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arXiv:2312.15399 · Quantum Information Processing

Improved security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in decoy-state quantum key distribution

Zijian Li, Bingbing Zheng, Chengxian Zhang, Zhenrong Zhang, Hongbo Xie, Kejin Wei

Published Jan 29, 2024• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s11128-023-04238-0

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