With the increasing demand for secure communication in optical space networks, it is essential to develop physical-layer scalable security solutions. In this context, we present the asymptotic security analysis of a keyless quantum private communication protocol that transmits classical information over quantum states. Different from the previous literature, our protocol sends dummy (decoy) states optimally obtained from the true information to deceive the eavesdropper. We analyze optical on-off keying (OOK) and binary phase shift keying (BPSK) for several detection scenarios. Our protocol significantly improves the protocol without decoy states whenever Bob is at a technological disadvantage with respect to Eve. Our protocol guarantees positive secrecy capacity when the eavesdropper gathers up to 90-99.9% (depending on the detection scenario) of the photon energy that Bob detects, even when Eve is only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics. We apply our results to the design of an optical inter-satellite link (ISL) study case with pointing losses, and introduce a new design methodology whereby the link margin is guaranteed to be secure by our protocol. Hence, our design does not require knowing the eavesdropper’s location and/or channel state: the protocol aborts whenever the channel drops below the secured margin. Our protocol can be implemented with state-of-the-art space-proof technology. Finally, we also show the potential secrecy advantage when using (not yet available) squeezed quantum states technology.
With the increasing demand for secure communication in optical space networks, it is essential to develop physical-layer scalable security solutions. In this context, we present the asymptotic security analysis of a keyless quantum private communication protocol that transmits classical information over quantum states. Different from the previous literature, our protocol sends dummy (decoy) states optimally obtained from the true information to deceive the eavesdropper. We analyze optical on-off keying (OOK) and binary phase shift keying (BPSK) for several detection scenarios. Our protocol significantly improves the protocol without decoy states whenever Bob is at a technological disadvantage with respect to Eve. Our protocol guarantees positive secrecy capacity when the eavesdropper gathers up to 90-99.9% (depending on the detection scenario) of the photon energy that Bob detects, even when Eve is only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics. We apply our results to the design of an optical inter-satellite link (ISL) study case with pointing losses, and introduce a new design methodology whereby the link margin is guaranteed to be secure by our protocol. Hence, our design does not require knowing the eavesdropper’s location and/or channel state: the protocol aborts whenever the channel drops below the secured margin. Our protocol can be implemented with state-of-the-art space-proof technology. Finally, we also show the potential secrecy advantage when using (not yet available) squeezed quantum states technology.
We study information-theoretical security for space links between a satellite and a ground station. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a well-established method for information-theoretical secure communication, giving the eavesdropper unlimited access to the channel and technological resources limited by only the laws of quantum physics. But QKD for space links is extremely challenging, the achieved key rates are extremely low, and daytime operating impossible. However, eavesdropping on a channel in free space without being noticed seems complicated, given the constraints imposed by orbital mechanics. If we also exclude the eavesdropper's presence in a given area around the emitter and receiver, we can guarantee that he has access to only a fraction of the optical signal. In this setting, quantum keyless private (direct) communication based on the wiretap channel model is a valid alternative to provide information-theoretical security. Like for QKD, we assume that the legitimate users are limited by state-of-the-art technology, while the potential eavesdropper is only limited by physical laws: either by specifying her detection strategy (Helstrom detector) or by bounding her knowledge, assuming the most powerful strategy through the Holevo information. Nevertheless, we demonstrate information-theoretical secure communication rates (positive keyless private capacity) over a classical-quantum wiretap channel using on-off keying of coherent states. We present numerical results for a setting equivalent to the recent experiments with the Micius satellite and compare them to the fundamental limit for the secret key rate of QKD. We obtain much higher rates compared with QKD with an exclusion area of less than 13 m for low earth orbit satellites. Moreover, we show that the wiretap channel quantum keyless privacy is much less sensitive to noise and signal dynamics and daytime operation is possible.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most established approach in quantum communication. However, long-distance free-space implementations, particularly satellite links, remain challenging, especially during the day due to daylight background noise. Quantum keyless private communication (QKPC) is a quantum communication protocol that enables information-theoretic security with simpler system requirements, improved robustness against noise, and without the need for secret key distribution. QKPC and QKD are complementary, with QKPC enabling free-space links where QKD is impractical, while QKD provides channel monitoring for applications that require eavesdropping detection. Here, we report a complete implementation of QKPC in a daylight free-space experiment over a 90 m rooftop link, using an experimentally simple setup. Our demonstration includes all stages of the protocol, from encoding and synchronization to message decoding, operates entirely without auxiliary classical synchronization channels, and is implemented offline through post-processing. This work demonstrates the feasibility of practical and scalable quantum communication over high-noise daylight links and highlights the potential of QKPC as a complementary solution to QKD for future ground-based and space-based communication systems.
We assume information is discrete-modulated over coherent states of the single-mode electromagnetic field and transmitted over space quantum channels. In this letter, we provide a comparison of quantum detection with classical detection for communication using on-off keying (OOK) and binary phase shift keying (BPSK) for illustrative system parameters for LEO, MEO and GEO satellites. To do so, we assume an attenuation-only (pure-loss) channel and compute the Shannon capacities for the following detection methods: classical (shot-noise limited) single-photon and coherent detectors as well as optimal quantum hypothesis-testing (Helstrom) detection. As in classical system engineering design, we also obtain theoretical references for comparison, namely, Shannon capacities and Holevo bounds for the ideal Gaussian optical channel. Our results show the ranges of transmitted power and orbital heights for which either classical or quantum detection is optimal, thus providing useful insights into design guidelines and operations of future space communication systems. We also obtain the remarkable result that the BPSK Holevo bound achieves the ultimate quantum capacity of the considered channel.
