Federated learning (FL) has become one of the standard approaches for deploying machine learning models on edge devices, where private training data are distributed across clients, and a shared model is learned by aggregating locally computed updates from each client. While this paradigm enhances communication efficiency by only requiring updates at the end of each training epoch, the transmitted model updates remain vulnerable to malicious tampering, posing risks to the integrity of the global model. Although current digital signature algorithms can protect these communicated model updates, they fail to ensure quantum security in the era of large-scale quantum computing. Fortunately, various post-quantum cryptography algorithms have been developed to address this vulnerability, especially the three NIST-standardized algorithms - Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+.In this work, we empirically investigate the impact of these three NIST-standardized PQC algorithms for digital signatures within the FL procedure, covering a wide range of models, tasks, and FL settings. Our results indicate that Dilithium stands out as the most efficient PQC algorithm for digital signature in federated learning. Additionally, we offer an in-depth discussion of the implications of our findings and potential directions for future research.
Federated learning (FL) has become one of the standard approaches for deploying machine learning models on edge devices, where private training data are distributed across clients, and a shared model is learned by aggregating locally computed updates from each client. While this paradigm enhances communication efficiency by only requiring updates at the end of each training epoch, the transmitted model updates remain vulnerable to malicious tampering, posing risks to the integrity of the global model. Although current digital signature algorithms can protect these communicated model updates, they fail to ensure quantum security in the era of large-scale quantum computing. Fortunately, various post-quantum cryptography algorithms have been developed to address this vulnerability, especially the three NIST-standardized algorithms - Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+.In this work, we empirically investigate the impact of these three NIST-standardized PQC algorithms for digital signatures within the FL procedure, covering a wide range of models, tasks, and FL settings. Our results indicate that Dilithium stands out as the most efficient PQC algorithm for digital signature in federated learning. Additionally, we offer an in-depth discussion of the implications of our findings and potential directions for future research.
Industrial innovations, driven by technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud computing, and Artificial Intelligence (AI), have revolutionized various operational domains, including supply chain management, equipment monitoring, predictive maintenance, and quality control. Deep Learning (DL) has become instrumental in addressing complex, data-driven challenges within industrial settings, relying on large datasets collected from heterogeneous sources. However, centralizing these datasets on cloud platforms poses significant privacy and security risks. Federated Learning (FL) offers a promising solution by enabling distributed model training across multiple nodes while preventing the exchange of raw data. Despite its advantages, FL introduces new vulnerabilities, especially related to the security of communication channels between participating entities. Traditional cryptographic mechanisms, such as digital signatures and model encryption, can mitigate these risks, but the emergence of quantum computing threatens the robustness of conventional solutions. This work explores the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into FL to enhance security without incurring significant performance degradation. A modular FL architecture with three security levels is proposed: (i) an unprotected baseline; (ii) authenticated communication using ML-DSA digital signatures; and (iii) full protection combining ML-DSA and ML-KEM-512-based key encapsulation. Implemented within the Flower framework, the architecture is evaluated under simulated MitM attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that PQC-enhanced schemes effectively mitigate quantum-resistant threats while maintaining acceptable computational overhead, thereby ensuring model integrity and data confidentiality.
Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative machine learning without centralizing raw data. However, the impending threat of cryptographically-relevant quantum computers exposes FL's reliance on classical public-key cryptography (e.g., RSA, ECC) to Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later (HNDL) attacks. We present PQ-FL, the first open federated learning control plane secured end-to-end using the finalized NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards. Our architecture integrates ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) for transport-layer identity authentication (mTLS) and ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203) for application-layer model payload encryption. To overcome the lack of comprehensive PQC support in standard Python libraries (BoringSSL), we introduce a novel OQS-stunnel sidecar pattern that proxies edge client traffic. We evaluate the system on a CUDA-accelerated edge cluster training a convolutional neural network. Empirical results confirm successful multi-round aggregation using FedAvg, Krum, and Trimmed-Mean strategies alongside differential privacy, achieving seamless PQC key encapsulation (1568-byte ciphertexts) and verifiable asynchronous global model streaming.
