Abstract Nash equilibrium is employed to find a game theoretic robust security bound on quantum bit error rate (QBER) for DL04 protocol which is a scheme for quantum secure direct communication that has been experimentally realized recently. The receiver, sender and eavesdropper (Eve) are considered to be quantum players (players having the capability to perform quantum operations). Specifically, Eve is considered to have the capability of performing quantum attacks (e.g., Wójcik’s original attack, Wójcik’s symmetrized attack and Pavičić attack) and classical intercept and resend attack. Game theoretic analysis of the security of DL04 protocol in the above scenario is performed by considering several game scenarios. The analysis revealed the absence of a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium point within these game scenarios. Consequently, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium points are identified and employed to establish both upper and lower bounds for QBER. Further, the vulnerability of the DL04 protocol to Pavičić attack in the message mode is established. In addition, it is observed that the quantum attacks performed by Eve are more powerful than the classical attack, as the QBER value and the probability of detecting Eve’s presence are found to be lower in quantum attacks compared to classical ones.
Abstract Nash equilibrium is employed to find a game theoretic robust security bound on quantum bit error rate (QBER) for DL04 protocol which is a scheme for quantum secure direct communication that has been experimentally realized recently. The receiver, sender and eavesdropper (Eve) are considered to be quantum players (players having the capability to perform quantum operations). Specifically, Eve is considered to have the capability of performing quantum attacks (e.g., Wójcik’s original attack, Wójcik’s symmetrized attack and Pavičić attack) and classical intercept and resend attack. Game theoretic analysis of the security of DL04 protocol in the above scenario is performed by considering several game scenarios. The analysis revealed the absence of a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium point within these game scenarios. Consequently, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium points are identified and employed to establish both upper and lower bounds for QBER. Further, the vulnerability of the DL04 protocol to Pavičić attack in the message mode is established. In addition, it is observed that the quantum attacks performed by Eve are more powerful than the classical attack, as the QBER value and the probability of detecting Eve’s presence are found to be lower in quantum attacks compared to classical ones.
Quantum superdense coding protocol is addressed in the literature as a promising approach for efficient quantum communication. It allows two parties, to transmit classical bits using quantum bits. However, its security is threatened by a scrambling attack that involves modifying the automated gate specification to effectively scramble the final measurement, and by a bijection attack that performs a bijective transformation on the final measured strings. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to preventing such attacks by introducing decoy qubits into the superdense coding protocol, which act as a source of randomness that can detect any tampering with the entangled states and enable the detection of an eavesdropper. To strategize the selection and sending of these decoy qubits and address the interaction between the sender, receiver, and eavesdropper, we propose a dynamic non-cooperative game-based approach evaluated with a Q-learning algorithm to model and analyze this problem as a benefit-cost model. The utility functions of the proposed game are based on the concepts of return on protection, which illustrates the gain of selecting and sending a decoy qubit, and return on attack, which illustrates the reward of the eavesdropper for performing an attack to compromise the communication. Moreover, we discuss and analyze the Nash equilibrium convergence of this attack-defense model. Finally, we perform simulation work using a Q-learning algorithm to show the effectiveness of the proposed model in assessing the behavior of the players and its ability to reach equilibrium within a finite number of steps.
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems operate under noise, but security of most protocols have been analyzed under ideal noiseless scenarios. In this work, we investigated security performance of BB84 protocol under effect of collective rotation noise. Using theoretical quantum information frameworks, we analyzed key security parameters including quantum bit error rate (QBER), mutual information and secret key rate (SKR). Security of protocol is studied under various eavesdropping scenarios based on intercept and resend attacks. Our results show that collective rotation noise has a significant impact on the information shared between the two parties. Particularly, we extended prior treatments by suggesting a noise engineering strategy where we identified a non-zero noise range where information accessed by Eve is minimized while corresponding SKR degradation remains relatively small. This analysis provide insights into robustness of BB84 protocol under realistic noisy channels and may contribute towards development of more resilient QKD systems.
Quantum cryptography uses quantum mechanics to guarantee secure communication. BB84 is a widely used quantum key distribution that provides a way for two parties, a sender, Alice, and a receiver, Bob, to share an unconditionally secure key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Three different criteria can be assumed to study the BB84 protocol. They are the efficiency of the protocol, the probability that Eve remains undetected, and the amount of knowledge Eve has about Alice's bit sequence. In a previous approach, we only considered the probability that Eve remains undetected. We viewed this protocol as a three player static game in which Alice and Bob were two cooperative players and Eve was a competitive one. In our game model, Alice's and Bob's objective was to maximize the probability of detecting Eve, while Eve's objective was to minimize this probability. In this paper, our previous effort is extended and we also consider the other two criteria, i.e. the efficiency of the protocol and the amount of knowledge Eve has about Alice's bit sequence. Using these models, we show how game theory can be used to find the strategies for Alice, Bob and Eve.
Security of the quantum secure direct communication protocol (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the C-S QSDC protocol is not secure if the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused by quantum channel noise is higher than 4.17%. Our eavesdropping scheme induces about 4.17% QBER for those check qubits. However, such QBER can be hidden in the counterpart induced by the noisy quantum channel if the eavesdropper Eve replaces the original noisy channel by an ideal one. Furthermore, if the QBER induced by quantum channel noise is lower than 4.17%, then in the eavesdropping scheme Eve still can eavesdrop part of the secret messages by safely attacking a fraction of the transmitted qubits. Finally, an improvement on the C-S QSDC protocol is put forward.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security by exploiting the principles of quantum mechanics. Among QKD protocols, the BB84 scheme remains the most widely adopted for both theoretical research and practical implementation. A critical parameter determining the reliability and security of BB84 is the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), which quantifies errors in the sifted key arising from channel noise or potential eavesdropping. This paper presents a systematic review and analysis of QBER within the BB84 protocol, examining its calculation, statistical estimation methods, and role in detecting eavesdropping activity. Simulation results, corroborated by reported experimental observations, reveal a near-linear relationship between eavesdropping intensity and QBER, with values approaching 25% under full intercept-resend attacks. Four confidence interval estimation methods, Wald, Wilson, Clopper-Pearson, and Hoeffding's inequality, are compared for robust QBER analysis in finite-key scenarios. Protocol enhancements, including decoy-state methods, hybrid cryptographic models, and quantum-resistant authentication, are discussed as mechanisms to mitigate errors and strengthen resilience across fiber, free-space, underwater, and satellite QKD systems. Open challenges in distinguishing noise-induced errors from malicious eavesdropping, and the role of adaptive error correction and machine-learning-assisted QBER estimation in future quantum networks, are identified as key directions for further research.
Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) enables the direct transmission of confidential information through quantum channels without requiring prior secret-key establishment.This paper presents a simulation-based study of two representative QSDC protocols: the DL04 protocol and the Ping-Pong protocol.A MATLAB/Simulink implementation of the DL04 protocol is developed to model quantum state generation, random phase preparation, message encoding, transmission, detection, and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) evaluation under ideal channel conditions.Randomness is generated using a Binary Bernoulli Generator, providing statistically independent and reproducible bit sequences for quantum state preparation.In parallel, the Ping-Pong protocol is analyzed in MATLAB under different channel noise levels and eavesdropping scenarios using performance metrics such as fidelity, QBER, and Security Bit Error Rate (SBER).Results demonstrate the successful implementation of DL04 secuirity check with negligible QBER using binary Bernoulli generator in an ideal channel and illustrate the sensitivity of Ping-Pong communication to noise and attacks.The study provides a comparative understanding of practical single-photon and entanglement-based QSDC schemes and establishes a foundation for future experimental implementations.