We develop a communication-theoretic framework for privacy-aware and resilient decision making in cyber-physical systems under misaligned objectives between the encoder and the decoder. The encoder observes two correlated signals (X,θ) and transmits a finite-rate message Z to aid a legitimate controller (the decoder) in estimating X + θ, while an eavesdropper intercepts Z to infer the private parameter θ. Unlike conventional setups where encoder and decoder share a common mean squared error objective, here the encoder minimizes a Lagrangian that balances legitimate control fidelity and the information leakage about θ. In contrast, the decoder’s goal is purely to minimize its own estimation error without regard for privacy. We analyze fully, partially, and non-revealing strategies that arise from this conflict, and characterize optimal linear encoders when the rate constraints are lifted. For finite-rate channels, we employ gradient-based methods to compute the optimal controllers. Numerical experiments illustrate how tuning the privacy parameter shapes the trade-off between control performance and resilience against unauthorized inferences.
We develop a communication-theoretic framework for privacy-aware and resilient decision making in cyber-physical systems under misaligned objectives between the encoder and the decoder. The encoder observes two correlated signals (X,θ) and transmits a finite-rate message Z to aid a legitimate controller (the decoder) in estimating X + θ, while an eavesdropper intercepts Z to infer the private parameter θ. Unlike conventional setups where encoder and decoder share a common mean squared error objective, here the encoder minimizes a Lagrangian that balances legitimate control fidelity and the information leakage about θ. In contrast, the decoder’s goal is purely to minimize its own estimation error without regard for privacy. We analyze fully, partially, and non-revealing strategies that arise from this conflict, and characterize optimal linear encoders when the rate constraints are lifted. For finite-rate channels, we employ gradient-based methods to compute the optimal controllers. Numerical experiments illustrate how tuning the privacy parameter shapes the trade-off between control performance and resilience against unauthorized inferences.
We investigate signaling game problems where an encoder and a decoder with misaligned objectives communicate. We consider a variety of setups involving cost criterion mismatch, prior mismatch and a particular application to privacy problems. We also consider both Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts. First, we extend the classical results on the scalar cheap talk problem which is intro-duced by Crawford and Sobel. In prior work, it is shown that the encoder must employ a quantization policy under any Nash equilibrium for arbitrary source distributions. We specifically consider sources with a log-concave density and in-vestigate properties of equilibria. For sources with two-sided unbounded support, we prove that, for any finite number of bins, there exists a unique equilibrium. If the source has semi-unbounded support, then there may exist a finite upper bound on the number of bins in equilibrium depending on certain explicit condi-tions. Moreover, we show that an equilibrium with more bins is more informative by showing that the expected costs of the encoder and the decoder in equilibrium decrease as the number of bins increases. Furthermore, for strictly log-concave sources with two-sided unbounded support, we prove that if the encoder and decoder iteratively compute their best responses starting from a given number of bins, then the resulting policies converge to the unique equilibrium with the corresponding number of bins. Second, we model a privacy problem as a signaling game between an encoder and a decoder. Given a pair of correlated observations modeled as jointly Gaus-sian random vectors, the encoder aims to hide one of them and convey the other one to the decoder. In contrast, the aim of the decoder is to accurately estimate both of the random vectors. For the resulting signaling game problem, we show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium among all admissible policies is attained by a set of explicitly characterized linear policies. We also show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium coincides with a Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, we formulate the information bottleneck problem within our Stackelberg frame-work under the mean squared error criterion where the information bottleneck setup has a further restriction that only one of the parameters is observed at the encoder. We show that the Gaussian information bottleneck problem admits a linear solution which is explicitly characterized. Third, we investigate communications through a Gaussian noise channel be-tween an encoder and a decoder with prior mismatch. Although they consider the same cost function, the induced expected costs as a map of their policies are misaligned due to their prior mismatch. We analyze the resulting signaling game problem under Stackelberg equilibria. We first investigate robustness of equilibria and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium cost of the encoder is upper semi continuous, under the Wasserstein metric, as the encoder’s prior approaches the decoder’s prior, and it is also lower semi continuous with Gaussian priors. In addition, we show that the optimality of affine policies for Gaussian signaling no longer holds under prior mismatch. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which there exist informative equilibria under an affine policy restriction. Fourth, we extend Crawford and Sobel’s formulation to a multidimensional source setting. We first provide a set of geometry conditions that decoder actions at a Nash equilibrium has to satisfy considering any multidimensional source. Then, we consider independent and identically distributed sources and charac-terize necessary and sufficient conditions under which an informative linear equi-librium exists. We observe that these conditions involve the bias vector that leads to misaligned costs. Depending on certain conditions on the bias vector, the existence of linear equilibria may require sources with a Gaussian or a sym-metric density. Moreover, we provide a rate-distortion theoretic formulation of the cheap talk problem and obtain achievable rate and distortion pairs for the Gaussian case. Finally, in a communication theoretic setup, we consider modulation classi-fication and symbol decoding problems jointly and propose optimal strategies under various settings. The aim is to decode a sequence of received signals with an unknown modulation scheme. First, the prior probabilities of the candidate modulation schemes are assumed to be known and a formulation is proposed under the Bayesian framework. Second, we address the case when the prior prob-abilities of the candidate modulation schemes are unknown, and provide a method under the minimax framework. Numerical simulations show that the proposed techniques improve the performance under the employed criteria compared to the conventional techniques in a variety of system configurations.
