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arXiv:2310.10192 · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Is Bohr's correspondence principle just Hankel's principle of permanence?

Iulian D. Toader

Published Dec 28, 2023• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

No, but the paper argues that Bohr understood his correspondence principle, or at least an aspect of that principle expressed by the notion of rational generalization, as grounded in Hankel's principle of permanence, adapted to new historical and theoretical contexts. This is shown to illuminate some otherwise obscure aspects of Bohr's approach to quantum theory, as well as a seemingly strange criticism against this approach, due to Feyerabend and Bohm.

DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.12.003

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No, but the paper argues that Bohr understood his correspondence principle, or at least an aspect of that principle expressed by the notion of rational generalization, as grounded in Hankel's principle of permanence, adapted to new historical and theoretical contexts. This is shown to illuminate some otherwise obscure aspects of Bohr's approach to quantum theory, as well as a seemingly strange criticism against this approach, due to Feyerabend and Bohm.
A correspondence principle has been used in physics as a tool for developing new theories. Many physicists also believe that this principle implies the fact that new theories cannot contradict the well-confirmed former theories. In this essay, I examine critically and historically the epistemological consistency of this position. I explore Einstein's technical usage of a correspondence principle as a guide towards generalising special relativity. I also refer to his thoughts and perplexities in face of the doubts posed by the epistemological significance of the correspondence above. The correspondence problem also intrigued Bohr at a certain period in his research, because classical theories represented a glorious patrimony of science that had to be recovered and salvaged in some way. In my analysis of Bohr's correspondence principle I look at the historical development of the principle in Bohr's various contributions to the Copenhagen philosophy. Another response to the correspondence riddle was given by Schrödinger. In the fifties, he proposed a new conception of ondulatory mechanics, a continuous theory in opposition to Bohr's and Heisenberg's fundamental discreteness. The lack of individuality of the atomic particles presented in the new statistics, and in Heisenberg's indeterminacy relations, were by Schrödinger considered to be aspects of a more general crisis in the ontology of classical atomism.
The theoretical and experimental context within which the “Copenhagen Interpretation” of quantum theory was generated is underemphasized by recent critics of the Bohr-Heisenberg philosophy. When an interpretation of a theory has been as successful as this one has been, there is little practical warrant for the “alternative interpretations” which have, since Bohm, been receiving prominence. Indeed, these are not even genuine alternatives; although rich in provocative prose, they provide not a scrap of algebra with which to organize the practical physicist's thinking. Several objections to the Bohr interpretation are critically examined, as is also a particular use of the correspondence principle which has seemed to cast doubt on the Copenhagen ideas.
It is widely known that both the Correspondence Principle and the Adiabatic Principle were the two pillars of Bohr's quantum theory. However, the Correspondence Principle usually gets much more attention in historical accounts. A closer look at Bohr's quantum theory shows that, although the fate of the Adiabatic Principle was closely tied up with the validity of mechanics, it also played a significant role in the old quantum theory. In the early 1920s, when dealing with multielectron atoms, Bohr was forced to reshape the theory and thus to reconsider the relative relevance of the two principles. It is precisely the late preponderance of the Correspondence Principle which has, in perspective, biased the historical weight attributed to each of them.
Niels Bohr’s “correspondence principle” is typically believed to be the requirement that in the limit of large quantum numbers (n→∞) there is a statistical agreement between the quantum and classical frequencies. A closer reading of Bohr’s writings on the correspondence principle, however, reveals that this interpretation is mistaken. Specifically, Bohr makes the following three puzzling claims: First, he claims that the correspondence principle applies to small quantum numbers as well as large (while the statistical agreement of frequencies is only for large n); second, he claims that the correspondence principle is a law of quantum theory; and third, Bohr argues that formal apparatus of matrix mechanics (the new quantum theory) can be thought of as a precise formulation of the correspondence principle. With further textual evidence, I offer an alternative interpretation of the correspondence principle in terms of what I call Bohr’s selection rule. I conclude by showing how this new interpretation of the correspondence principle readily makes sense of Bohr’s three puzzling claims.
I reinterpret Bohr's attitude towards quantum mechanical formalism and its empirical content, based on his understanding of the correspondence principle and its approximate applicability. I suggest that Bohr understood complementarity as a limitation imposed by the commutation relations upon the applicability of the idealizations which had grounded the use of the correspondence principle. By discussing this interpretation against the contemporary background of discussions regarding “naïve realism” about operators (as observables), I suggest that a Bohrian view on the empirical content of quantum mechanical operators may provide a middle ground between complete contextualism and an untenable realism about quantum properties.
A conception of the Correspondence Principle which Bohr deployed implicitly in developing a new theory of atomic constitution in 1913, is made explicit through an extensive examination of his classic paper of that year. Arguments are considered which purport to show that the application of the principle must be restricted to few isolated cases. These arguments are either defused or rejected. In particular an extensive review of issues concerning the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is made to counter the claims that an insurmountable conceptual gap exits between the tenets of this theory and those of Classical Mechanics which makes it logically impossible for the latter to be regarded as the 'limiting case' of the former. In the light of a particular interpretation adopted and defended, a proposal is made that suggests that the Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of Classical Mechanics, as well as Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, can be viewed as 'limiting cases' of Quantum Mechanics. Having established a case for the global validity of the requirement imposed on physics by the Correspondence Principle, it is then argued that this requirement is indispensable if a particular brand of realism is adopted for the interpretation of theories in physics. Taking on board the assumption that an ultimate theory exists which mirrors the underlying physical constitution of the world, it is subsequently argued that the intertheory order established by the global imposition of the principle in physics, can be used to solve the problem of rational theory choice for this brand of realism.