Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2412.08530 · Quantum Science and Technology

Ensemble-based quantum token protocol benchmarked on IBM quantum processors

Lucas Tsunaki, Bernd Bauerhenne, Malwin Xibraku, Martín E. Garcia, Kilian Singer, Boris Naydenov

Published Sep 5, 2025• 9 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract Quantum tokens envision to store unclonable quantum states in a physical device, with the goal of being used for personal authentication protocols, as required by banks. Still, the experimental realization of such devices faces many technical challenges, which can be partially mitigated using ensembles instead of single qubits. In this work, we thus propose an ensemble-based quantum token protocol, describing it through a simple yet general model based on a quantum mechanical observable. The protocol is benchmarked on five IBM quantum processors and a general hacker attack scenario is analyzed, in which the attacker attempts to read the bank token and forge a fake one, based on the information gained from this measurement. We experimentally demonstrate that the probability that the bank erroneously accepts a forged coin composed of multiple tokens can reach values below 10−22, while the probability that the bank accepts its own coin is above 0.999. The overall security of the protocol is therefore demonstrated within a hardware-agnostic framework, confirming the practical viability of the protocol in arbitrary quantum systems and thus paving the way for future applications with different ensembles of qubits, such as color center defects in solids.

DOI
10.1088/2058-9565/ae03e6

Related papers

Quantum Vault: Symmetric No-Cloning Protection for Token Issuer and User (Benchmarked on IBM Quantum)

Lucas Tsunaki, Boris Naydenov

Abstract Quantum tokens are underlying primitives for quantum money and network proposals, which leverage the no-cloning theorem to realize unforgeable authentication. A relevant but overlooked type of attack to such architectures is one in which a hacker steals the classical side information about the token states from the issuing agent (e.g., a bank), enabling the forgery of fake tokens without violating the no-cloning theorem. Our proposal addresses this threat by removing the classical side information about the token states, where instead a copy of the token is stored at the bank, i.e. a quantum vault. This copy can be accessed by anyone to perform authentication, consuming the token pair in the process. We benchmark the protocol and identify quality parameters within a hardware agnostic framework employing IBM Quantum processors, such that the protocol is applicable to arbitrary quantum platforms. By comparing the efficiency with which genuine tokens are produced and authenticated against a possible estimate-and-forge attack, we quantify the security of the protocol. We achieve probabilities lower than 10-4 for false-negative errors (Type 1) and 10-10 for successful attacks (Type 2) when considering quantum bills composed of 200 tokens, even in the worst performing processor and a conservative uncertainty estimate. The quantum vault not only protects both user and bank symmetrically with the same quantum principles, but provides a step towards public key authentication, since any untrusted party can have access granted by the bank to the tokens' authentication interface without being able to clone them. Besides this bank-mediated form of publicly accessible verifiability, our proposal achieves traceability and revocability, since the bank retains the vault copy of the tokens.

•Oct 16, 2026•0 citations

Security analysis of ensemble-based quantum token protocol under advanced attacks

Bernd Bauerhenne, Lucas Tsunaki, Jan Thieme +2 more

We present and characterize advanced attacks on an ensemble-based quantum token protocol that allows for implementing non-clonable quantum coins. Multiple differently initialized tokens of identically prepared qubit ensembles are combined to a quantum coin that can be issued by a bank. A sophisticated attempt to copy tokens can assume that measurements on sub-ensembles can be carried through and that even individual qubits can be measured. Even though such an advanced attack might be perceived as technically unfeasible, we prove the security of the protocol under these conditions. We performed numerical simulations and verified our results by experiments on the IBM quantum platforms for different types of advanced attacks. Finally, we demonstrate that the security of the quantum coin can be made high by increasing the number of tokens. This paper in conjunction with provided numerical simulation tools verified against experimental data from the IBM quantum platforms allows for securely implementing our ensemble-based quantum token protocol with arbitrary quantum systems.

