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arXiv:2302.12867

On homomorphic encryption using abelian groups: Classical security analysis

Eleni Agathocleous, Vishnupriya Anupindi, Annette Bachmayr, Chloe Martindale, Rahinatou Yuh Njah Nchiwo, Mima Stanojkovski

Published Feb 24, 2023• 0 citations
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Abstract

In [15], Leonardi and Ruiz-Lopez propose an additively homomorphic public key encryption scheme whose security is expected to depend on the hardness of the learning homomorphism with noise problem (LHN). Choosing parameters for their primitive requires choosing three groups $G$, $H$, and $K$. In their paper, Leonardi and Ruiz-Lopez claim that, when $G$, $H$, and $K$ are abelian, then their public key cryptosystem is not quantum secure. In this paper, we study security for finite abelian groups $G$, $H$, and $K$ in the classical case. Moreover, we study quantum attacks on instantiations with solvable groups.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2302.12867

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In [15], Leonardi and Ruiz-Lopez propose an additively homomorphic public key encryption scheme whose security is expected to depend on the hardness of the learning homomorphism with noise problem (LHN). Choosing parameters for their primitive requires choosing three groups GGG, HHH, and KKK. In their paper, Leonardi and Ruiz-Lopez claim that, when GGG, HHH, and KKK are abelian, then their public key cryptosystem is not quantum secure. In this paper, we study security for finite abelian groups GGG, HHH, and KKK in the classical case. Moreover, we study quantum attacks on instantiations with solvable groups.
Group homomorphic encryption represents one of the most important building blocks in modern cryptography. It forms the basis of widely-used, more sophisticated primitives, such as CCA2-secure encryption or secure multiparty computation. Unfortunately, recent advances in quantum computation show that many of the existing schemes completely break down once quantum computers reach maturity (mainly due to Shor's algorithm). This leads to the challenge of constructing quantum-resistant group homomorphic cryptosystems. In this work, we prove the general impossibility of (abelian) group homomorphic encryption in the presence of quantum adversaries, when assuming the IND-CPA security notion as the minimal security requirement. To this end, we prove a new result on the probability of sampling generating sets of finite (sub-)groups if sampling is done with respect to an arbitrary, unknown distribution. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition on homomorphic encryption schemes for our quantum attack to work and discuss its satisfiability in non-group homomorphic cases. The impact of our results on recent fully homomorphic encryption schemes poses itself as an open question.
Web-servers are a dominant medium of modern communication and thus process vast amounts of highly sensitive, private data. Social networks, online auctions, and all kinds of cloud services constitute popular examples of online services complying with this paradigm. Due to many alarming scandals regarding the misuse of private data, IT security solutions protecting this sensitive data (for example by hiding it through encryption) are indispensable. Ideally, web-servers should be able to compute on private data without seeing it - we refer to this as the "Secure Outsourcing of Computation". Most notably, the cryptographic primitive of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) enables the web-servers to process data in the encrypted domain, which thereby hides/protects all private data as it is never available in the clear. More precisely, HE is a type of encryption that allows for the computation of certain functionalities on encrypted data without knowledge of the decryption key. Depending on the HE scheme, various functionalities can be evaluated in the encrypted domain, ranging from additions or multiplications only (Group Homomorphic Encryption, GHE), to virtually any computable functionality (Fully Homomorphic Encryption, FHE). We provide a clean foundational framework for HE that permits security characterizations for a large class of HE schemes and shows strong similarities between GHE and FHE. We study these characterizations in order to assess the limits of HE, and show that GHE is obsolete in the quantum world, meaning that any GHE scheme can be broken by a quantum computer. Together with our newly constructed universal blueprint that encompasses virtually any GHE scheme, we know exactly how these schemes must be designed and what the underlying hardness assumptions must look like. To some extent, this rounds off the topic of GHE both in the standard and quantum model of computation. In the standard model (which is presently assumed to be the most realistic model of computation), GHE is still highly attractive as it provides very efficient solutions to a variety of practical problems. On the basis of our foundational framework, we construct new GHE schemes with unique features and show their employability in practical applications. Most importantly, we use the special features of one of these schemes and develop a novel technique to achieve a practically efficient solution to the problem of securely outsourcing computations. Our construction allows multiple users to send encryptions of their private data under their own keys to a distrusted web-server that can then, on behalf of the users, evaluate any dynamically chosen computable function on these inputs in the encrypted domain (even across encryptions under different public keys) without learning anything at all, and without interacting with the users.
There has been a great deal of work on improving the efficiency of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. Our approach, in this regard, is to use the idea of packed ciphertexts to construct a multi-bit FHE with a short public key on the basis of the learning with errors (LWE) problem. More specifically, our FHE scheme builds on a basic encryption scheme that chooses LWE samples from the Gaussian distribution and adds Gaussian error to it. This results in decreasing the number of LWE samples from 2nlogq to n + 1. We prove that our FHE scheme is pragmatically feasible and its security relies on the hardness of the LWE problem. In addition, we form a new process of key switching for multi-bit FHE based on the ideas adopted by Brakerski et al. for optimizing the process of key switching. Finally, we analyze and compare the concrete parameters between our FHE scheme and BGH13 scheme. The result shows that compared with the BGH13 scheme, our scheme has a smaller public key by a factor about logq.
Hash functions are a basic cryptographic primitive. Certain hash functions try to prove security against collision and preimage attacks by reductions to known hard problems. These hash functions usually have some additional properties that allow for that reduction. Hash functions which are additive or multiplicative are vulnerable to a quantum attack using the hidden subgroup problem algorithm for quantum computers. Using a quantum oracle to the hash, we can reconstruct the kernel of the hash function, which is enough to find collisions and second preimages. When the hash functions are additive with respect to the group operation in an Abelian group, there is always an efficient implementation of this attack. We present concrete attack examples to provable hash functions, including a preimage attack to ⊕\oplus⊕-linear hash functions and for certain multiplicative homomorphic hash schemes.
The efficiency of fully homomorphic encryption is a big question at present. To improve efficiency of fully homomorphic encryption, we use the technique of packed ciphertext to construct a multi-bit fully homomorphic encryption based on Learning with Errors problem. Our scheme has a short public key. Since our fully homomorphic encryption scheme builds on the basic encryption scheme that choose Learning with Errors samples from Gaussian distribution and add Gaussian error to it, which result in that the number of Learning with Errors samples decrease from 2nlogq to n+1. We prove that our fully homomorphic encryption scheme is feasible and its security relies on the hardness of Learning with Errors problem. In addition we adapt the optimization for the process of key switching from GHS13 and formal this new process of key switching for multi-bit fully homomorphic encryption. At last, we analyze the concert parameters and compare these parameters between our scheme and GHS13 scheme. The data show that our scheme has public key smaller by a factor of about logq than it in GHS13 scheme.