Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2502.15615 · Physical Review A

Sufficiency of the counterfactual account of Lüders' rule to rule out ontological models of quantum mechanics

Alisson Tezzin, Bárbara Amaral, Jonte R. Hance

Published Nov 10, 2025• 7 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Ontological models, as used in the generalized contextuality literature, play a central role in current research on quantum foundations, providing a framework for defining classicality, constructing classical analogs of key quantum phenomena, and examining the ontology of quantum states. In this work, we show that a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule—which we argue is naturally implied by the mathematical structure of the rule itself—renders such models inherently incompatible with the quantum formalism. This incompatibility arises because the counterfactual update requires ontological models to update their states according to conditional probability, which in turn renders predictions of sequential measurements order-independent. This implies that ontological models, even contextual ones, must either act differently than what we would expect given (this, typically implicitly assumed account of) quantum state update rule, or cannot model quantum behavior.

DOI
10.1103/65zd-1lys

Related papers

Incompatibility of deterministic underlying states with a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule

A Tezzin, B Amaral, Jonte R. Hance

In this work, we show that a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule—which we argue is naturally implied by the mathematical structure of the rule itself—rules out underlying-state models of quantum mechanics (a type of hidden-variable model, typically used in the contextuality and nonlocality literature, where quantum states are treated as probability measures over “better-defined states”). This incompatibility arises because the counterfactual update requires ontological models to update their states according to conditional probability, which in turn establishes an equivalence between compatibility and the existence of such models.

•Nov 1, 2025•0 citations

Incompatibility of deterministic underlying states with a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule

Alisson Tezzin, Bárbara Amaral, Jonte R. Hance

In this work, we show that a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule—which we argue is naturally implied by the mathematical structure of the rule itself—rules out underlying-state models of quantum mechanics (a type of hidden-variable model, typically used in the contextuality and nonlocality literature, where quantum states are treated as probability measures over “better-defined states”). This incompatibility arises because the counterfactual update requires ontological models to update their states according to conditional probability, which in turn establishes an equivalence between compatibility and the existence of such models.

arXiv:2502.00546•Physical Review A•Nov 10, 2025•6 citations

Understanding sequential measurements in psi-epistemic ontological models

Joshua B. Ruebeck

Since the famous debates of Einstein & Bohr, physicists have argued about the nature of the quantum state. Is it best thought of as describing the-way-things-are out there in the world, or merely as a description of our knowledge of such things? In more recent years, this has been termed the ψ-epistemic/ψ-ontic debate, and that distinction has been given a mathematical definition within the ontological models formalism. This formalism is a framework for describing a large class of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we show that consideration of sequential measurements, and the fact that the quantum state changes during measurements, has been a neglected topic in this area as it places nontrivial restrictions on the structure of ψ-epistemic ontological models. \n \nWe do this by finding a general restriction on the structure of ψ-epistemic models, although not one that is strong enough to rule them out categorically. We then apply this restriction to all of the known examples of ψ-epistemic ontological models and show that they can’t represent sequential measurements. We also present a new version of the ontological models formalism, based on hidden Markov models, which we develop briefly and describe how it may be useful for either proving a no-go theorem (i.e. ‘ψ-epistemic models can’t exist’) or for learning more about the structure of ψ-epistemic models and how to construct them.

•Aug 6, 2019•0 citations

Causation does not explain contextuality

Sally Shrapnel, Fabio Costa

Realist interpretations of quantum mechanics presuppose the existence of elements of reality that are independent of the actions used to reveal them. Such a view is challenged by several no-go theorems that show quantum correlations cannot be explained by non-contextual ontological models, where physical properties are assumed to exist prior to and independently of the act of measurement. However, all such contextuality proofs assume a traditional notion of causal structure, where causal influence flows from past to future according to ordinary dynamical laws. This leaves open the question of whether the apparent contextuality of quantum mechanics is simply the signature of some exotic causal structure, where the future might affect the past or distant systems might get correlated due to non-local constraints. Here we show that quantum predictions require a deeper form of contextuality: even allowing for arbitrary causal structure, no model can explain quantum correlations from non-contextual ontological properties of the world, be they initial states, dynamical laws, or global constraints.