The security of prepare-and-measure satellite-based quantum key distribution (QKD), under restricted eavesdropping scenarios, is addressed.We particularly consider cases where the eavesdropper, Eve, has limited access to the transmitted signal by Alice and/or Bob's receiver station.This restriction is modeled by lossy channels between relevant parties, where the transmissivity of such channels can, in principle, be bounded by monitoring techniques.An artifact of such lossy channels is the possibility of having bypass channels, those that are not accessible to Eve but that may not necessarily be characterized by the users either.This creates interesting unexplored scenarios for analyzing QKD security.In this paper, we obtain generic bounds on the key rate in the presence of bypass channels and apply them to continuousvariable QKD protocols with Gaussian encoding with direct and reverse reconciliation.We find regimes of operation in which the above restrictions on Eve can considerably improve system performance.We also develop customized bounds for several protocols in the BB84 family and show that, in certain regimes, even the simple protocol of BB84 with weak coherent pulses is able to offer positive key rates at high channel losses, which would otherwise be impossible under an unrestricted Eve.In this case, the limitation on Eve would allow Alice to send signals with larger intensities than the optimal value under an ideal Eve, which effectively reduces the effective channel loss.In all these cases, the part of the transmitted signal that does not reach Eve can play a nontrivial role in specifying the achievable key rate.Our work opens up new security frameworks for spaceborne quantum communications systems.
In the age of information and globalisation, secure communication as well as the protection of sensitive data against unauthorised access are of utmost importance. Quantum cryptography currently provides the only way to exchange a cryptographic key between two parties in an unconditionally secure fashion. Owing to losses and noise of today's optical fibre and detector technology, at present quantum cryptography is limited to distances below a few 100 km. In principle, larger distances could be subdivided into shorter segments, but the required quantum repeaters are still beyond current technology. An alternative approach for bridging larger distances is a satellite-based system, that would enable secret key exchange between two arbitrary points on the globe using free-space optical communication. The aim of the presented experiment was to investigate the feasibility of satellite-based global quantum key distribution. In this context, a free-space quantum key distribution experiment over a real distance of 144 km was performed. The transmitter and the receiver were situated in 2500 m altitude on the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife, respectively. The small and compact transmitter unit generated attenuated laser pulses, that were sent to the receiver via a 15-cm optical telescope. The receiver unit for polarisation analysis and detection of the sent pulses was integrated into an existing mirror telescope designed for classical optical satellite communications. To ensure the required stability and efficiency of the optical link in the presence of atmospheric turbulence, the two telescopes were equipped with a bi-directional automatic tracking system. Still, due to stray light and high optical attenuation, secure key exchange would not be possible using attenuated pulses in connection with the standard BB84 protocol. The photon number statistics of attenuated pulses follows a Poissonian distribution. Hence, by removing a photon from all pulses containing two or more photons, an eavesdropper could measure its polarisation without disturbing the polarisation state of the remaining pulse. In this way, he can gain information about the key without introducing detectable errors. To protect against such attacks, the presented experiment employed the recently developed method of using additional "decoy" states, i.e., the the intensity of the pulses created by the transmitter were varied in a random manner. By analysing the detection probabilities of the different pulses individually, a photon-number-splitting attack can be detected. Thanks to the decoy-state analysis, the secrecy of the resulting quantum key could be ensured despite the Poissonian nature of the emitted pulses. For a channel attenuation as high as 35 dB, a secret key rate of up to 250 bit/s was achieved. Our outdoor experiment was carried out under real atmospheric conditions and with a channel attenuation comparable to an optical link from ground to a satellite in low earth orbit. Hence, it definitely shows the feasibility of satellite-based quantum key distribution using a technologically comparatively simple system.
Satellite based quantum key distribution (QKD) aims to establish secure key exchange over long distances despite significant technological challenges. To alleviate some of these challenges, Ghalaii et al. [PRX Quantum 4, 040320 (2023)] proposed that any airborne eavesdropper up to a certain size can be detected by classical monitoring techniques, limiting the transmission efficiencies of any undetected Eve. This creates a new QKD scenario in which some of the transmitted signal from Alice to Bob bypasses Eve entirely. In this manuscript, we develop a general framework for computing key rates in this "bypass" scenario for discrete variable protocols. We first numerically support a conjecture that the performance of BB84 with single photons does not improve under bypass constraints, and go on to find new regimes that do. Specifically, we find improvements when the receiver's detectors have an efficiency mismatch and when BB84 is implemented using weak coherent pulses under certain squashing assumptions. Technically, our framework is realized by including marginal constraints on the source to account for bypass effects, combined with existing numerical approaches for minimizing the key rate and squashing and dimension reduction techniques to handle photonic states of unbounded dimension.