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arXiv:2309.01466 · Distributed Computing

Communication lower bounds for cryptographic broadcast protocols

Erica Blum, Elette Boyle, Ran Cohen, Chen-Da Liu-Zhang

Published Jan 7, 2025• 5 citations
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Abstract

Abstract Broadcast protocols enable a set of n parties to agree on the input of a designated sender, even facing attacks by malicious parties. In the honest-majority setting, randomization and cryptography were harnessed to achieve low-communication broadcast with sub-quadratic total communication and balanced sub-linear cost per party. However, comparatively little is known in the dishonest-majority setting. Here, the most communication-efficient constructions are based on Dolev and Strong (SICOMP ’83), and sub-quadratic broadcast has not been achieved. On the other hand, the only nontrivial $$\omega (n)$$ ω ( n ) communication lower bounds are restricted to deterministic protocols, or against strong adaptive adversaries that can perform “after the fact” removal of messages. We provide new communication lower bounds in this space, which hold against arbitrary cryptography and setup assumptions, as well as a simple sub-quadratic broadcast protocol showing near tightness of our first bound.

DOI
10.1007/s00446-024-00473-5

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Abstract Broadcast protocols enable a set of n parties to agree on the input of a designated sender, even facing attacks by malicious parties. In the honest-majority setting, randomization and cryptography were harnessed to achieve low-communication broadcast with sub-quadratic total communication and balanced sub-linear cost per party. However, comparatively little is known in the dishonest-majority setting. Here, the most communication-efficient constructions are based on Dolev and Strong (SICOMP ’83), and sub-quadratic broadcast has not been achieved. On the other hand, the only nontrivial ω(n)\omega (n)ω(n) ω ( n ) communication lower bounds are restricted to deterministic protocols, or against strong adaptive adversaries that can perform “after the fact” removal of messages. We provide new communication lower bounds in this space, which hold against arbitrary cryptography and setup assumptions, as well as a simple sub-quadratic broadcast protocol showing near tightness of our first bound.
Broadcast among n parties in the presence of t ges n/3 malicious parties is possible only with some additional setup. The most common setup considered is the existence of a PKI and secure, digital signatures, where so-called authenticated broadcast is achievable for any t2) rounds. In particular, we obtain expected constant-round pivtocols for t = n/2 + O(1). ldr On the negative side, we show that even randomized protocols require Omega(2n/(n-t)) rounds. This in particular rules out expected constant-round protocols when the fraction of honest parties is sub-constant.
We consider the classical problem of synchronous broadcast with dishonest majority, when a public-key infrastructure and digital signatures are available. In a surprising result, Hirt and Zikas (Eurocrypt 2010) recently observed that all existing protocols for this task are insecure against an adaptive adversary who can choose which parties to corrupt as the protocol progresses. Moreover, they prove an impossibility result for adaptively secure broadcast in their setting. We argue that the communication model adopted by Hirt and Zikas is unrealistically pes-simistic. We revisit the problem of adaptively secure broadcast in a more natural synchronous model (with rushing), and show that broadcast is possible in this setting for an arbitrary num-ber of corruptions. Our positive result holds under a strong, simulation-based definition in the universal-composability framework. We also study the impact of adaptive attacks on protocols for secure multi-party computation where broadcast is used as a sub-routine. 1
Traditional protocols for secure multi-party computation among n parties communicate at least a linear (in n) number of bits, even when computing very simple functions. In this work we investigate the feasibility of protocols with sublinear communication complexity. Concretely, we consider two clients, one of which may be corrupted, who wish to perform some “small” joint computation using n servers but without any trusted setup. We show that enforcing sublinear communication complexity drastically affects the feasibility bounds on the number of corrupted parties that can be tolerated in the setting of information-theoretic security. We provide a complete investigation of security in the presence of semi-honest adversaries—static and adaptive, with and without erasures—and initiate the study of security in the presence of malicious adversaries. For semi-honest static adversaries, our bounds essentially match the corresponding bounds when there is no communication restriction—i.e., we can tolerate up to t<(1/2−ϵ)nt < (1/2 -\epsilon )nt<(1/2−ϵ)n corrupted parties. For the adaptive case, however, the situation is different. We prove that without erasures even a small constant fraction of corruptions is intolerable, and—more surprisingly—when erasures are allowed, we prove that t<(1−0.5−ϵ)nt < (1 - \sqrt{0.5} - \epsilon )nt<(1−0.5​−ϵ)n corruptions can be tolerated, which we also show to be essentially optimal. The latter optimality proof hinges on a new treatment of probabilistic adversary structures that may be of independent interest. In the case of active corruptions in the sublinear communication setting, we prove that static “security with abort” is feasible when t<(1/2−ϵ)nt < (1/2 - \epsilon )nt<(1/2−ϵ)n , namely, the bound that is tight for semi-honest security. All of our negative results in fact rule out protocols with sublinear message complexity.
