Abstract We introduce a class of circuits that solve a particular case of the Bernstein–Vazirani recursive problem for second-level recursion. This class of circuits allows for the implementation of the oracle using a number of T-gates that grows linearly with the number of qubits in the problem. We find an application of this scheme to quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE), which is an important cryptographic technology useful for delegated quantum computing, allowing a remote server to perform quantum computations on encrypted quantum data, so that the server cannot know anything about the client’s data. Liang’s QHE schemes are suitable for circuits with a polynomial number of gates T / T † . Thus, the simplified circuits we have constructed can be evaluated homomorphically in an efficient manner.
Abstract We introduce a class of circuits that solve a particular case of the Bernstein–Vazirani recursive problem for second-level recursion. This class of circuits allows for the implementation of the oracle using a number of T-gates that grows linearly with the number of qubits in the problem. We find an application of this scheme to quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE), which is an important cryptographic technology useful for delegated quantum computing, allowing a remote server to perform quantum computations on encrypted quantum data, so that the server cannot know anything about the client’s data. Liang’s QHE schemes are suitable for circuits with a polynomial number of gates T / T † . Thus, the simplified circuits we have constructed can be evaluated homomorphically in an efficient manner.
We apply quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) schemes suitable for circuits with a polynomial number of T + T † gates to Grover's algorithm, performing a simulation in Qiskit of a Grover circuit that contains three qubits. The T + T † -gate complexity of Grover's algorithm is also analyzed in order to show that any Grover circuit can be evaluated homomorphically in an efficient manner. We discuss how to apply these QHE schemes to allow for the efficient homomorphic evaluation of any Grover circuit composed of n qubits using n − 2 extra ancilla qubits. We also show how the homomorphic evaluation of the special case where there is only one marked item can be implemented using an algorithm that makes the decryption process more efficient compared with the standard Grover algorithm. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) can allow clients to directly perform quantum computation on encrypted data with the assistance of a remote quantum server. However, existing QHE schemes often overlook the crucial property of verifiability which enables clients to validate the correctness of computation results provided by the server. In this paper, we propose a verifiable QHE scheme based on the universal quantum gate set {H,P,Toffoli}. At first, a specialized gadget is designed to eliminate the errors that may arise during the homomorphic evaluation of non-Clifford Toffoli gates in a non-interactive manner. Furthermore, the designed gadget is versatile and can be seamlessly integrated into an existing QHE scheme that implements quantum gates in another universal quantum gate set {H,T,CNOT} to homomorphically evaluate more quantum gates. Subsequently, a verifiable method is introduced to the QHE scheme based on {H,P,Toffoli} for the client to detect whether the server is honest during the homomorphic computation by employing three types of indistinguishable quantum circuits.
Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) is an encryption method that allows quantum computation to be performed on one party's private data with the program provided by another party, without revealing much information about the data nor about the program to the opposite party. It is known that information-theoretically-secure QHE for circuits of unrestricted size would require exponential resources, and efficient computationally-secure QHE schemes for polynomial-sized quantum circuits have been constructed. In this paper we first propose a QHE scheme for a type of circuits of polynomial depth, based on the rebit quantum computation formalism. The scheme keeps the restricted type of data perfectly secure. We then propose a QHE scheme for a larger class of polynomial-depth quantum circuits, which has partial data privacy. Both schemes have good circuit privacy. We also propose an interactive QHE scheme with asymptotic data privacy, however, the circuit privacy is not good, in the sense that the party who provides the data could cheat and learn about the circuit. We show that such cheating would generally affect the correctness of the evaluation or cause deviation from the protocol. Hence the cheating can be caught by the opposite party in an interactive scheme with embedded verifications. Such scheme with verification has a minor drawback in data privacy. Finally, we show some methods which achieve some nontrivial level of data privacy and circuit privacy without resorting to allowing early terminations, in both the QHE problem and in secure evaluation of classical functions. The entanglement and classical communication costs in these schemes are polynomial in the circuit size and the security parameter (if any).
Cloud computing allows clients with limited computational resources to offload computations to more powerful remote servers. In this paradigm, homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes enable a server to run any computation on a client's encrypted data. These schemes are widely used in cloud computing protocols such as delegated computing, two-party secure computation, and zero-knowledge proofs. Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) aims to achieve the objectives of HE with quantum data and quantum circuits, enabling cloud quantum servers to compute on encrypted quantum data uploaded by clients. In this work, we consider a scenario where a client has access to a quantum “encryption/decryption device”, which allows the encryption, transmission, reception, and decryption of quantum states, but not universal quantum computation. In this setting, we provide a proof-of-concept software simulation of quantum homomorphic encryption. Our code implements the “EPR scheme” of Broadbent and Jeffery, which allows for the execution of universal quantum circuits by the server at the cost of requiring shared EPR pairs between the client and server. Our implementation explores the near-term viability of the EPR scheme. Perhaps unsurprisingly, our experiments indicate that the additional cost of homomorphic circuit evaluation is minor in comparison to the simulation cost of the quantum operations. Our simulation toolkit is implemented in Python and is open-source.
Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) is an encryption method that allows quantum computation to be performed on one party's private data with the program provided by another party, without revealing much information about the data nor about the program to the opposite party. It is known that information-theoretically-secure QHE for circuits of unrestricted size would require exponential resources, and efficient computationally-secure QHE schemes for polynomial-sized quantum circuits have been constructed. In this paper we first propose a QHE scheme for a type of circuits of polynomial depth, based on the rebit quantum computation formalism. The scheme keeps the restricted type of data perfectly secure. We then propose a QHE scheme for a larger class of polynomial-depth quantum circuits, which has partial data privacy. Both schemes have good circuit privacy. We also propose an interactive QHE scheme with asymptotic data privacy, however, the circuit privacy is not good, in the sense that the party who provides the data could cheat and learn about the circuit. We show that such cheating would generally affect the correctness of the evaluation or cause deviation from the protocol. Hence the cheating can be caught by the opposite party in an interactive scheme with embedded verifications. Such scheme with verification has a minor drawback in data privacy. Finally, we show some methods which achieve some nontrivial level of data privacy and circuit privacy without resorting to allowing early terminations, in both the QHE problem and in secure evaluation of classical functions. The entanglement and classical communication costs in these schemes are polynomial in the circuit size and the security parameter (if any).
Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic primitive that enables information processing on encrypted data. Such primitives are useful in a delegated computing setting in which a client delegates processing to a server, but does not trust the server fully with her information. Here, I discuss a way of performing quantum homomorphic encryption. A homomorphic encryption protocol comprises of four algorithms: random key generation, encryption, evaluation, and decryption. Our technique requires that a pair of commuting operators be used to implement the encryption and evaluation. The client randomly selects the former, while the server implements the latter. Then post-evaluation, if the client decrypts using the inverse of the encryption, he retrieves the input state with the desired computation implemented. The code space has to be chosen carefully so that non-trivial evaluations can be performed on the logical qubits. Since the encryption key is not known to the server, the randomness introduced by key generation hides some information about the encoded data despite it being put into the hands of the server. This framework is powerful because it gives a general description for implementing quantum homomorphic encryption. For example, families of commuting groups of operators are known to exist via the Schur-Weyl duality. However, it is limited by a no-go theorem that states that an exponential overhead is needed if arbitrary computation and perfect security are desired. Nonetheless, our protocols are still interesting as an application for near-term quantum computers, especially when the computational tasks require only low-depth circuits.