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arXiv:2207.06295

On the Free Will Theorem

Simon Kochen

Published Jul 13, 2022• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We strengthen the Free Will Theorem, which proved the spontaneity of particles, based on the free will of the experimenter. The new result is unconditional, and does not require the experimenter's free will to prove the particles' spontaneity.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2207.06295

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