One of quantum theory's salient features is its apparent indeterminism, i.e. measurement outcomes are typically probabilistic. We formally define and address whether this uncertainty is unavoidable or whether post-quantum theories can offer a predictive advantage while conforming to the Born rule on average. We present a no-go claim combining three aspects: predictive advantage, no-signalling, and reliable intersubjectivity between quantum observers. The results of the analysis lead to the conclusion that there exists a fundamental limitation on genuine predictive advantage. However, we uncover a fascinating possibility: When the assumption of reliable intersubjectivity between different observers is violated, subjective predictive advantage can, in principle, exist. This, in turn, entails an epistemic boundary between different observers of the same theory. The findings reconcile us to quantum uncertainty as an aspect of limits on Nature's predictability.
One of quantum theory's salient features is its apparent indeterminism, i.e. measurement outcomes are typically probabilistic. We formally define and address whether this uncertainty is unavoidable or whether post-quantum theories can offer a predictive advantage while conforming to the Born rule on average. We present a no-go claim combining three aspects: predictive advantage, no-signalling, and reliable intersubjectivity between quantum observers. The results of the analysis lead to the conclusion that there exists a fundamental limitation on genuine predictive advantage. However, we uncover a fascinating possibility: When the assumption of reliable intersubjectivity between different observers is violated, subjective predictive advantage can, in principle, exist. This, in turn, entails an epistemic boundary between different observers of the same theory. The findings reconcile us to quantum uncertainty as an aspect of limits on Nature's predictability.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and formalizes physical knowability constraints, understood here as constraints on what any conceivable observer can know about the physical world; I henceforth call these “epistemic constraints” for terseness. Here, epistemic constraints concern the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
Uncertainty principle, one of the most iconic features of quantum mechanics, was originally viewed as a fundamental limitation. Since the inception of quantum information science, researchers began to use it to achieve quantum advantages. To better understand the origin of these advantages, an essential question is: To what extent can the uncertainty principle's signatures be simulated by a single measurement? As a single measurement clearly cannot demonstrate the uncertainty principle, such a simulation, if exists, implies the claimed advantages may either stem from other quantum features, or just be reproducible in a less resourceful way. In this work, we report a series of noise-robust no-go theorems, showing that strong enough signatures of uncertainty principle cannot be simulated by a single measurement, even when assisted by quantum pre- or post-processing. This signature is modelled by complementary instruments. We completely characterise complementary instruments by a numerically feasible measure and show that they are necessary and sufficient resources for the advantage in an operational task that aims to unambiguously send classical information.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and formalizes physical knowability constraints, understood here as constraints on what any conceivable observer can know about the physical world; I henceforth call these “epistemic constraints” for terseness. Here, epistemic constraints concern the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and then formalizes a physically relevant concept that I have called “Epistemic Constraint.” Here, epistemic constraints are the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and then formalizes a physically relevant concept that I have called "Epistemic Constraint." Here, epistemic constraints are the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid's fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
In the early stages of the famous debates between Einstein and Bohr on the foundations of quantum mechanics, Einstein attempted to devise thought experiments aiming at showing that arbitrarily accurate predictions of incompatible physical quantities was possible, in violation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Bohr was able to defend quantum mechanics from those attacks by showing that a careful application of the uncertainty principle to the experimental apparata as well as the measured system lead to consistent results. Could Bohr have given an independent argument for the irreducible unpredictability implied by the uncertainty principle?
The celebrated 1964 theorem of John Bell shows that no model that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics can simultaneously satisfy the ontological concepts of locality and determinism. However, nothing can be concluded from Bell's theorem alone about locality by itself or determinism by itself--it is possible to reproduce quantum-mechanical predictions with deterministic models which violate locality as well as indeterministic models which satisfy locality. On the other hand, there's almost universal agreement that the epistemic form of locality--signal locality, or the impossibility of faster-than-light communication--must hold in a relativistic universe. By making a similar distinction between determinism and the epistemic concept of predictability, I show that signal locality plus the bare observed phenomena of Bell inequality violations lead to the remarkable conclusion that Nature is fundamentally unpredictable. This result grounds the quantum-mechanical prohibition of arbitrarily accurate predictions on the principle of relativity, regardless of any postulates of quantum mechanics.