arXiv:1708.00137•Quantum•May 18, 2018•35 citations

Contextuality and Ontological Models: A Tale of Desire and Disappointment

Piers Lillystone

Since being defined by Kochen and Specker, and separately by Bell, contextuality has been proposed as one of the key phenomena that distinguishing quantum theory from classical theories. However, with the rise of quantum information contextuality's position as the leading definition of the quantum/classical boundary has been called into question. This is due to the fact that a contextual explanation is required by subtheories that offer no exponential quantum computational advantage over classical computation. In this thesis, submitted in requirement for a PhD in physics with quantum information, we shall explore this unwanted contextuality, and show that generalized contextuality is more prevalent than was previously thought. \n \nFirst we will show that the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which was previously thought of as a non-contextual subtheory, requires a generalized contextual ontological model, when transformations are included in the operational description. In addition to this we show that the even smaller single-rebit stabilizer subtheory, a strict subtheory of the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, must also admit a generalized contextual ontological model, again when transformations are included in the operational description. We then show that both these subtheories require negatively represented quasi-probability representations, re-establishing the link between contextuality and negativity for transformations. We also investigate the representation of transformations in generic quasi-probability representations, showing that under a reasonable assumption almost-all unitaries must be negatively represented by a finite quasi-probability representation. \n \nSecond we will investigate the efficiently simulable n-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which exhibits all forms of contextuality and thus represents the main obstacle to identifying contextuality as a resource for quantum computation. To this end we present an attempt at constructing a model based on a frame-switching Wigner function. This leads us to constructing a contextual ψ-epistemic ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism. We shall see that this model is outcome deterministic, which is one of the core assumptions in the definition of traditional non-contextuality. This model then will lead us to a result that proves that any ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism requires at least n-1 generators to be encoded in the ontology of the model. As n-1 generators represents almost full knowledge about the stabilizer state, we therefore posit that ψ-onicity, a more controversial notion of non-classicality, is actually the resource for quantum computation.

•Sep 23, 2019•0 citations

Conspiracy in ontological models: λ sufficiency and measurement contextuality

Yiruo Lin

The conspiracy of ontic states responding to measurements contextually to comply with noncontextual quantum mechanical probabilities is analyzed for general ontological models. A general physical picture of ontological space structure and how ontic states are disturbed by measurement contexts is presented. A common assumption in ontological models called $\ensuremath{\lambda}$ sufficiency is analyzed and argued to be inconsistent with measurement contextuality for ontological models with certain symmetry in ontic space with respect to quantum states and measurements.