Collaborative threat intelligence via federated learning (FL) faces critical risks from quantum computing, which can compromise classical encryption methods. This study proposes a quantum-secure FL framework using post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to protect cross-organizational data sharing. We expose vulnerabilities in traditional FL through simulated quantum attacks on RSA encrypted gradients and introduce a hybrid architecture integrating NIST-standardized algorithms CRYSTALS-Kyber for key exchange and CRYSTALS-Dilithium for authentication. Testing on APT attack datasets demonstrated 97.6% threat detection accuracy with minimal latency overhead (18.7%), validating real-world viability. A healthcare consortium case study confirmed secure ransomware indicator sharing without breaching privacy regulations. The work highlights the urgency of quantum ready defenses and provides technical guidelines for deploying PQC in FL systems, alongside policy recommendations for standardizing quantum resilience in threat-sharing networks.
Federated Learning (FL) enables decentralized Machine Learning (ML) by allowing clients to train a shared model locally, reducing privacy risks and eliminating centralized data collection. However, FL deployments face significant challenges, related to orchestration heterogeneity, scalability, and security. Clients often differ in computational capacity, availability, and connectivity, requiring advanced orchestration mechanisms for efficient resource management and reliability. Moreover, FL communications remain vulnerable to attacks such as eavesdropping and model poisoning. In this paper, we showcase an architecture for deploying and orchestrating FL workloads secured with quantum keys and post-quantum cryptography to ensure confidentiality and integrity against classical and quantum threats.
NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) project selected three digital signature algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+) to standardize as PQC digital signature standards. In addition to the PQC digital signature standards, for diversity and to address the concerns on the overheads including key/signature sizes and computational performances, NIST is considering 14 additional digital signature algorithms for further standardization. One or more algorithms from these 14 algorithms can be selected for further standardization. However due to the dynamic nature of the NIST standardization process and cryptanalysis, all these candidate algorithms go through continuous changes and updates. The latest updates in Oct 2025 outdated the previous performance analyses of these algorithms. In this paper, we study the computational performance overheads of the NIST PQC additional signature candidates (round 2 - latest submission packages) in terms of key generation time, signing time, and verification time. Our results show that additional signature candidate algorithms including Hawk, CROSS, and SNOVA are competitive and computationally outperform the PQC standards on several occasions.
As federated learning (FL) keeps dominating the way in privacy-preserving machine learning (ML), notably in finance, its long-term sustainability is confronted with the approaching challenge of quantum computing. The introduction of quantum computing poses a challenge to traditional cryptographic technique on which FL relies RSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and some homomorphic encryption (HE) methods applied for encrypting model updates during training rendering this chapter to explore the interplay between the threat of quantum computing and the FL architectures, with emphasis on the implications this interaction introduces to cybersecurity and privacy in finance applications. Quantum computers are theoretically capable of solving hard math problems that have been regarded as computationally intractable for quantum computers. The well-known algorithms like Shor’s and Grover’s provides serious risk to the cryptographic procedures FL pipelines depends on. The finance sector, by its nature involving sensitive data and dependence on secure, distributed ML systems, is particularly vulnerable. The chapter begins by summarizing the fundamentals of FL and current encryption methods adapted to protect FL workflows. It then shifts towards the essence of quantum computing, emphasizing on the notable algorithms that threaten FL. We also explore potential attack points through which quantum computing could attack FL, e.g., model inversion attacks, poisoning attacks facilitated by quantum capabilities, and threats to secure aggregation. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is also presented as a potential counterattack, followed by a discussion of its use case in FL platforms. This chapter attempts to close the gap between FL and quantum computing threats to the financial sector. It is an introduction to practitioners and researchers to revisit examining security assumptions in FL and move towards the quantum-augmented cyber threat model.