In classical cryptography, certified deletion is simply impossible. Since classical information can be copied any number of times easily. In quantum cryptography, certified deletion is possible because of theorems of quantum mechanics such as the quantum no-clone theorem, quantum superposition etc. In this paper, we show the PKE-CD (Public Key Encryption with Certified Deletion) scheme constructed in by Bartusek and Khurana in CRYPTO 2023 lack an important security property, which is important in practical applications. Then we show how to enhance this property, and construct a concrete scheme with this property. And we also discuss the relations between PKE-CD and other quantum cryptographic schemes such as quantum seal, quantum bit commitment etc.
In classical cryptography, certified deletion is simply impossible. Since classical information can be copied any number of times easily. In quantum cryptography, certified deletion is possible because of theorems of quantum mechanics such as the quantum no-clone theorem, quantum superposition etc. In this paper, we show the PKE-CD (Public Key Encryption with Certified Deletion) scheme constructed in by Bartusek and Khurana in CRYPTO 2023 lack an important security property, which is important in practical applications. Then we show how to enhance this property, and construct a concrete scheme with this property. And we also discuss the relations between PKE-CD and other quantum cryptographic schemes such as quantum seal, quantum bit commitment etc.
Quantum public-key encryption (PKE), where public-keys and/or ciphertexts can be quantum states, is an important primitive in quantum cryptography. Unlike classical PKE (e.g., RSA or ECC), quantum PKE can leverage quantumsecure cryptographic assumptions or the principles of quantum mechanics for security. It has great potential in providing for secure cryptographic systems under potentially weaker assumptions than is possible classically. In addition, it is of both practical and theoretical interest, opening the door to novel cryptographic systems not possible with classical information alone. While multiple quantum PKE schemes have been proposed, they require a large number of qubits acting coherently, and are not practical on current noisy quantum devices. In this paper, we design a practical quantum PKE scheme, taking into account the constraints of current NISQ devices. Specifically, we design a PKE scheme with quantum-classical public keys and classical ciphertexts, that is noise-resilient and only requires a small number of qubits acting coherently. In addition, our design provides tradeoffs in terms of efficiency and the number of qubits that are required.
Certified deletion allows a client to upload encrypted data to a server as a quantum state, then later request that the server delete their data and detect whether the server complies. If verification passes, then the data on the server will remain hidden even if the decryption key is later leaked. In publicly verifiable certified deletion, the verification key is published so that anyone may check for deletion compliance.
In this work, we give a general compiler to publicly verifiable certified deletion that allows the client to initially upload the *quantum* ciphertext using purely *classical* communication, assuming the post-quantum hardness of LWE in the plain model. Our approach can be applied to a wide variety of primitives, including commitments and public-key, attribute-based, identity-based, and fully-homomorphic encryption.
Moreover, our constructions allow the client to classically manage the encrypted data beyond just verifying its deletion. The classical client may non-destructively audit the ciphertext via a Proof of No Intrusion to check whether it has been leaked to a third party. The classical client may also retrieve the data while simultaneously verifying its deletion from the server. Thus, they do not have to choose between retrieving the data and protecting it against future key leakage.
As our core technical contribution, we give a classical-communication protocol and simulation technique that allows adapting purification-based security arguments for BB84-style states which are prepared through classical interaction. It makes the required purification available in a hybrid experiment, despite the classical transcript uniquely determining the prepared state in a real execution.
Certified deletion allows Alice to outsource data to Bob and, at a later time, obtain a verifiable guarantee that the file has been irreversibly deleted at her request. This functionality, while impossible using classical information alone, can be achieved using quantum information. Existing approaches rely either on one-time pad (OTP) encryption or on computational hardness assumptions that may be vulnerable to future advances in classical or quantum computing. In this work, we introduce and formalize hybrid encryption with certified deletion in the preprocessing model (pHE-CD) and propose two constructions. Each construction composes an information-theoretic key encapsulation mechanism (iKEM) with a data encapsulation mechanism that provides certified deletion (DEM-CD) security, offering different security guarantees depending on the properties of DEM-CD. When DEM-CD is one-time information-theoretically secure, the composition provides information-theoretic security for both encryption and certified deletion. When DEM-CD is computationally secure, the composed construction provides computationally secure (post-quantum) encryption and everlasting certified deletion, where confidentiality is computational until the deletion certificate is successfully verified. After successful verification, confidentiality becomes unconditional. That is, successful verification of the deletion certificate guarantees that the data has been removed information-theoretically from the adversary's view. Both pHE-CD constructions support the encryption of arbitrarily long messages. Construction 2 is key-efficient and uses a DEM-CD built from quantum coding and AES, providing quantum-safe security for encryption. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results and directions for future research.
In the context of classical information, every message is composed of 0s and 1s; these messages can generally be copied at will. However, when quantum phenomena are used to model information, this guarantee no longer exists. This difference gives rise to a range of cryptographic possibilities when one considers encoding certain messages as quantum information. In our case, we analyze a potential benefit of encoding part of an encryption scheme’s ciphertext as quantum information. We call this type of ciphertext a quantum ciphertext. In particular, quantum ciphertexts are useful when one wants to be able to prove the deletion of the plaintext underlying a ciphertext. Since classical ciphertexts can be copied, clearly such feat is impossible using classical information alone. However, we show that quantum encodings allow such certified deletion. More precisely, we show that it is possible to encrypt classical data into a quantum ciphertext such that the recipient of the ciphertext can produce a classical string which proves to the originator that the recipient has relinquished any chance of recovering the plaintext, should the decryption key be revealed. Our scheme is feasible with current quantum technology: the honest parties only require quantum devices for single-qubit preparation and measurements, and the scheme is robust against noise in these devices. Furthermore, we provide a proof of security which requires only a finite amount of communication, and which therefore avoids the common technique of relying on the analysis of an asymptotic case.
Abstract Asymmetric encryption has some important applications in the field of communication. In classical computers, most public key encryption schemes are designed based on computational assumption. In other words, they can ensure computational security. When the computing power is large enough, it will pose a threat to these encryption schemes. We propose a quantum public key encryption scheme which based on properties of quantum physics. Our scheme realizes encryption and decryption with few resources and does not rely on any computational assumption. The key in our scheme consists of classical bits and qubits. Where the private key are classical bit and public key are qubits. The public key are generated through private key. We analyze the performance and security of the scheme. Our scheme ensures the information-theoretic secure and can be implemented easily.
It is an important question to find constructions of quantum cryptographic protocols which rely on weaker computational assumptions than classical protocols. Recently, it has been shown that oblivious transfer and multi-party computation can be constructed from one-way functions, whereas this is impossible in the classical setting in a black-box way. In this work, we study the question of building quantum public-key encryption schemes from one-way functions and even weaker assumptions. Firstly, we revisit the definition of IND-CPA security to this setting. Then, we propose three schemes for quantum public-key encryption from one-way functions, pseudorandom function-like states with proof of deletion and pseudorandom function-like states, respectively.