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arXiv:2304.03397

High-Dimensional Quantum Certified Deletion

Felix Hufnagel, Anne Broadbent, Ebrahim Karimi

Published Apr 6, 2023• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Certified deletion is a protocol which allows two parties to share information, from Alice to Bob, in such a way that if Bob chooses to delete the information, he can prove to Alice that the deletion has taken place by providing a verification key. It is not possible for Bob to both provide this verification, and gain information about the message that was sent. This type of protocol is unique to quantum information and cannot be done with classical approaches. Here, we expand on previous work to outline a high-dimensional version of certified deletion that can be used to incorporate multiple parties. We also experimentally verify the feasibility of these protocols for the first time, demonstrating the original 2-dimensional proposal, as well as the high-dimensional scenario up to dimension 8.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2304.03397

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Certified deletion is a protocol which allows two parties to share information, from Alice to Bob, in such a way that if Bob chooses to delete the information, he can prove to Alice that the deletion has taken place by providing a verification key. It is not possible for Bob to both provide this verification, and gain information about the message that was sent. This type of protocol is unique to quantum information and cannot be done with classical approaches. Here, we expand on previous work to outline a high-dimensional version of certified deletion that can be used to incorporate multiple parties. We also experimentally verify the feasibility of these protocols for the first time, demonstrating the original 2-dimensional proposal, as well as the high-dimensional scenario up to dimension 8.
Quantum information has the property that measurement is an inherently destructive process. This feature is most apparent in the principle of complementarity, which states that mutually incompatible observables cannot be measured at the same time. Recent work by Broadbent and Islam (TCC 2020) builds on this aspect of quantum mechanics to realize a cryptographic notion called certified deletion. While this remarkable notion enables a classical verifier to be convinced that a (private-key) quantum ciphertext has been deleted by an untrusted party, it offers no additional layer of functionality. In this work, we augment the proof-of-deletion paradigm with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). We construct the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme with certified deletion - an interactive protocol which enables an untrusted quantum server to compute on encrypted data and, if requested, to simultaneously prove data deletion to a client. Our scheme has the desirable property that verification of a deletion certificate is public; meaning anyone can verify that deletion has taken place. Our main technical ingredient is an interactive protocol by which a quantum prover can convince a classical verifier that a sample from the Learning with Errors (LWE) distribution in the form of a quantum state was deleted. As an application of our protocol, we construct a Dual-Regev public-key encryption scheme with certified deletion, which we then extend towards a (leveled) FHE scheme of the same type. We introduce the notion of Gaussian-collapsing hash functions - a special case of collapsing hash functions defined by Unruh (Eurocrypt 2016) - and we prove the security of our schemes under the assumption that the Ajtai hash function satisfies a certain strong Gaussian-collapsing property in the presence of leakage.
Certified deletion allows a client to upload encrypted data to a server as a quantum state, then later request that the server delete their data and detect whether the server complies. If verification passes, then the data on the server will remain hidden even if the decryption key is later leaked. In publicly verifiable certified deletion, the verification key is published so that anyone may check for deletion compliance. In this work, we give a general compiler to publicly verifiable certified deletion that allows the client to initially upload the *quantum* ciphertext using purely *classical* communication, assuming the post-quantum hardness of LWE in the plain model. Our approach can be applied to a wide variety of primitives, including commitments and public-key, attribute-based, identity-based, and fully-homomorphic encryption. Moreover, our constructions allow the client to classically manage the encrypted data beyond just verifying its deletion. The classical client may non-destructively audit the ciphertext via a Proof of No Intrusion to check whether it has been leaked to a third party. The classical client may also retrieve the data while simultaneously verifying its deletion from the server. Thus, they do not have to choose between retrieving the data and protecting it against future key leakage. As our core technical contribution, we give a classical-communication protocol and simulation technique that allows adapting purification-based security arguments for BB84-style states which are prepared through classical interaction. It makes the required purification available in a hybrid experiment, despite the classical transcript uniquely determining the prepared state in a real execution.
In the context of classical information, every message is composed of 0s and 1s; these messages can generally be copied at will. However, when quantum phenomena are used to model information, this guarantee no longer exists. This difference gives rise to a range of cryptographic possibilities when one considers encoding certain messages as quantum information. In our case, we analyze a potential benefit of encoding part of an encryption scheme’s ciphertext as quantum information. We call this type of ciphertext a quantum ciphertext. In particular, quantum ciphertexts are useful when one wants to be able to prove the deletion of the plaintext underlying a ciphertext. Since classical ciphertexts can be copied, clearly such feat is impossible using classical information alone. However, we show that quantum encodings allow such certified deletion. More precisely, we show that it is possible to encrypt classical data into a quantum ciphertext such that the recipient of the ciphertext can produce a classical string which proves to the originator that the recipient has relinquished any chance of recovering the plaintext, should the decryption key be revealed. Our scheme is feasible with current quantum technology: the honest parties only require quantum devices for single-qubit preparation and measurements, and the scheme is robust against noise in these devices. Furthermore, we provide a proof of security which requires only a finite amount of communication, and which therefore avoids the common technique of relying on the analysis of an asymptotic case.
Certified deletion allows Alice to outsource data to Bob and, at a later time, obtain a verifiable guarantee that the file has been irreversibly deleted at her request. This functionality, while impossible using classical information alone, can be achieved using quantum information. Existing approaches rely either on one-time pad (OTP) encryption or on computational hardness assumptions that may be vulnerable to future advances in classical or quantum computing. In this work, we introduce and formalize hybrid encryption with certified deletion in the preprocessing model (pHE-CD) and propose two constructions. Each construction composes an information-theoretic key encapsulation mechanism (iKEM) with a data encapsulation mechanism that provides certified deletion (DEM-CD) security, offering different security guarantees depending on the properties of DEM-CD. When DEM-CD is one-time information-theoretically secure, the composition provides information-theoretic security for both encryption and certified deletion. When DEM-CD is computationally secure, the composed construction provides computationally secure (post-quantum) encryption and everlasting certified deletion, where confidentiality is computational until the deletion certificate is successfully verified. After successful verification, confidentiality becomes unconditional. That is, successful verification of the deletion certificate guarantees that the data has been removed information-theoretically from the adversary's view. Both pHE-CD constructions support the encryption of arbitrarily long messages. Construction 2 is key-efficient and uses a DEM-CD built from quantum coding and AES, providing quantum-safe security for encryption. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results and directions for future research.
Consider two parties: Alice and Bob and suppose that Bob is given a qubit system in a quantum state ϕ , unknown to him. Alice knows ϕ and she is supposed to convince Bob that she knows ϕ sending some test message. Is it possible for her to convince Bob providing him "zero knowledge" i. e. no information about ϕ he has? We prove that there is no "zero knowledge" protocol of that kind. In fact it turns out that basing on Alice message, Bob (or third party - Eve - who can intercept the message) can synthetize a copy of the unknown qubit state ϕ with nonzero probability. This "no-go" result puts general constrains on information processing where information about quantum state is involved.
Consider two parties: Alice and Bob and suppose that Bob is given a qubit system in a quantum state phi\\phiphi, unknown to him. Alice knows phi\\phiphi and she is supposed to convince Bob that she knows phi\\phiphi sending some test message. Is it possible for her to convince Bob providing him "zero knowledge" i. e. no information about phi\\phiphi he has? We prove that there is no "zero knowledge" protocol of that kind. In fact it turns out that basing on Alice message, Bob (or third party - Eve - who can intercept the message) can synthetize a copy of the unknown qubit state phi\\phiphi with nonzero probability. This "no-go" result puts general constrains on information processing where information {\\it about} quantum state is involved.