In the medium term, quantum computing must tackle two key challenges: fault tolerance and security. Fault tolerance will be solved with sufficiently high quality experiments on large numbers of qubits, but the scale and complexity of these devices means that a cloud-based access model is likely to dominate. How can we risk evaluating valuable computations on an untrusted server? Here we detail a verifiable circuit-based model that only requires classical communication between parties. The server is blind to the details of the computation, which is computationally secure.
In the medium term, quantum computing must tackle two key challenges: fault tolerance and security. Fault tolerance will be solved with sufficiently high quality experiments on large numbers of qubits, but the scale and complexity of these devices means that a cloud-based access model is likely to dominate. How can we risk evaluating valuable computations on an untrusted server? Here we detail a verifiable circuit-based model that only requires classical communication between parties. The server is blind to the details of the computation, which is computationally secure.
Recent experimental achievements motivate an ever-growing interest from companies starting to feel the limitations of classical computing. Yet, in light of ongoing privacy scandals, the future availability of quantum computing through remotely accessible servers pose peculiar challenges: Clients with quantum-limited capabilities want their data and algorithms to remain hidden, while being able to verify that their computations are performed correctly. Research in blind and verifiable delegation of quantum computing attempts to address this question. However, available techniques suffer not only from high overheads but also from over-sensitivity: When running on noisy devices, imperfections trigger the same detection mechanisms as malicious attacks, resulting in perpetually aborted computations. Hence, while malicious quantum computers are rendered harmless by blind and verifiable protocols, inherent noise severely limits their usability. We address this problem with an efficient, robust, blind, verifiable scheme to delegate deterministic quantum computations with classical inputs and outputs. We show that: 1) a malicious Server can cheat at most with an exponentially small success probability; 2) in case of sufficiently small noise, the protocol succeeds with a probability exponentially close to 1; 3) the overhead is barely a polynomial number of repetitions of the initial computation interleaved with test runs requiring the same physical resources in terms of memory and gates; 4) the amount of tolerable noise, measured by the probability of failing a test run, can be as high as 25% for some computations and will be generally bounded by 12.5% when using a planar graph resource state. The key points are that security can be provided without universal computation graphs and that, in our setting, full fault-tolerance is not needed to amplify the confidence level exponentially close to 1.
Blind quantum computing (BQC) is a computational paradigm that allows a client with limited quantum capabilities to delegate quantum computations to a more powerful server while keeping both the algorithm and data hidden. However, in practice, existing BQC protocols face significant challenges when scaling to large-scale computations due to photon losses, low efficiencies, and high overheads associated with fault-tolerant operations, requiring the client to compile both logical operations and error correction primitives. We use a recently demonstrated hybrid light-matter approach [PRL 132, 150604 (2024); Science 388, 509-513 (2025)] to develop an architecture for scalable fault-tolerant blind quantum computation. By combining high-fidelity local gates on the server's matter qubits with delegated blind rotations using photons, we construct loss-tolerant delegated gates that enable efficient algorithm compilation strategies and a scalable approach for fault-tolerant blind logical algorithms. Our approach improves the error-correction threshold and increases the speed and depth of blind logical circuits. Finally, we outline how this architecture can be implemented on state-of-the-art quantum hardware, including neutral atom arrays and solid-state spin defects. These new capabilities open up new opportunities for deep circuit blind quantum computing.
Verifiable blind quantum computing allows a client with poor quantum devices to delegate universal quantum computing to a remote quantum server in such a way that the client's privacy is protected and the honesty of the server is verified. In existing protocols, the client has to send single-qubit states to the server. These states might be decohered by the channel noise. Furthermore, the client hides some "trap" qubits in the server's register so that the client can detect the server's deviation. In reality, however, these trap qubits are disturbed by imperfect operations by the server, which reduces the probability that the client accepts the honest server. To solve these problems, we propose a new gadget that allows the client to remotely prepare encoded logical single-qubit states in the server's place. Importantly, in our fault-tolerant verifiable blind quantum computing protocol, the client needs only the ability of physical single-qubit measurements in X and Z bases.
Blind quantum computation (BQC) enables a client without enough quantum power to delegate his quantum computation to a quantum server, while keeping the input data, the algorithm and the result unknown to the server. In the studies of practical BQC protocol, an important problem is how to reduce the quantum requirement of the client. Multi-server BQC protocols have been proposed to solve this problem. We review the double-server and triple-server protocols [Li et al., Phys. Rev. A 89, 040302(R) (2014)], and propose a modified double-server BQC protocol with a trusted center. In our protocol, the servers are allowed to communicate mutually, and the client is completely classical. Furthermore, our double-server protocol can be modified into a single-server protocol by simply combining the two servers. Compared with the triple-server protocol, our double-server and single-server protocols are more simple and the client is not required to have the ability to access quantum channel. So our protocols are more practical when quantum computer is applied in the `cloud' model.
Blind quantum computation is an appealing use of quantum information technology because it can conceal both the client's data and the algorithm itself from the server. However, problems need to be solved in the practical use of blind quantum computation and fault-tolerance is a major challenge. Broadbent et al. proposed running error correction over blind quantum computation, and Morimae and Fujii proposed using fault-tolerant entangled qubits as the resource for blind quantum computation. Both approaches impose severe demands on the teleportation channel, the former requiring unrealistic data rates and the latter near-perfect fidelity. To extend the application range of blind quantum computation, we suggest that Alice send input qubits encoded with error correction code instead of single input qubits. Two fault-tolerant protocols are presented and we showed the trade-off of the computational overhead using the ten-bit quantum carry-lookahead adder as an example. Though these two fault-tolerant protocols require the client to have more quantum computing ability than using approaches from prior work, they provide better fault-tolerance when the client and the server are connected by realistic quantum repeater networks.
With the advent of quantum cloud computing, the security of delegated quantum computation has become of utmost importance. While multiple statistically secure blind verification schemes in the prepare-and-send model have been proposed, none of them achieves full quantum fault-tolerance, a prerequisite for useful verification on scalable quantum computers. In this paper, we present the first fault-tolerant blind verification scheme for universal quantum computations able to handle secret-dependent noise on the verifier's quantum device. Composable security of the proposed protocol is proven in the Abstract Cryptography framework. Our main tools are two novel distillation protocols that turn secret-dependent noise into secret-independent noise. The first one is run by the verifier and acts on its noisy gates, while the second and more complex one is run entirely on the prover's device and acts on states provided by the verifier. Both are required to overcome the leakage induced by secret-dependent noise. We use these protocols to prepare states in the X-Y-plane whose noise is overwhelmingly secret-independent, which then allows us to verify with exponential confidence arbitrary fault-tolerant BQP computations.