The rapid development of quantum computers threatens traditional cryptographic schemes, prompting the need for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Although the NIST standardization process has accelerated the development of such algorithms, their application in resource-constrained environments such as embedded systems remains a challenge. Automotive systems relying on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus for communication are particularly vulnerable due to their limited computational capabilities, high traffic, and need for real-time response. These constraints raise concerns about the feasibility of implementing PQC in automotive environments, where legacy hardware and bit rate limitations must also be considered.In this paper, we introduce PQ-CAN, a modular framework for simulating the performance and overhead of PQC algorithms in embedded systems. We consider the automotive domain as our case study, testing a variety of PQC schemes under different scenarios. Our simulation enables the adjustment of embedded system computational capabilities and CAN bus bit rate constraints. We also provide insights into the trade-offs involved by analyzing each algorithm’s security level and overhead for key encapsulation and digital signature. By evaluating the performance of these algorithms, we provide insights into their feasibility and identify the strengths and limitations of PQC in securing automotive communications in the post-quantum era.
The rapid development of quantum computers threatens traditional cryptographic schemes, prompting the need for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Although the NIST standardization process has accelerated the development of such algorithms, their application in resource-constrained environments such as embedded systems remains a challenge. Automotive systems relying on the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus for communication are particularly vulnerable due to their limited computational capabilities, high traffic, and need for real-time response. These constraints raise concerns about the feasibility of implementing PQC in automotive environments, where legacy hardware and bit rate limitations must also be considered.In this paper, we introduce PQ-CAN, a modular framework for simulating the performance and overhead of PQC algorithms in embedded systems. We consider the automotive domain as our case study, testing a variety of PQC schemes under different scenarios. Our simulation enables the adjustment of embedded system computational capabilities and CAN bus bit rate constraints. We also provide insights into the trade-offs involved by analyzing each algorithm’s security level and overhead for key encapsulation and digital signature. By evaluating the performance of these algorithms, we provide insights into their feasibility and identify the strengths and limitations of PQC in securing automotive communications in the post-quantum era.
The rapid development of quantum computing has introduced serious concerns for modern cryptography, especially in embedded systems. These devices typically rely on well-established cryptographic techniques like RSA and ECC, which have provided secure communications and authentication for ages. However, with the advancement of quantum algorithms such as Shor's and Grover's, these classical approaches are now at risk. Once large-scale quantum computers become operational, they could easily break public-key encryption and weaken symmetric encryption, putting embedded devices at significant risk, especially those that remain in use for over a decade with limited or no ability to receive updates. That's why adopting post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is becoming urgent, not because quantum computers are already here, but because the systems we build today may still be running a decade from now, when those threats become real. Additionally, “record now, decrypt later” attacks mean that sensitive data being encrypted today could be compromised in the future, even if it seems safe now. To respond to this challenge, several possible PQC algorithms have been developed and standardized. NIST has selected Kyber for key encapsulation and Dilithium and SPHINCS+ for digital signatures, and other algorithms like FALCON and SABER are being evaluated for more specialized use. However, implementing these algorithms in embedded environments is quite tricky due to concrete hardware and software constraints like RAM restrictions, CPU power limits, and certainly vulnerability to other independent attacks. In summary, this work discusses the challenges mentioned above and outlines the migration strategies, including cryptographic inventory, hybrid approaches to adoption, and systems with cryptoagility. The report provides a view of how embedded systems can be made ready to become secure in a post-quantum future, relying on literature, governmental resolutions, and real-world implementations.
The growth of quantum computing reveals a series of significant threats to cryptographic systems known today, such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman, which are extremely important for Internet security, but are threatened by the increase in possible quantum attacks. The area of public and private key cryptography is vast. Therefore, this article addresses post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms and the challenges of implementing them in Internet of Things (IoT) devices, given the difficulty of application due to restricted resources, such as RAM and clock speed . To this end, we will discuss the need for standardization of algorithms considering low-resource IoT devices, prioritizing RAM over ROM, meeting the needs of low-memory devices, which are lighter. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has validated four cryptographic systems that are secure against quantum attacks. We analyze the implications of these systems on the infrastructure of current networks and will compare in detail these algorithms and their respective strengths, weaknesses, and trade-offs. We evaluate the feasibility of post-quantum encryption (PQC) algorithms in resource-constrained IoT devices using the ESP-WROOM-32 microcontroller. Three cryptographic schemes were implemented and compared.
The transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) marks a pivotal shift in ensuring digital security, prompted by the potential of quantum computers to compromise classical systems such as Rivest-Shamir-Adlema and elliptic-curve cryptography. In response, NIST has standardized three foundational PQC algorithms: Module-lattice-based Key-encapsulation Mechanism for key establishment; Module-lattice-based Digital Signature, and Stateless Hash-based Digital Signature algorithms for digital signatures. Meanwhile, FALCON and Hamming Quasi-cyclic (HQC) schemes, both selected as finalists, are expected to join the standards soon. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of these NIST-selected PQC standards, with a dual focus on software implementations and hardware architecture designs. We analyze their mathematical frameworks, distinctive features, and optimization strategies related to performance, security, and resource efficiency. The software review examines algorithmic complexity, memory usage, and programming considerations, while the hardware review discusses FPGA and ASIC implementations, emphasizing modular arithmetic, polynomial operations, and resource efficiency challenges. A comparative analysis highlights the strengths and trade-offs of each algorithm, offering insights into their applicability across various platforms-from resource-constrained internet of things devices to high-performance computing environments. This study provides a foundational understanding of NIST’s selected PQC standards and their practical deployment in securing the post-quantum era.
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a critical area of research aimed at addressing the threat quantum computing poses to traditional cryptographic systems. It focuses on evaluating the efficiency, security, and practical performance of PQC algorithms through experimental analysis. This research supports the development of optimized cryptographic solutions, contributes to standardization efforts, and ensures secure and efficient implementations for a wide range of applications. Despite progress in PQC, gaps still exist in practical performance evaluations, particularly in resource-constrained environments. There is a lack of standardized comparisons, hindering the selection of suitable algorithms for specific use cases like IoT and cloud systems. Furthermore, research on scalability, integration challenges, and the trade-offs between security and efficiency remains insufficient. The methodology involves creating a comprehensive framework to evaluate various PQC algorithms, including lattice-based (e.g., Kyber, Dilithium), code-based (e.g., McEliece), and hash-based (e.g., SPHINCS+). These algorithms will be tested in diverse environments, from resource-constrained devices to high-performance infrastructures such as cloud platforms. Key metrics such as encryption/decryption speed, key sizes, memory usage, and computational efficiency will be measured, focusing on the trade-offs between security, efficiency, and scalability. The results will be benchmarked against standardized metrics to provide a clear understanding of each algorithm's suitability for real-world deployment. The findings indicate that lattice-based algorithms like Kyber offer a strong balance between security and efficiency but require considerable computational resources. Code-based algorithms like McEliece are highly secure but come with large key sizes and slower speeds. Hash-based schemes like SPHINCS+ provide strong security but are computationally expensive, making them less suitable for resource-limited systems. The highlights the importance of optimizing PQC algorithms according to specific application requirements, where the choice of algorithm must balance security, efficiency, and resource constraints, with continuous optimization needed to address evolving real-world demands.
The advent of quantum computers makes asymmetric cryptographic algorithms insecure and vulnerable. A promising solution to ensure the continued security attributes of confidentiality, integrity, and availability is the use of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. The adoption of quantum-safe algorithms takes place at a vastly different pace in different industries. In some industries, adoption processes are slow due to the required adaptation of regulations and standards. At the same time, long-lived products with non-PQC algorithms are more likely to become insecure during their lifetime. Vehicles are a prime example of long-lived products where the adoption of PQC proceeds slowly. When quantum computers are able to break relevant key lengths of asymmetric cryptography and, thus, render current vehicle systems insecure, vehicles that are developed and produced today will most likely remain in use. In this work, we provide a structured and comprehensive overview of the current migration state of PQC algorithms in the automotive area. We address use cases involving asymmetric cryptography in the automotive context that face the challenge of adapting PQC, such as internal vehicle networks, manufacturer-specific communication, and vehicle-to-everything communication. In addition, we review the standards concerning vehicle security and their relevance to PQC. Finally, we identify and discuss open research challenges regarding the adoption of PQC in the automotive domain and further steps towards quantum-safe vehicles.
This research evaluated the practicality of implementing Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms onboard resource-constrained computing devices. While PQC is computationally efficient, key sizes, memory usage, and bandwidth constraints are of concern in an embedded environment. The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol serves as an example of limited communication in an arbitrary embedded environment. It utilizes only eight (8) bytes of data payload per message, requiring the large keys of PQC algorithms to be split into several messages. Improvements upon the CAN protocol exist to increase throughput, although the unmodified version remains in use. This research is likely to be more restricted than future development. Comparison was made between PQC and current standard algorithms to evaluate computational cost. Ultimately, this research determined that PQC algorithms such as CRYSTALS-Kyber [1], CRYSTALS-Dilithium [2], and Falcon [3] are presently viable in low capacity networks.