Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2211.01665 · Lecture notes in computer science

Best-of-Both-Worlds Multiparty Quantum Computation with Publicly Verifiable Identifiable Abort

Kai-Min Chung, Mi-Ying Huang, Er-Cheng Tang, Jiapeng Zhang

Published Jan 1, 2024• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-58751-1_5

Related papers

Round Efficient Secure Multiparty Quantum Computation with Identifiable Abort

Bar Alon, Hao Chung, Kai-Min Chung +3 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2021•18 citations

Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation with Identifiable Abort

Carsten Baum, Emmanuela Orsini, Peter Schöll

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2016•37 citations

Secure Multiparty Computation with Identifiable Abort via Vindicating Release

Ran Cohen, Jack Doerner, Yashvanth Kondi +1 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2024•12 citations

Secure Multi-Party Computation with Identifiable Abort

Yuval Ishai, Rafail Ostrovsky, Vassilis Zikas

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2014•103 citations

Multiparty Computation with Covert Security and Public Verifiability

Peter Schöll, Mark Simkin, Luisa Siniscalchi

Multiparty computation protocols (MPC) are said to be secure against covert adversaries if the honest parties are guaranteed to detect any misbehavior by the malicious parties with a constant probability. Protocols that, upon detecting a cheating attempt, additionally allow the honest parties to compute certificates, which enable third parties to be convinced of the malicious behavior of the accused parties, are called publicly verifiable. In this work, we make several contributions to the domain of MPC with security against covert adversaries. We identify a subtle flaw in a protocol of Goyal, Mohassel, and Smith (Eurocrypt 2008), meaning that their protocol does not allow to identify a cheating party, and show how to fix their original construction to obtain security against covert adversaries. We present generic compilers that transform arbitrary passively secure preprocessing protocols, i.e. protocols where the parties have no private inputs, into protocols that are secure against covert adversaries and publicly verifiable. Using our compiler, we construct the first efficient variants of the BMR and the SPDZ protocols that are secure and publicly verifiable against a covert adversary that corrupts all but one party, and also construct variants with covert security and identifiable abort. We observe that an existing impossibility result by Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu (TCC 2012) can be used to show that there exist certain functionalities that cannot be realized by parties, that have oracle-access to broadcast and arbitrary two-party functionalities, with information-theoretic security against a covert adversary.

Leibniz international proceedings in informatics•Jan 1, 2022•5 citations

Secure Multi-party Quantum Computation with a Dishonest Majority

Yfke Dulek, Alex B. Grilo, Stacey Jeffery +2 more

arXiv:1909.13770•Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2020•58 citations
Multiparty computation protocols (MPC) are said to be secure against covert adversaries if the honest parties are guaranteed to detect any misbehavior by the malicious parties with a constant probability. Protocols that, upon detecting a cheating attempt, additionally allow the honest parties to compute certificates, which enable third parties to be convinced of the malicious behavior of the accused parties, are called publicly verifiable. In this work, we make several contributions to the domain of MPC with security against covert adversaries. We identify a subtle flaw in a protocol of Goyal, Mohassel, and Smith (Eurocrypt 2008), meaning that their protocol does not allow to identify a cheating party, and show how to fix their original construction to obtain security against covert adversaries. We present generic compilers that transform arbitrary passively secure preprocessing protocols, i.e. protocols where the parties have no private inputs, into protocols that are secure against covert adversaries and publicly verifiable. Using our compiler, we construct the first efficient variants of the BMR and the SPDZ protocols that are secure and publicly verifiable against a covert adversary that corrupts all but one party, and also construct variants with covert security and identifiable abort. We observe that an existing impossibility result by Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu (TCC 2012) can be used to show that there exist certain functionalities that cannot be realized by parties, that have oracle-access to broadcast and arbitrary two-party functionalities, with information-theoretic security against a covert adversary.