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arXiv:2307.12047 · Physical Review Research

Efficient lattice Hamiltonian encoding for the shortest vector problem

Anonymous, Cong Ling, Florian Mintert

Published Sep 11, 2026• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The advent of quantum computing necessitates the transition of worldwide cryptosystems to postquantum cryptography (PQC), which is founded upon the problem of finding short vectors in high-dimensional structured lattices. It is assumed that the structure of these lattices cannot be exploited by quantum or classical algorithms attempting to find short vectors. In this work, we focus on the structure of the lattices used in PQC protocols—negacyclic (and cyclic) lattices—and provide a quantum algorithmic framework that efficiently encodes the structured lattices into Hamiltonians by exploiting their underlying symmetries. The efficient encoding substantially reduces the dimension of the corresponding Hilbert space by limiting it to a relevant subspace where short vectors are likely to be found—leading to significant savings in quantum resources (e.g., qubit count and circuit depth) required to implement a quantum algorithm for finding short vectors. We analytically prove the efficient encoding procedure and benchmark the proposed framework using the variational quantum eigensolver, demonstrating improved results with reduced quantum resources.

DOI
10.1103/zv7d-3vbv

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The advent of quantum computing necessitates the transition of worldwide cryptosystems to postquantum cryptography (PQC), which is founded upon the problem of finding short vectors in high-dimensional structured lattices. It is assumed that the structure of these lattices cannot be exploited by quantum or classical algorithms attempting to find short vectors. In this work, we focus on the structure of the lattices used in PQC protocols—negacyclic (and cyclic) lattices—and provide a quantum algorithmic framework that efficiently encodes the structured lattices into Hamiltonians by exploiting their underlying symmetries. The efficient encoding substantially reduces the dimension of the corresponding Hilbert space by limiting it to a relevant subspace where short vectors are likely to be found—leading to significant savings in quantum resources (e.g., qubit count and circuit depth) required to implement a quantum algorithm for finding short vectors. We analytically prove the efficient encoding procedure and benchmark the proposed framework using the variational quantum eigensolver, demonstrating improved results with reduced quantum resources.
Lattice-based cryptography has emerged as one of the most prominent candidates for postquantum cryptography, projected to be secure against the imminent threat of large-scale fault-tolerant quantum computers. The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is to find the shortest nonzero vector in a given lattice. It is fundamental to lattice-based cryptography and believed to be hard even for quantum computers. We study a natural generalization of the SVP known as the K -Densest Sublattice Problem ( K -DSP): to find the densest K -dimensional sublattice of a given lattice. We formulate K -DSP as finding the first excited state of a Z -basis Hamiltonian, making K -DSP amenable to investigation via an array of quantum algorithms, including Grover search, quantum Gibbs sampling, adiabatic, and variational quantum algorithms. The complexity of the algorithms depends on the basis through which the input lattice is presented. We present a classical polynomial-time algorithm that takes an arbitrary input basis and preprocesses it into inputs suited to quantum algorithms. With preprocessing, we prove that O ( K N 2 ) qubits suffice for solving K -DSP for N -dimensional input lattices. We empirically demonstrate the performance of a quantum approximate optimization algorithm K -DSP solver for low dimensions, highlighting the influence of a good preprocessed input basis. We then discuss the hardness of K -DSP in relation to the SVP, to see if there is a reason to build postquantum cryptography on K -DSP. We devise a quantum algorithm that solves K -DSP with runtime exponent ( 5 K N log 2 N ) / 2 . Therefore, for fixed K , K -DSP is no more than polynomially harder than the SVP. The central insight we use is similar in spirit to those underlying the best-known classical K -DSP algorithm due to Dadush and Micciancio. Whether the exponential dependence on K can be lowered remains an open question. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
The landscape of modern cryptography, traditionally anchored in the computational hardness of number-theoretic problems such as integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem, faces an existential threat from the advent of quantum computing. Shor's algorithm, discovered in 1994, demonstrates the theoretical capability of a sufficiently powerful quantum computer to efficiently solve these problems, rendering widely used cryptographic schemes like RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) insecure. This imminent threat necessitates a paradigm shift towards post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which aims to develop cryptographic algorithms resistant to both classical and quantum attacks. Among the various candidates for PQC, lattice-based cryptography has emerged as a particularly promising area. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the transition from classical number theory-based cryptography to lattice-based schemes. We explore the fundamental mathematical principles underlying lattices, introduce key lattice problems such as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), Closest Vector Problem (CVP), Small Integer Solution (SIS), and Learning With Errors (LWE), and discuss their application in constructing quantum-resistant cryptographic primitives. Furthermore, we analyze the security, efficiency, and practical considerations of prominent lattice-based cryptosystems, highlighting their role in the ongoing NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process. The paper concludes by discussing the challenges and future directions in the deployment and research of lattice-based cryptographic solutions.
