particles. A deterministic model of free will is developed, based on two concepts. The first generalises the notion of initialisation of nonlinear systems where information cascades upscale from the Planck scale, exemplified by the chaology of colliding billiard balls, and featured in the author's Rational Quantum Mechanics. With `just-in-time' initialisation, such Planck-scale information is only initialised when it is needed to describe super-Planck scale evolution, and not e.g., at the time of the Big Bang. In this way determinism does not imply predestination and a system with finitely many degrees of freedom can shadow a system with infinitely many, over arbitrarily long timescales. The second concept describes the upscale control of such Planck-scale information on super-Planck scales and is illustrated by reference to stochastic rounding in numerical analysis. Using these concepts, a deterministic model is proposed whereby freely-made decisions are made by using past experiences to control the impact of noise in the low-energy brain. It is claimed that such a model has evolutionary advantages, not least preventing paralysis by analysis and encouraging rational risk taking. It is concluded that humans have free will, determinism notwithstanding. The model is applied to study the foundational issue of free choice in quantum physics experiments: it is shown that violating the Measurement Independence assumption does not invalidate the free-will conclusion above.
If the concept of “free will” is reduced to that of “choice” all physical world share the latter quality. Anyway the “free will” can be distinguished from the “choice”: The “free will” involves implicitly a certain goal, and the choice is only the mean, by which the aim can be achieved or not by the one who determines the target. Thus, for example, an electron has always a choice but not free will unlike a human possessing both. Consequently, and paradoxically, the determinism of classical physics is more subjective and more anthropomorphic than the indeterminism of quantum mechanics for the former presupposes certain deterministic goal implicitly following the model of human freewill behavior. Quantum mechanics introduces the choice in the fundament of physical world involving a generalized case of choice, which can be called “subjectless”: There is certain choice, which originates from the transition of the future into the past. Thus that kind of choice is shared of all existing and does not need any subject: It can be considered as a low of nature. There are a few theorems in quantum mechanics directly relevant to the topic: two of them are called “free will theorems” by their authors (Conway and Kochen 2006; 2009). Any quantum system either a human or an electron or whatever else has always a choice: Its behavior is not predetermined by its past. This is a physical law. It implies that a form of information, the quantum information underlies all existing for the unit of the quantity of information is an elementary choice: either a bit or a quantum bit (qubit).
The concept of 'super-indeterminism' captures the notion that the free choice assumption of orthodox quantum mechanics necessitates only the following requirement: an agent's free-choice performance in the selection of measurement settings must not represent an exception to the rule of irreducible quantum indeterminism in the physical universe (i.e, "universal indeterminism"). Any additional metaphysical speculation, such as to whether quantum indeterminism, i.e., intrinsic randomness, implicates the reality of experimenter "freedom", "free will", or "free choice", is redundant in relation to the predictive success of orthodox quantum mechanics. Accordingly, super-indeterminism views as redundant also, from a technical standpoint, whether an affirmative or a negative answer is claimed in reference to universal indeterminism as a necessary precondition for experimenter freedom. Super-indeterminism accounts, for example, for the circular reasoning which is implicit in the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen [1,2]. The concept of super-indeterminism is of great assistance in clarifying the often misunderstood meaning of the concept of "free variables" as used by John Bell [3]. The present work argues that Bell sought an operational, effective free will theorem , one based upon the notion of "determinism without predetermination", i.e., one wherein "free variables" represent universally uncomputable variables. In conclusion, the standard interpretation of quantum theory does not answer, and does not need to answer in order to ensure the predictive success of orthodox theory, the question of whether either incompatibilism or compatibilism is valid in relation to free-will metaphysics and to the free-will phenomenology of experimenter agents in quantum mechanics.