•Sep 24, 2025•0 citations

Quantum Vault: Symmetric No-Cloning Protection for Token Issuer and User (Benchmarked on IBMQ)

Lucas Tsunaki, Boris Naydenov

Quantum tokens are underlying primitives for quantum money and network proposals, which leverage the no-cloning theorem to realize unforgeable authentication. A relevant but overlooked type of attack to such architectures is one in which a hacker steals the classical side information about the token states from the issuing agent (e.g., a bank), enabling the forgery of fake tokens without violating the no-cloning theorem. Our proposal addresses this threat by removing the classical side information about the token states, where instead a copy of the token is stored at the bank, i.e. a quantum vault. This copy can be accessed by anyone to perform authentication, consuming the token pair in the process. We benchmark the protocol and identify quality parameters within a hardware agnostic framework employing IBMQ processors, such that the protocol is applicable to arbitrary quantum platforms. By comparing the efficiency with which genuine tokens are produced and authenticated against a possible estimate-and-forge attack, we quantify the security of the protocol. We achieve probabilities lower than $10^{-4}$ for false-negative errors (Type 1) and $10^{-10}$ for successful attacks (Type 2) when considering quantum bills composed of 200 tokens, even in the worst performing processor and most conservative uncertainty estimate. The quantum vault not only protects both user and bank symmetrically with the same quantum principles, but provides a step towards public key authentication, since any untrusted party can have access granted by the bank to the tokens' authentication interface without being able to clone them. Besides this bank-mediated form of publicly accessible verifiability, our proposal achieves traceability and revocability, since the bank retains the vault copy of the tokens.

quant-pharXiv:2605.03564•May 6, 2026•0 citations

Security analysis of ensemble-based quantum token protocol under advanced attacks

Bernd Bauerhenne, Lucas Tsunaki, Jan Thieme +2 more

Abstract We present and characterize advanced attacks on an ensemble-based quantum token protocol that allows for implementing non-clonable quantum coins. Multiple differently initialized tokens of identically prepared qubit ensembles are combined to a quantum coin that can be issued by a bank. A sophisticated attempt to copy tokens can assume that measurements on sub-ensembles can be carried through and that even individual qubits can be measured. Even though such an advanced attack might be perceived as technically unfeasible, we prove the security of the protocol under these conditions. We performed numerical simulations and verified our results by experiments on the IBM quantum platforms for different types of advanced attacks. Finally, we demonstrate that the security of the quantum coin can be made high by increasing the number of tokens. This paper in conjunction with provided numerical simulation tools verified against experimental data from the IBM quantum platforms allows for securely implementing our ensemble-based quantum token protocol with arbitrary quantum systems.

arXiv:2412.20243•Quantum Science and Technology•Sep 5, 2025•7 citations

Practical quantum tokens: challenges and perspectives

Nadezhda P. Kukharchyk, Holger Boche, Christian Deppe +21 more

The concept of quantum tokens dates back alongside quantum cryptography to Stephen Wiesner's seminal work in 1983[1]. Already this initial work proposes society-relevant applications such as secure quantum banknotes, which can be exchanged between a bank and a customer. This quantum currency is based on various physical states that can be easily verified but is protected from being copied by the fundamental quantum laws. Four decades later, these ideas have flourished in the field of quantum information, and the concept of quantum banknotes has not only adopted many varying names, such as quantum money, quantum coins, quantum-digital payments, and quantum tokens, but also reached its first experimental demonstrations. In this perspective article, we discuss the current state-of-the-art of quantum tokens in the field of quantum information, as well as their future perspectives. We present a number of physical realizations of quantum tokens with integrated quantum memories and their applicability scenarios in detail. Finally, we discuss how quantum tokens fit into the information security ecosystem and consider their relationship to post-quantum cryptography.

quant-pharXiv:2602.10621•Quantum Science and Technology•Feb 12, 2026•1 citation

Scalable Quantum Device Authentication Using Hardware-Efficient Quantum Physical Unclonable Functions

