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arXiv:2205.05520 · Foundations of Physics

Limitations to Genuine Measurements in Ontological Models of Quantum Mechanics

Roderich Tumulka

Published Oct 1, 2022• 6 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract Given an ontological model of a quantum system, a “genuine measurement,” as opposed to a quantum measurement, means an experiment that determines the value of a beable, i.e., of a variable that, according to the model, has an actual value in nature before the experiment. We prove a theorem showing that in every ontological model, it is impossible to measure all beables. Put differently, there is no experiment that would reliably determine the ontic state. This result shows that the positivistic idea that a physical theory should only involve observable quantities is too optimistic.

DOI
10.1007/s10701-022-00633-2

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Abstract Given an ontological model of a quantum system, a “genuine measurement,” as opposed to a quantum measurement, means an experiment that determines the value of a beable, i.e., of a variable that, according to the model, has an actual value in nature before the experiment. We prove a theorem showing that in every ontological model, it is impossible to measure all beables. Put differently, there is no experiment that would reliably determine the ontic state. This result shows that the positivistic idea that a physical theory should only involve observable quantities is too optimistic.
Studying the extent to which realism is compatible with quantum mechanics teaches us something about the quantum mechanical universe, regardless of the validity of such realistic assumptions. It has also recently been appreciated that these kinds of studies are fruitful for questions relating to quantum information and computation. Motivated by this, we extend the ontological model formalism for realistic theories to describe a set of theories emphasizing the role of measurement and preparation devices by introducing `hidden variables' to describe them. We illustrate both the ontological model formalism and our generalization of it through a series of example models taken from the literature. Our extension of the formalism allows us to quantitatively analyze the meaning contextuality (a constraint on successful realistic theories), finding that - taken at face-value - it can be realized as a natural interaction between the configurations of a system and measurement device. However, we also describe a property that we call deficiency, which follows from contextuality, but does not admit such a natural interpretation. Loosely speaking, deficiency breaks a symmetry between preparations and measurements in quantum mechanics. It is the property that the set of ontic states which a system prepared in quantum state psi may actually be in, is strictly smaller than the set of ontic states which would reveal the measurement outcome psi with certainty.
The problem of objectification of measurement is investigated in orthodox quantum mechanics, that is assuming the validity of the Schrodinger equation (and the other postulates) for the composite object-plus-measuring-instrument system. It is argued that by giving physical meaning to basic entities, the positivist and the realist positions must be explicitly distinguished. It is shown that the objectification problem is satisfactorily solved within quantum mechanics for the positivist, but not for the realist. For the latter, a partially satisfactory solution is obtained by assuming that the quantum mechanical description of individual systems is incomplete and, by assuming further, that the pointer observable has definite values prior to any measurement in any quantum state (a so-called beable).
In this paper, we show that Quantum Mechanics does not admit ontological models, in the sense that the quantum state of a system cannot correspond to a set of physical states representing the independent reality of the system. We show, via two thought experiments based on the Wigner's friend scenario, that if the ontic state of physical systems in the lab is the same for Wigner and for his friend, one of the following will be violated: PBR theorem, Quantum-theoretic predictions, and the "No-superdeterminism" assumption.
Epistemic models of nature prove to be problematic in many settings, particularly in those in which measurement procedures are ill-defined. By contrast, in ontological models of nature, measurement results are independent of the procedure used to obtain them. Quantum mechanics, as a model of nature, is notoriously ambiguous in this regard. If we assume that all measurement results can be expressed in terms of pointer readings, then any useful ontology would need to unambiguously specify the positions of things. But the positions of pointers are ill-defined in many relativistic and cosmological settings. One potential solution to this problem presents itself in the solutions to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation as developed by Hartle and Hawking. In this article we introduce such a model in which these solutions to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation serve as the ontology of the model. We then show that, for any model that admits these solutions as beables, the global preservation of Lorentz invariance is incompatible with global determinism. However, we also show that an Everett-like interpretation that allows for all possible mappings of the matter field to the geometry and for all possible foliations of these mappings as being equally real, might solve this problem.
The ontological model framework provides a rigorous approach to address the question of whether the quantum state is ontic or epistemic. When considering only conventional projective measurements, auxiliary assumptions are always needed to prove the reality of the quantum state in the framework. For example, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem is based on an additional preparation independence assumption. In this paper, we give a new proof of psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements in the ontological model framework. It is argued that the proof needs not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and also applies to deterministic theories such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In addition, we give a simpler argument for psi-ontology beyond the framework, which is only based on protective measurements and a weaker criterion of reality. The argument may be also appealing for those people who favor an anti-realist view of quantum mechanics.
What is a physical object according to the theory of quantum mechanics? The first answer to be considered is that given by Bohr in terms of the concept of complementarity. This interpretation is illustrated by way of an example, the two slit experiment, which highlights some of the associated problems of ontology. One such problem is the so-called problem of measurement or observation. Various interpretations of measurement in Quantum Theory, including those of Heisenberg, von Neumann, Everett and Bohr, are compared and contrasted. A second problem concerns whether or not QT can be considered complete and therefore satisfactory as a basis for physics. Various attempts to complete QT by means of the addition of ‘hidden variables’ to the quantum mechanical state function are considered and their aims and achievements assessed. Finally, we investigate some of the characteristic ontological problems for the orthodox interpretation of Relativistic Quantum Theory.