We consider a privacy-signaling game problem in which a transmitter with privacy concerns and a receiver, which does not pay attention to these privacy concerns, communicate. In this communication scenario, the transmitter observes a pair of correlated random variables which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The transmitter constructs its message based on these random variables with the aim to hide one of them and convey the other one. In contrast, the objective of the receiver is to accurately estimate both of the random variables so as to gather as much information as possible. These conflicting objectives are analyzed in a game theoretic framework where depending on the commitment conditions (of the sender), we consider Nash or Stackelberg equilibria. We show that a payoff dominant (i.e., most desirable for both players) Nash equilibrium is attained by affine policies and we explicitly characterize these policies. In addition, the strategies at the characterized Nash equilibrium is shown to form also a Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that there always exists an informative Stackelberg equilibrium for the multidimensional parameter setup. We also revisit the information bottleneck problem within our Stackelberg framework under the mean squared error distortion criterion where the information bottleneck setup has a further restriction that only one of the parameters is observed at the sender. We fully characterize the Stackelberg equilibria under certain conditions and when these conditions are not met we establish the existence of informative equilibria.
Estimation theoretic secure transmission of a scalar random parameter is investigated in the presence of an eavesdropper. The aim is to minimize the estimation error at the receiver under a secrecy constraint at the eavesdropper; or, alternatively, to maximize the estimation error at the eavesdropper for a given estimation accuracy limit at the receiver. In the considered setting, the encoder at the transmitter is allowed to use a randomized mapping between two one-to-one and continuous functions and the eavesdropper is fully aware of the encoding strategy at the transmitter. For small numbers of observations, both the eavesdropper and the receiver are modeled to employ linear minimum mean-squared error (LMMSE) estimators, and for large numbers of observations, the expectation of the conditional Cramér-Rao bound (ECRB) metric is employed for both the receiver and the eavesdropper. Optimization problems are formulated and various theoretical results are provided in order to obtain the optimal solutions and to analyze the effects of encoder randomization. In addition, numerical examples are presented to corroborate the theoretical results. It is observed that stochastic encoding can bring significant performance gains for estimation theoretic secrecy problems.
We introduce a privacy-signaling game problem in which a transmitter with privacy concerns observes a pair of correlated random vectors which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The transmitter aims to hide one of these random vectors and convey the other one whereas the objective of the receiver is to accurately estimate both of the random vectors. We analyze these conflicting objectives in a game theoretic framework where depending on the commitment conditions (of the sender), we consider Nash or Stackelberg (Bayesian persuasion) equilibria. We show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium among all admissible policies is attained by a set of explicitly characterized linear policies. We also show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium coincides with a Stackelberg equilibrium. We formulate the information bottleneck problem within our Stackelberg framework under the mean squared error distortion criterion where the information bottleneck setup has a further restriction that only one of the parameters is observed at the sender. We show that this MMSE Gaussian Information Bottleneck Problem admits a linear solution which is explicitly characterized in the paper. We provide explicit conditions on when the optimal solutions, or equilibrium solutions in the Nash setup, are informative or noninformative.