Franco Cirillo, Christian Esposito

The rapid development of quantum computing has increased the need for reliable methods to authenticate quantum devices and ensure that only genuine systems participate in computations. Existing approaches often rely on quantum memory or are not easily adaptable to different hardware platforms, which limits their practicality as quantum processors continue to grow in size and complexity. We propose a new Quantum Physical Unclonable Function scheme that exploits the intrinsic noise of Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum devices while avoiding the need for quantum memory. The method employs a quantum circuit designed to capture device-specific noise efficiently without adding unnecessary complexity, making it suitable for larger processors and a variety of quantum hardware. The scheme implements a challenge-response protocol and is evaluated on real IBM quantum processors using up to 32 qubits, significantly more than the small systems typically considered in previous studies. We measure instability and uniqueness, showing a clear separation between responses from the same device and those from different devices. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach is scalable, practical, and capable of providing robust authentication for current and future quantum devices.

International Conference on Quantum Communications, Networking, and Computing (QCNC)•Apr 6, 2026•2 citations
Abstract Quantum tokens envision to store unclonable quantum states in a physical device, with the goal of being used for personal authentication protocols, as required by banks. Still, the experimental realization of such devices faces many technical challenges, which can be partially mitigated using ensembles instead of single qubits. In this work, we thus propose an ensemble-based quantum token protocol, describing it through a simple yet general model based on a quantum mechanical observable. The protocol is benchmarked on five IBM quantum processors and a general hacker attack scenario is analyzed, in which the attacker attempts to read the bank token and forge a fake one, based on the information gained from this measurement. We experimentally demonstrate that the probability that the bank erroneously accepts a forged coin composed of multiple tokens can reach values below 10−22, while the probability that the bank accepts its own coin is above 0.999. The overall security of the protocol is therefore demonstrated within a hardware-agnostic framework, confirming the practical viability of the protocol in arbitrary quantum systems and thus paving the way for future applications with different ensembles of qubits, such as color center defects in solids.
Abstract Quantum tokens are underlying primitives for quantum money and network proposals, which leverage the no-cloning theorem to realize unforgeable authentication. A relevant but overlooked type of attack to such architectures is one in which a hacker steals the classical side information about the token states from the issuing agent (e.g., a bank), enabling the forgery of fake tokens without violating the no-cloning theorem. Our proposal addresses this threat by removing the classical side information about the token states, where instead a copy of the token is stored at the bank, i.e. a quantum vault. This copy can be accessed by anyone to perform authentication, consuming the token pair in the process. We benchmark the protocol and identify quality parameters within a hardware agnostic framework employing IBM Quantum processors, such that the protocol is applicable to arbitrary quantum platforms. By comparing the efficiency with which genuine tokens are produced and authenticated against a possible estimate-and-forge attack, we quantify the security of the protocol. We achieve probabilities lower than 10-4 for false-negative errors (Type 1) and 10-10 for successful attacks (Type 2) when considering quantum bills composed of 200 tokens, even in the worst performing processor and a conservative uncertainty estimate. The quantum vault not only protects both user and bank symmetrically with the same quantum principles, but provides a step towards public key authentication, since any untrusted party can have access granted by the bank to the tokens' authentication interface without being able to clone them. Besides this bank-mediated form of publicly accessible verifiability, our proposal achieves traceability and revocability, since the bank retains the vault copy of the tokens.
We present and characterize advanced attacks on an ensemble-based quantum token protocol that allows for implementing non-clonable quantum coins. Multiple differently initialized tokens of identically prepared qubit ensembles are combined to a quantum coin that can be issued by a bank. A sophisticated attempt to copy tokens can assume that measurements on sub-ensembles can be carried through and that even individual qubits can be measured. Even though such an advanced attack might be perceived as technically unfeasible, we prove the security of the protocol under these conditions. We performed numerical simulations and verified our results by experiments on the IBM quantum platforms for different types of advanced attacks. Finally, we demonstrate that the security of the quantum coin can be made high by increasing the number of tokens. This paper in conjunction with provided numerical simulation tools verified against experimental data from the IBM quantum platforms allows for securely implementing our ensemble-based quantum token protocol with arbitrary quantum systems.