A fundamental computational problem is to find a shortest non-zero vector in Euclidean lattices, a problem known as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). This problem is believed to be hard even on quantum computers and thus plays a pivotal role in post-quantum cryptography. In this work we explore how (efficiently) Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices may be used to solve SVP. Specifically, we map the problem to that of finding the ground state of a suitable Hamiltonian. In particular, (i) we establish new bounds for lattice enumeration, this allows us to obtain new bounds (resp. estimates) for the number of qubits required per dimension for any lattices (resp. random q-ary lattices) to solve SVP; (ii) we exclude the zero vector from the optimization space by proposing (a) a different classical optimisation loop or alternatively (b) a new mapping to the Hamiltonian. These improvements allow us to solve SVP in dimension up to 28 in a quantum emulation, significantly more than what was previously achieved, even for special cases. Finally, we extrapolate the size of NISQ devices that is required to be able to solve instances of lattices that are hard even for the best classical algorithms and find that with approximately 103 noisy qubits such instances can be tackled.
Finding the shortest non-zero vector on a lattice is a fundamental problem in lattices that is believed to be hard both for classical and quantum computers. Two of the three standardised by NIST post-quantum cryptosystems rely on its hardness. Research on theoretical and practical performance of quantum algorithms to solve the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is crucial to establish confidence in those new standards. Exploring the capabilities that Variational Quantum Algorithms (VQA) that can run on Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices have in solving SVP has been an active area of research. The qubit-requirement for doing so has been analysed and demonstrated that it is plausible to encode SVP on the ground state of a Hamiltonian in an efficient way. Due to the heuristic nature of VQAs no analysis of the performance and specifically of the time complexity of those approaches for scales beyond the non-interesting classically simulatable sizes has been performed. In this paper, motivated by Boulebnane and Montanaro [1] work on the k-SAT problem, we propose to use angle pretraining of the Quantum Approximate Optimisation Algorithm (QAOA) for SVP and we demonstrate that QAOA with fixed angles performs well on much larger instances than those used in training. Avoiding the limitations that arise due to the use of optimiser, we are able to extrapolate the observed performance and we observe the probability of success scaling as2−0.695n2^{-0.695n}2−0.695nwithnnnbeing dimensionality of the search space for a depthp=3p=3p=3pre-trained QAOA algorithm. By repeating the algorithm, we get heuristic time complexityO(20.695n)O(2^{0.695n})O(20.695n)to solve the problem with high probability, a bit worse than the fault-tolerant Grover approach ofO(20.5n)O(2^{0.5n})O(20.5n). On the other hand, both the number of qubits, and most importantly the depth of each quantum computation, are considerably better in our approach – Grover requires exponential depth, while each run of constantpppfixed-angles QAOA requires polynomial depth. Further, we analyse the performance of QAOA in solving approximate-SVP, a version of the problem that one seeks a multiplicative approximation to the shortest vector. As a side result, we propose a novel method to avoid the zero vector solution to SVP without introducing more logical qubits. This improves upon the previous works as it results in more space efficient encoding of SVP on NISQ architectures without ignoring the zero vector problem.
Noisy intermediate-scale quantum cryptanalysis focuses on the capability of near-term quantum devices to solve the mathematical problems underlying cryptography, and serves as a cornerstone for the design of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. For the shortest vector problem (SVP), which is one of the computationally hard problems in lattice-based cryptography, existing near-term quantum cryptanalysis algorithms map the problem onto a fully-connected quantum Ising Hamiltonian, and obtain the solution by optimizing for the first excited state. However, as the quantum system scales with the problem size, determining the first excited state becomes intractable due to the exponentially increased complexity for large-scale SVP instances. In this paper, we propose a variational quantum Korkin-Zolotarev (VQKZ) algorithm, which significantly reduces the qubit requirement for solving the SVP. Specifically, by transforming the original SVP into a series of subproblems on projected sublattices, the proposed VQKZ algorithm enables near-term quantum devices to solve SVP instances with lattice dimensions 61.39% larger than those solvable by previous methods. Furthermore, numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed VQKZ algorithm can significantly outperform existing methods in terms of the length of solution vectors.
The advent of large-scale quantum computers poses a profound and imminent threat to the security foundations of modern cryptography. Widely deployed public-key cryptosystems, such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), rely on problems like integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which Shor's algorithm can efficiently solve. This necessitates a proactive transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Among leading candidates, lattice-based cryptography stands out due to its robust security guarantees, based on hard problems lacking known efficient quantum solutions, and structural properties facilitating efficient implementation. This paper explores the fundamental principles of lattice-based cryptography, detailing underlying mathematical hard problems such as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVPSVPSVP) and Learning With Errors (LWELWELWE). We review the evolution of lattice-based schemes, from early constructions to contemporary candidates like Kyber and Dilithium, emphasizing their suitability for Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and Digital Signature Schemes (DSS). Furthermore, we analyze their performance characteristics, security assumptions, and resilience against classical and quantum attacks, providing a critical comparison with other PQC families. This comprehensive overview, structured through a systematic critical analysis framework, highlights the ascendancy of lattice-based cryptography as a cornerstone for future quantum-resistant security infrastructure, offering theoretical underpinnings, practical implications, and actionable future research directions for a post-quantum world.