Physical layer security has gained a renewed interest with the advances in modern wireless communication technologies. In estimation theoretic security, secrecy levels are measured via estimation theoretic tools and metrics, such as mean-squared error (MSE), where the objective is to perform accurate estimation of the parameter at the intended receiver while keeping the estimation error at the eavesdropper above a certain level. This framework proves useful both for analyzing the achievable performance under security constraints in parameter estimation problems, and for designing low-complexity, practical methods to enhance security in communication systems. In this dissertation, we investigate optimal deterministic encoding of random scalar and vector parameters in the presence of an eavesdropper, who is unaware of the encoding operation. We also analyze optimal stochastic encoding of a random parameter under secrecy constraints in a Gaussian wiretap channel model, where the eavesdropper is aware of the encoding strategy at the transmitter. In addition, we perform optimal parameter design for secure broadcast of a parameter to multiple receivers with fixed estimators. First, optimal deterministic encoding of a scalar parameter is investigated in the presence of an eavesdropper. The aim is to minimize the expectation of the conditional Cram´er-Rao bound (ECRB) at the intended receiver while keeping the MSE at the eavesdropper above a certain threshold. The eavesdropper is modeled to employ the linear minimum mean-squared error (LMMSE) estimator based on the encoded version of the parameter. First, the optimal encoding function is derived in the absence of secrecy constraints for any given prior distribution on the parameter. Next, an optimization problem is formulated under a secrecy constraint and various solution approaches are proposed. Also, theoretical results on the form of the optimal encoding function are provided. Furthermore, a robust parameter encoding approach is developed. In this case, the objective is to maximize the worst-case Fisher information of the parameter at the intended receiver while keeping the MSE at the eavesdropper above a certain level. The optimal encoding function is derived when there exist no secrecy constraints. Next, to obtain the solution of the problem in the presence of the secrecy constraint, the form of the encoding function that maximizes the MSE at the eavesdropper is explicitly derived for any given level of worst-case Fisher information. Then, based on this result, a low-complexity algorithm is provided to calculate the optimal encoding function for the given secrecy constraint. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the theoretical results for both the ECRB and worst-case Fisher information based designs. Second, optimal deterministic encoding of a vector parameter is investigated in the presence of an eavesdropper. The objective is to minimize the ECRB at the intended receiver while satisfying an individual secrecy constraint on the MSE of estimating each parameter at the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is modeled to employ the LMMSE estimator based on the noisy observation of the encoded parameter without being aware of encoding. First, the problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problem in the space of vector-valued functions. Then, two practical solution strategies are developed based on nonlinear individual encoding and affine joint encoding of parameters. Theoretical results on the solutions of the proposed strategies are provided for various scenarios on channel conditions and parameter distributions. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed solution approaches. Third, estimation theoretic secure transmission of a scalar random parameter is investigated in the presence of an eavesdropper. The aim is to minimize the estimation error at the receiver under a secrecy constraint at the eavesdropper; or, alternatively, to maximize the estimation error at the eavesdropper for a given estimation accuracy limit at the receiver. In the considered setting, the encoder at the transmitter is allowed to use a randomized mapping between two one-to-one and continuous functions and the eavesdropper is fully aware of the encoding strategy at the transmitter. For small numbers of observations, both the eavesdropper and the receiver are modeled to employ LMMSE estimators, and for large numbers of observations, the ECRB metric is employed for both the receiver and the eavesdropper. Optimization problems are formulated and various theoretical results are provided in order to obtain the optimal solutions and to analyze the effects of encoder randomization. In addition, numerical examples are presented to corroborate the theoretical results. It is observed that stochastic encoding can bring significant performance gains for estimation theoretic secrecy problems. Finally, estimation theoretic secure broadcast of a random parameter is investigated. In the considered setting, each receiver device employs a fixed estimator and carries a certain security risk such that its decision can be available to a malicious third party with a certain probability. The encoder at the transmitter is allowed to use a random mapping to minimize the weighted sum of the conditional Bayes risks of the estimators under secrecy and average power constraints. After formulating the optimal parameter design problem, it is shown that the optimization problem can be solved individually for each parameter value and the optimal mapping at the transmitter involves a randomization among at most three different signal levels. Sufficient conditions for improvability and nonimprovability of the deterministic design via stochastic encoding are obtained. Numerical examples are provided to corroborate the theoretical results.
In this paper, optimal deterministic encoding of a vector parameter is investigated in the presence of an eavesdropper. The objective is to minimize the expectation of the conditional Cramér-Rao bound at the intended receiver, while satisfying an individual secrecy constraint on the mean-squared error of estimating each parameter at the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is modeled to employ the linear minimum mean-squared error estimator based on the noisy observation of the encoded parameter without being aware of encoding. First, the problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problem in the space of vector-valued functions. Then, two practical solution strategies are developed based on nonlinear individual encoding and affine joint encoding of parameters. Theoretical results on the solutions of the proposed strategies are provided for various scenarios on channel conditions and parameter distributions. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed solution approaches.