Quantum tokens are underlying primitives for quantum money and network proposals, which leverage the no-cloning theorem to realize unforgeable authentication. A relevant but overlooked type of attack to such architectures is one in which a hacker steals the classical side information about the token states from the issuing agent (e.g., a bank), enabling the forgery of fake tokens without violating the no-cloning theorem. Our proposal addresses this threat by removing the classical side information about the token states, where instead a copy of the token is stored at the bank, i.e. a quantum vault. This copy can be accessed by anyone to perform authentication, consuming the token pair in the process. We benchmark the protocol and identify quality parameters within a hardware agnostic framework employing IBMQ processors, such that the protocol is applicable to arbitrary quantum platforms. By comparing the efficiency with which genuine tokens are produced and authenticated against a possible estimate-and-forge attack, we quantify the security of the protocol. We achieve probabilities lower than 10−410^{-4}10−4 for false-negative errors (Type 1) and 10−1010^{-10}10−10 for successful attacks (Type 2) when considering quantum bills composed of 200 tokens, even in the worst performing processor and most conservative uncertainty estimate. The quantum vault not only protects both user and bank symmetrically with the same quantum principles, but provides a step towards public key authentication, since any untrusted party can have access granted by the bank to the tokens' authentication interface without being able to clone them. Besides this bank-mediated form of publicly accessible verifiability, our proposal achieves traceability and revocability, since the bank retains the vault copy of the tokens.
Abstract We present and characterize advanced attacks on an ensemble-based quantum token protocol that allows for implementing non-clonable quantum coins. Multiple differently initialized tokens of identically prepared qubit ensembles are combined to a quantum coin that can be issued by a bank. A sophisticated attempt to copy tokens can assume that measurements on sub-ensembles can be carried through and that even individual qubits can be measured. Even though such an advanced attack might be perceived as technically unfeasible, we prove the security of the protocol under these conditions. We performed numerical simulations and verified our results by experiments on the IBM quantum platforms for different types of advanced attacks. Finally, we demonstrate that the security of the quantum coin can be made high by increasing the number of tokens. This paper in conjunction with provided numerical simulation tools verified against experimental data from the IBM quantum platforms allows for securely implementing our ensemble-based quantum token protocol with arbitrary quantum systems.
The concept of quantum tokens dates back alongside quantum cryptography to Stephen Wiesner's seminal work in 1983[1]. Already this initial work proposes society-relevant applications such as secure quantum banknotes, which can be exchanged between a bank and a customer. This quantum currency is based on various physical states that can be easily verified but is protected from being copied by the fundamental quantum laws. Four decades later, these ideas have flourished in the field of quantum information, and the concept of quantum banknotes has not only adopted many varying names, such as quantum money, quantum coins, quantum-digital payments, and quantum tokens, but also reached its first experimental demonstrations. In this perspective article, we discuss the current state-of-the-art of quantum tokens in the field of quantum information, as well as their future perspectives. We present a number of physical realizations of quantum tokens with integrated quantum memories and their applicability scenarios in detail. Finally, we discuss how quantum tokens fit into the information security ecosystem and consider their relationship to post-quantum cryptography.
The rapid development of quantum computing has increased the need for reliable methods to authenticate quantum devices and ensure that only genuine systems participate in computations. Existing approaches often rely on quantum memory or are not easily adaptable to different hardware platforms, which limits their practicality as quantum processors continue to grow in size and complexity. We propose a new Quantum Physical Unclonable Function scheme that exploits the intrinsic noise of Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum devices while avoiding the need for quantum memory. The method employs a quantum circuit designed to capture device-specific noise efficiently without adding unnecessary complexity, making it suitable for larger processors and a variety of quantum hardware. The scheme implements a challenge-response protocol and is evaluated on real IBM quantum processors using up to 32 qubits, significantly more than the small systems typically considered in previous studies. We measure instability and uniqueness, showing a clear separation between responses from the same device and those from different devices. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach is scalable, practical, and capable of providing robust authentication for current and future quantum devices.