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arXiv:2305.13861 · Science China Information Sciences

Practical phase-coding side-channel-secure quantum key distribution

Yang-Guang Shan, Zhen−Qiang Yin, Shuang Wang, Wei Chen, De‐Yong He, Guang‐Can Guo, Zheng‐Fu Han

Published Sep 10, 2026• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s11432-025-4932-x

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Abstract Security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is based on fundamental laws of quantum physics. However, the security of QKD implementations is at risk due to various deviations, called side channels, of the real device from the theoretical model. In this work, we discuss the practical ways to avoid the threat of side channels in QKD. We use interference visibility measurement for estimation of distinguishability of quantum signals, and show how to integrate it into the security proof. Our results paves the way towards the development of novel robust QKD schemes.
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