arXiv:2010.10688•Physical Review A•Feb 15, 2021•1 citation
Ontological models, as used in the generalized contextuality literature, play a central role in current research on quantum foundations, providing a framework for defining classicality, constructing classical analogs of key quantum phenomena, and examining the ontology of quantum states. In this work, we show that a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule—which we argue is naturally implied by the mathematical structure of the rule itself—renders such models inherently incompatible with the quantum formalism. This incompatibility arises because the counterfactual update requires ontological models to update their states according to conditional probability, which in turn renders predictions of sequential measurements order-independent. This implies that ontological models, even contextual ones, must either act differently than what we would expect given (this, typically implicitly assumed account of) quantum state update rule, or cannot model quantum behavior.
In this work, we show that a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule—which we argue is naturally implied by the mathematical structure of the rule itself—rules out underlying-state models of quantum mechanics (a type of hidden-variable model, typically used in the contextuality and nonlocality literature, where quantum states are treated as probability measures over “better-defined states”). This incompatibility arises because the counterfactual update requires ontological models to update their states according to conditional probability, which in turn establishes an equivalence between compatibility and the existence of such models.
In this work, we show that a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule—which we argue is naturally implied by the mathematical structure of the rule itself—rules out underlying-state models of quantum mechanics (a type of hidden-variable model, typically used in the contextuality and nonlocality literature, where quantum states are treated as probability measures over “better-defined states”). This incompatibility arises because the counterfactual update requires ontological models to update their states according to conditional probability, which in turn establishes an equivalence between compatibility and the existence of such models.
Since the famous debates of Einstein & Bohr, physicists have argued about the nature of the quantum state. Is it best thought of as describing the-way-things-are out there in the world, or merely as a description of our knowledge of such things? In more recent years, this has been termed the ψ-epistemic/ψ-ontic debate, and that distinction has been given a mathematical definition within the ontological models formalism. This formalism is a framework for describing a large class of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we show that consideration of sequential measurements, and the fact that the quantum state changes during measurements, has been a neglected topic in this area as it places nontrivial restrictions on the structure of ψ-epistemic ontological models. \n \nWe do this by finding a general restriction on the structure of ψ-epistemic models, although not one that is strong enough to rule them out categorically. We then apply this restriction to all of the known examples of ψ-epistemic ontological models and show that they can’t represent sequential measurements. We also present a new version of the ontological models formalism, based on hidden Markov models, which we develop briefly and describe how it may be useful for either proving a no-go theorem (i.e. ‘ψ-epistemic models can’t exist’) or for learning more about the structure of ψ-epistemic models and how to construct them.
Realist interpretations of quantum mechanics presuppose the existence of elements of reality that are independent of the actions used to reveal them. Such a view is challenged by several no-go theorems that show quantum correlations cannot be explained by non-contextual ontological models, where physical properties are assumed to exist prior to and independently of the act of measurement. However, all such contextuality proofs assume a traditional notion of causal structure, where causal influence flows from past to future according to ordinary dynamical laws. This leaves open the question of whether the apparent contextuality of quantum mechanics is simply the signature of some exotic causal structure, where the future might affect the past or distant systems might get correlated due to non-local constraints. Here we show that quantum predictions require a deeper form of contextuality: even allowing for arbitrary causal structure, no model can explain quantum correlations from non-contextual ontological properties of the world, be they initial states, dynamical laws, or global constraints.
Since being defined by Kochen and Specker, and separately by Bell, contextuality has been proposed as one of the key phenomena that distinguishing quantum theory from classical theories. However, with the rise of quantum information contextuality's position as the leading definition of the quantum/classical boundary has been called into question. This is due to the fact that a contextual explanation is required by subtheories that offer no exponential quantum computational advantage over classical computation. In this thesis, submitted in requirement for a PhD in physics with quantum information, we shall explore this unwanted contextuality, and show that generalized contextuality is more prevalent than was previously thought. \n \nFirst we will show that the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which was previously thought of as a non-contextual subtheory, requires a generalized contextual ontological model, when transformations are included in the operational description. In addition to this we show that the even smaller single-rebit stabilizer subtheory, a strict subtheory of the single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, must also admit a generalized contextual ontological model, again when transformations are included in the operational description. We then show that both these subtheories require negatively represented quasi-probability representations, re-establishing the link between contextuality and negativity for transformations. We also investigate the representation of transformations in generic quasi-probability representations, showing that under a reasonable assumption almost-all unitaries must be negatively represented by a finite quasi-probability representation. \n \nSecond we will investigate the efficiently simulable n-qubit stabilizer subtheory, which exhibits all forms of contextuality and thus represents the main obstacle to identifying contextuality as a resource for quantum computation. To this end we present an attempt at constructing a model based on a frame-switching Wigner function. This leads us to constructing a contextual ψ-epistemic ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism. We shall see that this model is outcome deterministic, which is one of the core assumptions in the definition of traditional non-contextuality. This model then will lead us to a result that proves that any ontological model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism requires at least n-1 generators to be encoded in the ontology of the model. As n-1 generators represents almost full knowledge about the stabilizer state, we therefore posit that ψ-onicity, a more controversial notion of non-classicality, is actually the resource for quantum computation.
The conspiracy of ontic states responding to measurements contextually to comply with noncontextual quantum mechanical probabilities is analyzed for general ontological models. A general physical picture of ontological space structure and how ontic states are disturbed by measurement contexts is presented. A common assumption in ontological models called $\ensuremath{\lambda}$ sufficiency is analyzed and argued to be inconsistent with measurement contextuality for ontological models with certain symmetry in ontic space with respect to quantum states and measurements.