The question of human free will has remained a central philosophi- cal challenge for millennia. In physics, the issue of determinism versus indeterminism resurfaces in quantum mechanics, where measurement choices play a key role. In this work, we propose an experimental pro- tocol inspired by delayed-choice quantum eraser experiments, in which the random switching of measurement settings is not performed by a quantum random number generator (QRNG), but instead by human participants making rapid spontaneous choices. If human choices are fundamentally unpredictable in a way that is not reducible to quantum determinism, then the universal wave function could not have encoded them prior to the decision event. By introducing quantum memories to extend the decision window and ensuring strict separation and blind- ness of participants, this experiment could test whether interference patterns depend on genuinely free human choices or behave identically to QRNG-based protocols. A violation of standard quantum predic- tions would have profound consequences for physics, philosophy, and neuroscience.
This paper shows that the conjunction of several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical information off to subjective conscious awareness (in much the same way that a song written on an ordinary compact-disc is only played when read by an outside medium, i.e. a CD-player). According to this theory, every possible physical “timeline” in the multiverse may be fully physically deterministic or physically-causally closed but each person’s consciousness still entirely free to choose, ex nihilo, outside of the physical order, which physically-closed timeline is experienced by conscious observers. Although Libertarian Compatibilism is admittedly fantastic, I show that it not only follows from several live scientific and philosophical hypotheses, I also show that it (A) is a far more explanatorily powerful model of quantum mechanics than more traditional interpretations (e.g. the Copenhagen, Everett, and Bohmian interpretations), (B) makes determinate, testable empirical predictions in quantum theory, and finally, (C) predicts and explains the very existence of a number of philosophical debates and positions in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will. First, I show that whereas traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics are all philosophically problematic and roughly as ontologically “extravagant” as Libertarian Compatibilism – in that they all posit “unseen” processes – Libertarian Compatibilism is nearly identical in structure to the only working simulation that human beings have ever constructed capable of reproducing (and so explaining) every single general feature of quantum mechanics we perceive: namely, massive-multiplayer-online-roleplaying videogames (or MMORPGs). Although I am not the first to suggest that our world is akin to a computer simulation, I show that existing MMORPGs (online simulations we have already created) actually reproduce every general feature of quantum mechanics within their simulated-world reference-frames. Second, I show that existing MMORPGs also replicate (and so explain) many philosophical problems we face in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will – all while conforming to the Libertarian Compatibilist model of reality. I conclude, as such, that as fantastic and metaphysically extravagant as Libertarian Compatibilism may initially seem, it may well be true. It explains a number of features of our reality that no other physical or metaphysical theory does.
The question of human free will has remained a central philosophical challenge for millennia. In physics, the issue of determinism versus indeterminism resurfaces in quantum mechanics, where measurement choices play a key role. In this work, we propose an experimental protocol inspired by delayed-choice quantum eraser experiments, in which the random switching of measurement settings is not performed by a quantum random number generator (QRNG), but instead by human participants making rapid spontaneous choices. If human choices are fundamentally unpredictable in a way that is not reducible to quantum mechanics or physical determinism, then the universal wave function could not have encoded them prior to the decision event. By introducing quantum memories to extend the decision window and ensuring strict separation and blindness of participants, this experiment could test whether interference patterns depend on genuinely free human choices or yield results identical to QRNG-based protocols.
The question of human free will has remained a central philosophical challenge for millennia. In physics, the issue of determinism versus indeterminism resurfaces in quantum mechanics, where measurement choices play a key role. In this work, we propose an experimental protocol inspired by delayed-choice quantum eraser experiments, in which the random switching of measurement settings is not performed by a quantum random number generator (QRNG), but instead by human participants making rapid spontaneous choices. If human choices are fundamentally unpredictable in a way that is not reducible to quantum mechanics or physical determinism, then the universal wave function could not have encoded them prior to the decision event. By introducing quantum memories to extend the decision window and ensuring strict separation and blindness of participants, this experiment could test whether interference patterns depend on genuinely free human choices or yield results identical to QRNG-based protocols.