The advent of quantum computing has profound implications for current technologies, offering advancements in optimization while posing significant threats to cryptographic algorithms. Public-key cryptosystems relying on prime factorization or discrete logarithms are particularly vulnerable, whereas block ciphers (BCs) remain secure through increased key lengths. In this study, we introduce a novel quantum implementation of SLIM, a lightweight block cipher optimized for 32-bit plaintext and an 80-bit key, based on a Feistel structure. This implementation distinguishes itself from other BC quantum implementations in its class (64-128-bit) by utilizing a minimal number of qubits while maintaining robust cryptographic strength and efficiency. By employing an innovative design that minimizes qubit usage, this work highlights SLIM's potential as a resource-efficient and secure candidate for quantum-resistant encryption protocols.
The advent of quantum computing has profound implications for current technologies, offering advancements in optimization while posing significant threats to cryptographic algorithms. Public-key cryptosystems relying on prime factorization or discrete logarithms are particularly vulnerable, whereas block ciphers (BCs) remain secure through increased key lengths. In this study, we introduce a novel quantum implementation of SLIM, a lightweight block cipher optimized for 32-bit plaintext and an 80-bit key, based on a Feistel structure. This implementation distinguishes itself from other BC quantum implementations in its class (64-128-bit) by utilizing a minimal number of qubits while maintaining robust cryptographic strength and efficiency. By employing an innovative design that minimizes qubit usage, this work highlights SLIM's potential as a resource-efficient and secure candidate for quantum-resistant encryption protocols.
The emergence of quantum computing demands rigorous reassessment of classical cryptographic primitives, particularly lightweight block ciphers (LBCs). This work addresses this critical need by presenting the first comprehensive quantum implementation and security analysis of the Feistel-based LBCs SLIM and MIBS against quantum cryptanalysis. Leveraging the inherent reversibility of the ciphers, we develop novel ancilla-free quantum circuits optimizing qubit utilization and depth. For SLIM-80, our design achieves 30,404 quantum cost with 112 qubits and depth of 4,066. For MIBS-64 and MIBS-80, we implement circuits with 23,371 and 24,363 quantum costs requiring 128 and 144 qubits, respectively, and a uniform depth of 4,768. We then quantify vulnerability to Grover’s key-search under the NIST PQC security constraint MAXDEPTH. By constructing Grover oracles under inner parallelization with multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs to suppress false positives, we demonstrate total attack costs of 2^111 for SLIM-80 and MIBS-80, and 2^94 for MIBS-64. These costs fall below NIST’s Level-1 security threshold 2^170, confirming both ciphers’ susceptibility to quantum threats despite their lightweight efficiency. Our methodology establishes a quantum implementation framework for Feistel ciphers, revealing critical trade-offs among qubit efficiency, depth, and quantum resilience.
Abstract We present a novel quantum implementation of SLIM, a lightweight 32/80-bit Feistel cipher. By inverting its Key addition-Substitution-Permutation (KSP) layers without ancillary qubits, we construct the full quantum circuit using 112 qubits with quantum cost 30,404 and depth 4,066. To assess quantum resilience, we implement Grover’s algorithm with three plaintext-ciphertext pairs (r = 3; 337 qubits), yielding an attack cost of 2 111 under NIST’s MAXDEPTH constraints—below the Level-1 threshold 2 170 . While SLIM falls short of NIST’s security threshold for near-term quantum attacks, among other lightweight BCs, its efficient architecture retains practical advantages for constrained applications.
With the rapid advancement of quantum computing, the security of traditional cryptographic systems is facing significant challenges. As a fundamental component of symmetric cryptography, block ciphers have attracted increasing attention regarding their quantum security in recent years.