Broadcast is a primitive which allows a specific party to distribute a message consistently among n parties, even if up to t parties exhibit malicious behaviour.In the classical model with a complete network of bilateral authenticated channels, the seminal result of [15] shows that broadcast is achievable if and only if t < n/3.There are two generalizations suggested for the broadcast problem -with respect to the adversarial model and the communication model.Fitzi and Maurer [10] consider a (non-threshold) general adversary that is characterized by the subsets of parties that could be corrupted, and show that broadcast can be realized from bilateral channels if and only if the union of no three possible corrupted sets equals the entire set of n parties.On the other hand, [4] extends the standard model of bilateral channels with the existence of b-minicast channels that allow to locally broadcast among any subset of b parties; the authors show that in this enhanced model of communication, secure broadcast tolerating up to t corrupted parties is possible if and only if t < b-1 b+1 n.These generalizations are unified in [14] where Raykov studies the problem of achieving broadcast from a complete set of b-minicast channels that is secure under general adversaries, and gives a tight characterization of the possible corrupted subsets of parties against which broadcast is (im)possible.This thesis initiates the study of achievability of broadcast in scenarios where only some subset of b-minicast channels are available, thereby addressing an open problem posed by [14].Even though the broadcast problem has been studied for the concrete case of incomplete 3minicast networks in [16] and [12], not much work has been done with respect to general b-minicast models.Our major contribution is the identification of types of minicast channels that are essential for broadcast secure against general adversaries.In particular, this allows us to derive a bound on the amount of b-minicasts required for some party to broadcast.Inspired by the result of [14], the thesis also proves some properties for an interesting class of adversaries, named chain adversaries, that are relevant to the problem at hand, and proposes a hierarchy over all possible general adversaries targeting a set of n parties.We conclude the discussion by showing why a prominent method to construct broadcast protocols -used by [16] for 3-minicast models -is not feasible when it comes to incomplete b-minicast models.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is perhaps the most popular paradigm in the area of cryptographic protocols. It allows several mutually untrustworthy parties to jointly compute a function of their private inputs, without revealing to each other information about those inputs. In the case of unconditional (information-theoretic) security, protocols are known which tolerate a dishonest minority of players, who may coordinate their attack and deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification. It is typically assumed in these results that parties are connected pairwise by authenticated, private channels, and that in addition they have access to a “broadcast ” channel. Broadcast allows one party to send a consistent message to all other parties, guaranteeing consistency even if the broadcaster is corrupted. Because broadcast cannot be simulated on the point-to-point network when more than a third of the parties are corrupt, it is impossible to construct general MPC protocols in this setting without using a broadcast channel (or some equivalent addition to the model). A great deal of research has focused on increasing the efficiency of MPC, primarily in terms of round complexity and communication complexity. In this work we propose a refinement of the round complexity which we term broadcast complexity. We view the broadcast channel as an expensive resource
In a distributed coin-flipping protocol, Blum [ACM Transactions on Computer Systems ’83], the parties try to output a common (close to) uniform bit, even when some adversarially chosen parties try to bias the common output. In an adaptively secure full-information coin flip, Ben-Or and Linial [FOCS ’85], the parties communicate over a broadcast channel, and a computationally unbounded adversary can choose which parties to corrupt along the protocol execution. Ben-Or and Linial proved that the n -party majority protocol is resilient to O(n)O(\sqrt {n})O(n​) corruptions, and conjectured this is a tight upper bound for any n -party protocol (of any round complexity). Their conjecture was proved to be correct, up to polylogarithmic factors, for single-turn (each party sends a single message) single-bit (a message is one bit) protocols Lichtenstein et al. [Combinatorica ’89], symmetric protocols Goldwasser et al. [ICALP ’15], and recently for (arbitrary message length) single-turn protocols Tauman Kalai et al. [DISC ’18]. Yet, the question of many-turn protocols was left entirely open. In this work, we close the above gap, proving that no n -party protocol (of any round complexity) is resilient to Ω(n⋅log⁡3n)\Omega (\sqrt {n} \cdot \log ^3 n)Ω(n​⋅log3n) adaptive corruptions. Namely, majority is the optimal coin-flipping protocol against adaptive adversaries (up to polylogarithmic factors).