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arXiv:2208.11793 · Quantum

Relative Facts of Relational Quantum Mechanics are Incompatible with Quantum Mechanics

Jay Lawrence, Marcin Markiewicz, Marek Żukowski

Published May 23, 2023• 21 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) claims to be an interpretation of quantum theory \cite{Rovelli.21}. However, there are significant departures from quantum theory: (i) in RQM measurement outcomes arise from interactions which entangle a system S and an observer A without decoherence, and (ii) such an outcome is a "fact" relative to the observer A , but it is not a fact relative to another observer B who has not interacted with S or A during the foregoing measurement process. For B the system S⊗A remains entangled. We derive a GHZ-like contradiction showing that relative facts described by these statements are incompatible with quantum theory. Hence Relational Quantum Mechanics should not be considered an interpretation of quantum theory, according to a criterion for interpretations that we have introduced. The criterion states that whenever an interpretation introduces a notion of outcomes, these outcomes, whatever they are, must follow the probability distribution specified by the Born rule.

DOI
10.22331/q-2023-05-23-1015

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Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) claims to be an interpretation of quantum theory \cite{Rovelli.21}. However, there are significant departures from quantum theory: (i) in RQM measurement outcomes arise from interactions which entangle a system S and an observer A without decoherence, and (ii) such an outcome is a "fact" relative to the observer A , but it is not a fact relative to another observer B who has not interacted with S or A during the foregoing measurement process. For B the system S⊗A remains entangled. We derive a GHZ-like contradiction showing that relative facts described by these statements are incompatible with quantum theory. Hence Relational Quantum Mechanics should not be considered an interpretation of quantum theory, according to a criterion for interpretations that we have introduced. The criterion states that whenever an interpretation introduces a notion of outcomes, these outcomes, whatever they are, must follow the probability distribution specified by the Born rule.
Abstract Lawrence et al. have presented an argument purporting to show that “relative facts do not exist” and, consequently, “Relational Quantum Mechanics is incompatible with quantum mechanics”. The argument is based on a GHZ-like contradiction between constraints satisfied by measurement outcomes in an extended Wigner’s friend scenario. Here we present a strengthened version of the argument, and show why, contrary to the claim by Lawrence et al., these arguments do not contradict the consistency of a theory of relative facts. Rather, considering this argument helps clarify how one should not think about a theory of relative facts, like RQM.
The relational interpretation (or RQM, for Relational Quantum Mechanics) solves the measurement problem by considering an ontology of sparse relative events, or "facts". Facts are realized in interactions between any two physical systems and are relative to these systems. RQM's technical core is the realisation that quantum transition amplitudes determine physical probabilities only when their arguments are facts relative to the same system. The relativity of facts can be neglected in the approximation where decoherence hides interference, thus making facts approximately stable.
We discuss the status of relative facts - the central concept of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) - in the context of the new amendment to RQM called cross-perspective links postulate. The new axiom states that by a proper measurement one learns the value of the relative outcome/fact earlier obtained by another observer-system. We discuss a Wigner-Friend-type scenario in which, without cross-perspective links postulate, relative facts have no predictive or causal power, whereas including cross-perspective links makes them effectively hidden variables, which causally determine outcomes of specific measurements. However, cross-perspective links axiom invalidates the other axiom of RQM, the one which states that in a Wigner-Friend scenario, RQM assigns an entangled state to the Friend and System after the unitary transformation of their interaction, despite the appearance of the relative fact for the Friend. This quantum mechanical state according to RQM properly describes the situation for Wigner. From this we show that RQM with cross-perspective links axiom is an internally inconsistent hidden variable theory and therefore cannot be treated as an interpretation of quantum mechanics in any sense.
Abstract This essay compares and contrasts relational quantum mechanics (RQM) with a pragmatist view of quantum theory (DP). It first explains important points of agreement. Then it points to two problems faced by RQM and sketch DP’s solutions to analogous problems. As both RQM and DP have taken the Born Rule to require relative facts, the essay next says what these might be. The main objection to RQM as originally conceived is that its ontology of relative facts is incompatible with scientific objectivity and undercuts the evidential base of quantum theory. In contrast, DP’s relative facts have all the objectivity one needs to accept quantum theory as scientific knowledge. But a very recent modification to RQM has successfully addressed the main objection, bringing the two views into even closer alignment.
This paper examines the explanatory adequacy of formulations of relational quantum mechanics by distinguishing two levels of relationality. Intra-event relationality concerns the specification of a fact that obtains relative to a system in a particular interaction; inter-event relationality concerns the constraints connecting an event to subsequent events, physical records, and a relational history. Using established results from measurement theory, we show that an effect can specify the statistics of the current outcome without uniquely determining the conditional operation or the statistics of subsequent sequences. Likewise, a fixed coupling and ready state do not uniquely determine the structure of retrievable records unless the readout is specified. We accordingly introduce a task-relative criterion of explanatory adequacy: the required structures must be assessed against the particular explanatory role that a formulation assigns to an event, a relational fact, or a link between perspectives. The conclusion is not that RQM must derive instruments, dynamics, or linking rules from relational principles. A formulation that explicitly incorporates these structures can be fully adequate for the task in question. The paper contributes a distinction between intra-event and inter-event adequacy, a unified criterion for the division of explanatory labor, and a task-relative definition of an architectural deficit.
The relational approach to quantum states asserts that the physical description of quantum systems is always relative to something or someone. In relational quantum mechanics (RQM) it is relative to other quantum systems, in the (neo-)Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory to measurement contexts, and in QBism to the beliefs of the agents. In contrast to the other two interpretations, in RQM any interaction between two quantum systems counts as a "measurement", and the terms "observer" and "observed system" apply to arbitrary systems. We show, in the form of a no-go theorem, that in RQM the physical description of a system relative to an observer cannot represent knowledge about the observer in the conventional sense of this term. The problem lies in the ambiguity in the choice of the basis with respect to which the relative states are to be defined in RQM. In interpretations of quantum theory where observations play a fundamental role, the problem does not arise because the experimental context defines a preferred basis.