In this paper, we propose new quantum attacks on two Feistel-type constructions, i.e., New Structure IV and the lightweight block cipher LBlock, under the quantum chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) model. First, we construct an 8-round quantum distinguisher for New Structure IV and perform an r(r>12)-round quantum key-recovery attack. Compared with Li et al.'s qCPA-based result presented at INSCRYPT 2024, our attack reduces the time complexity by a factor of 2n/2, where n denotes the subkey length. Second, we design a 9-round quantum distinguisher for LBlock and extend it to an r(r>15)-round quantum key-recovery attack. The proposed quantum distinguisher covers one more round than Liu et al.'s automated-search distinguisher at ASIACRYPT 2025, which results in a 216 reduction in the time complexity of our r-round quantum key-recovery attack on LBlock. Furthermore, by analyzing the structure of the round function and the key scheduling of LBlock, we reduce the subkey guess space for the 15-round attack from 76 bits to 52 bits, lowering the time complexity from O(238) to O(226) by a factor of 212.
Abstract The advent of quantum computing necessitates a rigorous reassessment of classical cryptographic primitives, particularly lightweight block ciphers (LBCs) deployed in resource-constrained environments. This work presents a comprehensive quantum implementation and security analysis of the Feistel-based LBC MIBS against quantum cryptanalysis. Using the inherent reversibility of its structure, we develop a novel ancilla-free quantum circuit that optimizes qubit count and depth. For MIBS-64 and MIBS-80, our implementation achieves quantum costs of 23,371 and 24,363, requiring 128 and 144 qubits, respectively, with a depth of 4,768. We subsequently quantify the cipher’s vulnerability to Grover’s key-search algorithm under the NIST PQC security constraint M A X D E P T H MAXDEPTH . By constructing Grover oracles using inner parallelization with multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs to suppress false positives, we demonstrate total quantum attack costs of approximately 2 94 for MIBS-64 and 2 111 for MIBS-80. These values fall below NIST’s Level-1 security threshold (2 170 ), confirming the susceptibility of both MIBS variants to quantum key-recovery attacks despite their classical lightweight efficiency.
The development of post-quantum cryptography requires cryptographic primitives that remain secure against quantum adversaries. Quantum key-recovery attacks constitute a fundamental class of quantum cryptanalytic techniques, and the resistance of a cryptosystem to such attacks serves as an important indicator of its overall security. Since the Feistel structure is a core component in the design of many block ciphers, efficient quantum key-recovery attacks on Feistel ciphers provide valuable insights into evaluating and strengthening their security. In this paper, we propose an efficient generic quantum key-recovery attack on Feistel ciphers. Our attack integrates universal hash families with Simon's and Grover's algorithms to perform key-recovery. We rigorously analyze the correctness of the proposed attack and derive its time and quantum resource complexities. A comprehensive comparison with existing keyrecovery attacks shows that the proposed approach improves both quantum resource usage and dominant query complexity, and therefore yields a more efficient quantum key-recovery attack. Our work enhances the understanding of Feistel ciphers under quantum threats and informs the design of robust cryptosystems for the post-quantum era.
The security of classical symmetric-key primitives is fundamentally challenged by the emergence of quantum computing, necessitating a rigorous evaluation of their post-quantum resilience. This paper presents a comprehensive quantum circuit realization and Grover cryptanalysis of GFSPX, a lightweight block cipher featuring a 64-bit data block and a 128-bit secret key. GFSPX utilizes a unique hybrid architecture that integrates a 4-branch generalized Feistel structure with both Addition-Rotation-XOR (ARX) and Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) components. Our quantum implementation optimizes resource distribution by exploiting the inherent reversibility of the Feistel network and employing a compact ripple-carry adder for the ARX layers. The proposed architecture achieves a qubit-optimized footprint of 209 qubits with a baseline quantum cost of 32,498 and a circuit depth of 7,617. To evaluate the cipher's resistance against quantum adversaries, we construct a parallelized Grover oracle using three plaintext-ciphertext pairs to eliminate spurious matches. Our analysis reveals that the total quantum cost of a key-recovery attack on GFSPX is 1.12×2159 quantum gates. Although this cost falls below the NIST Level 1 security threshold of 2170, the hybrid ARX-SPN design demonstrates a higher quantum attack resistance among other lightweight designs. These findings provide critical insights into the balance between classical efficiency and quantum resilience in next-generation cryptographic designs for resource-constrained environments.