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arXiv:2310.03014

The philosophical problems of implementing superselection rules

Jorge Manero

Published Oct 4, 2023• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Some physicists believe that superselection rules should be implemented to get rid of inconsistencies when a theory is framed in terms of a new mathematical formulation, whilst others think that this new formulation should be modified instead of implementing those rules, at the expense of introducing additional mathematical structure. The outcome, however, is that we are still uncertain whether these rules should be implemented and how they should be interpreted and assessed from the philosophical point of view. Based on a detailed examination of the group-theoretic reformulation of (relativistic and non-relativistic) quantum mechanics that prompts physicists to impose superselection rules, I shall argue that the implementation of these rules involves serious heuristic and epistemological concerns. Considering this argument, I shall conclude that there are suitable philosophical reasons to claim that the implementation of superselection rules should be rejected and that there are certain circumstances when the formulation of a theory should be modified.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2310.03014

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Some physicists believe that superselection rules should be implemented to get rid of inconsistencies when a theory is framed in terms of a new mathematical formulation, whilst others think that this new formulation should be modified instead of implementing those rules, at the expense of introducing additional mathematical structure. The outcome, however, is that we are still uncertain whether these rules should be implemented and how they should be interpreted and assessed from the philosophical point of view. Based on a detailed examination of the group-theoretic reformulation of (relativistic and non-relativistic) quantum mechanics that prompts physicists to impose superselection rules, I shall argue that the implementation of these rules involves serious heuristic and epistemological concerns. Considering this argument, I shall conclude that there are suitable philosophical reasons to claim that the implementation of superselection rules should be rejected and that there are certain circumstances when the formulation of a theory should be modified.
The superposition principle is a very basic ingredient of quantum theory. What may come as a surprise to many students, and even to many practitioners of the quantum craft, is tha superposition has limitations imposed by certain requirements of the theory. The discussion of such limitations arising from the so-called superselection rules is the main purpose of this paper. Some of their principal consequences are also discussed. The univalence, mass and particle number superselection rules of non-relativistic quantum mechanics are also derived using rather simple methods.
It is well-known that a physical state may be represented by a unit vector in a Hilbert space, whilst a physical observable may be represented by a self-adjoint operator on that same space. However, the introduction of a superselection rule on a Hilbert space imposes constraints such that not all self-adjoint operators can represent observables, which has further consequences for the states themselves as well as the physical processes that transform them. In this article, we review the concept of superselection from the view of how such rules would affect what we consider to be physical. Arguments for the existence of a superselection rule due to charge or possibly energy conservation are given and the emergence of effective superselection rules due to decoherence or the lack of a shared reference frame are also discussed.
Mainly due to the EPR trio having declared quantum mechanics as ‘not complete’ and given the acid criticisms of Schrödinger, including his famous cat paradox , many physicists felt encouraged to introduce new interpretations to confront a vaguely assembled orthodox interpretation . Indeed, there are numerous interpretations of quantum mechanics, so numerous that we have decided not to even enter into the interpretational arena, leaving that to the professionals and citing their encyclopedic works instead. In this regard, we are compelled to quote Dyson: ‘We still have passionate arguments between believers of various interpretations… The reason for these arguments is that various interpreters are trying to describe the quantum world in words… and the language is inappropriate for the purpose.’ Here, a humble approach to this subject is taken whilst opting for pragmatism.
Many scientific theories purport to describe empirically inaccessible aspects of the world. The agenda of foundational physics is more ambitious still: to characterize the world at the level of 'primitive ontology'. In this pursuit it often posits new and peculiar physical features, a proclivity aided by the abstract, mathematical way in which foundational theories are framed. But how do we decipher their physical content, and in particular the accounts of primitive ontology they offer, and why think that content is true? This dissertation explores the relationship between these questions -- between the problem of ontological interpretation in foundational physics and the nature of scientific realism. I do not argue for a unified account. Rather, I examine three contexts in which their interactions are particularly interesting and philosophically significant. First, I consider the role scientific methodology plays in a prominent naturalistic defense of scientific realism: the no-miracles argument. The most sophisticated form of this argument rests on the broad claim that successful scientific methodology is irredeemably theory dependent. I examine the nature of this theory dependence within the context of Maxwell's development of electromagnetism, and argue that the presence of competing ontological interpretations undermines the realist's attempt to draw sweeping epistemic conclusions from methodological success. I next consider the concept of theoretical reformulation and how it applies to the claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of (part of) Newtonian dynamics. How should this claim be understood in light of the fact that the world is non-classical? What can this tell us about the concept of theory reformulation itself, which plays a central role in arguments against scientific realism? I provide an analysis of theory reformulation in terms of counterfactual interpretative judgments, and then cast doubt on its justification in the classical case by developing a non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics. Finally, I consider whether competing ontological interpretations raise underdetermination problems for realism about foundational physics. After first re-formulating the underdetermination argument to avoid recent objections that it fails to pose any distinctive threat, I suggest a formulation of realism that vitiates the underdetermination threats posed by competing ontological interpretations.
A superselection rule advanced in the course of a quantum-mechanical treatment of some phenomenon is an assertion to the effect that the superposition principle of quantum mechanics is to be restricted in the application at hand. Superselection accounts of measurement all have in common a decision to represent the indicator states of detectors by eigenspaces of superselection operators named in a superselection rule, on the grounds that the states in question are states of a so-called classical quantity and therefore not subject to quantum interference effects. By this strategy superselectionists of measurement expect to dispense with use of projection postulates in treatments of measurement. I shall argue that superselection accounts of measurement are self-contradictory, and that treatments of infinite systems, if they can avoid the contradiction, are not true superselection accounts.
In this paper, we do not try to solve the measurement problem, but rather to properly formulate it. One of the reasons why it still lacks a precise, agreed definition is that the problem may take very different aspects depending on the interpretation of quantum mechanics embraced. Inspired by the methodology of theory-independent results like Bell's theorem, we propose to identify the common root of the puzzle in an interpretation-independent way i.e. as a property of the empirical statistics only, before deriving its philosophical consequences. The key observation is that quantum matter can not be described by a Kolmogorovian probabilistic theory. Arguing that the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory are the postulates of epistemic uncertainty leads us to reformulate the measurement problem as the impossibility to build an ontology independent of epistemology for quantum matter. Said differently, there exists no God's-eye view on quantum systems. Although it is meaningless to solve the measurement problem as defined in this way, insofar as it is a feature of the universe's statistics, such a formulation may on the other hand bring side benefits. In particular, we argue that it allows to: (i) shed a new light on the variety of interpretations; (ii) propose a fundamental reason why quantum mechanics and general relativity are so incompatible, not relying on purely mathematical or technical arguments; (iii) guide the quest for quantum gravity.