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arXiv:2408.02058 · Physical Review A

Bayesian rational agents in iterated quantum games

John B. DeBrota, Peter J. Love

Published Apr 10, 2026• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We apply a Bayesian agent-based framework inspired by QBism to iterations of two quantum games, the CHSH game and the quantum prisoners' dilemma. In each two-player game, players hold beliefs about an amount of shared entanglement and about the actions or beliefs of the other player. Each takes actions which maximize their expected utility and revises their beliefs with the classical Bayes rule between rounds. We simulate iterated play to see if and how players can learn about the presence of shared entanglement and to explore how their performance, their beliefs, and the game's structure interrelate. In the CHSH game, we find that players can learn that entanglement is present and use this to achieve quantum advantage. We find that they can only do so if they also believe the other player will act correctly to exploit the entanglement. In the case of low or zero entanglement in the CHSH game, the players cannot achieve quantum advantage, even in the case where they believe the entanglement is higher than it is. For the prisoners dilemma, we show that assuming 1-fold rational players (rational players who believe the other player is also rational) reduces the quantum extension [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)] of the prisoners dilemma to a game with only two strategies, one of which (defect) is dominant for low entanglement, and the other (the quantum strategy Q) is dominant for high entanglement. For intermediate entanglement, neither strategy is dominant. We again show that players can learn entanglement in iterated play. We also show that strong belief in entanglement causes optimal play even in the absence of entanglement -- showing that belief in entanglement is acting as a proxy for the players trusting each other. Our work points to possible future applications in resource detection and quantum algorithm design.

DOI
10.1103/vj16-6jyn

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We apply a Bayesian agent-based framework inspired by QBism to iterations of two quantum games, the CHSH game and the quantum prisoners' dilemma. In each two-player game, players hold beliefs about an amount of shared entanglement and about the actions or beliefs of the other player. Each takes actions which maximize their expected utility and revises their beliefs with the classical Bayes rule between rounds. We simulate iterated play to see if and how players can learn about the presence of shared entanglement and to explore how their performance, their beliefs, and the game's structure interrelate. In the CHSH game, we find that players can learn that entanglement is present and use this to achieve quantum advantage. We find that they can only do so if they also believe the other player will act correctly to exploit the entanglement. In the case of low or zero entanglement in the CHSH game, the players cannot achieve quantum advantage, even in the case where they believe the entanglement is higher than it is. For the prisoners dilemma, we show that assuming 1-fold rational players (rational players who believe the other player is also rational) reduces the quantum extension [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)] of the prisoners dilemma to a game with only two strategies, one of which (defect) is dominant for low entanglement, and the other (the quantum strategy Q) is dominant for high entanglement. For intermediate entanglement, neither strategy is dominant. We again show that players can learn entanglement in iterated play. We also show that strong belief in entanglement causes optimal play even in the absence of entanglement -- showing that belief in entanglement is acting as a proxy for the players trusting each other. Our work points to possible future applications in resource detection and quantum algorithm design.
Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We analyze games quantized within the EWL framework [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. We solve for the Nash equilibria of a variety of two-player quantum games and compare the results to the solutions of the corresponding classical games. We then analyze Bayesian games where there is uncertainty about the player types in two-player conflicting interest games. The solutions to the Bayesian games are found to have a phase diagram-like structure where different equilibria exist in different parameter regions, depending both on the amount of uncertainty and the degree of entanglement. We find that in games where a Pareto-optimal solution is not a Nash equilibrium, it is possible for the quantized game to have an advantage over the classical version. In addition, we analyze the behavior of the solutions as the strategy choices approach an unrestricted operation. We find that some games have a continuum of solutions, bounded by the solutions of a simpler restricted game. A deeper understanding of Bayesian quantum game theory could lead to novel quantum applications in a multi-agent setting.
To explore the influence of quantum information on the common social problem of honesty and trickery, we propose a Bayesian model for the quantum prisoners’ dilemma game. In this model, the players’ strategy formation is regarded as a negotiation of their move contract based on their types of decision policies, honesty or trickery. Although the implementation of quantum information cannot eliminate tricky players, players in our model can always end up with higher payoffs than in the classical game. For a good proportion of a credibility parameter value, a rational player will take an honest action, which is in remarkable contrast to the observation that players tend to defect in the classical prisoners’ dilemma game. This research suggests that honesty will be promoted to enhance cooperation with the assistance of quantum information resources.
We analyse different Bayesian games where payoffs of players depend on the types of players involved in a two-player game. The dependence is assumed to commensurate with the CHSH game setting. For this, we consider two different types of each player (Alice and Bob) in the game, thus resulting in four different games clubbed together as one Bayesian game. Considering different combinations of common interest, and conflicting interest coordination and anti-coordination games, we find that quantum strategies are always preferred over classical strategies if the shared resource is a pure non-maximally entangled state. However, when the shared resource is a class of mixed state, then quantum strategies are useful only for a given range of the state parameter. Surprisingly, when all conflicting interest games (Battle of the Sexes game and Chicken game) are merged into the Bayesian game picture, then the best strategy for Alice and Bob is to share a set of non-maximally entangled pure states. We demonstrate that this set not only gives higher payoff than any classical strategy, but also outperforms a maximally entangled pure Bell state, mixed Werner states, and Horodecki states. We further propose the representation of a special class of Bell inequality- tilted Bell inequality, as a common as well as conflicting interest Bayesian game. We thereafter, study the effect of sharing an arbitrary two-qubit pure state and a class of mixed state as quantum resource in those games; thus verifying that non-maximally entangled states with high randomness help attain maximum quantum benefit. Additionally, we propose a general framework of a two-player Bayesian game for d-dimensions Bell-CHSH inequality, with and without the tilt factor.
Quantum entanglement has been recently demonstrated as a useful resource in conflicting-interest games of incomplete information between two players, Alice and Bob [Pappa et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. The general setting for such games is that of correlated strategies where the correlation between competing players is established through a trusted common adviser; however, players need not reveal their input to the adviser. So far, the quantum advantage in such games has been revealed in a restricted sense. Given a quantum correlated equilibrium strategy, one of the players can still receive a higher than quantum average payoff with some classically correlated equilibrium strategy. In this work, by considering a class of asymmetric Bayesian games, we show the existence of games with quantum correlated equilibrium where the average payoff of both the players exceeds the respective individual maximum for each player over all classically correlated equilibriums.
Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, only single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been studied, therefore nothing is known for infinitely repeated quantum game. Investigating infinitely repeated games is crucial since finitely repeated games does not much differ from single round games. In this work we establish the concept of general repeated quantum games and show the Quantum Folk Theorem, which claims that by iterating a game one can find an equilibrium strategy of the game and receive reward that is not obtained by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding single round quantum game. A significant difference between repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma and repeated classical prisoner's dilemma is that the classical Pareto optimal solution is not always an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game when entanglement is sufficiently strong. In addition we present several concrete equilibrium strategies of the repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma.
Decision-making by the two negotiating parties is simulated by a prisoner's dilemma game.The game is formulated in a quantum manner, where players strategies are unitary transformations of qubits built over the basis of opposite decision options.Quantum strategies are correlated through the mechanism of quantum entanglement and the result of the game is obtained by the collapse of the resulting transformed state.The range of strategies allowed for quantum players is richer than in case of a classical game and therefore the result of the game can be better optimized.On the other hand, the quantum game is save against eavesdropping and the players can be assured that this type of quantum arbitration is fair.We show that quantum prisoner's dilemma has more favorable Nash equilibria than its classical analog and they are close to the Pareto optimal solutions.Some economical examples of utilizing quantum game Nash equilibria are proposed.