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arXiv:2203.14997 · Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical

Intermediate determinism in general probabilistic theories

Victoria J Wright

Published Nov 7, 2022• 0 citations
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Abstract

Abstract Quantum theory is indeterministic, but not completely so. When a system is in a pure state there are properties it possesses with certainty, known as actual properties. The actual properties of a quantum system (in a pure state) fully determine the probability of finding the system to have any other property. We will call this principle, wherein the deterministic elements of a theory completely characterise the probabilistic elements, intermediate determinism. In dimensions of at least three, intermediate determinism in quantum theory is guaranteed by the structure of its lattice of properties. This observation follows from Gleason’s theorem, which is why it fails to hold in dimension two. In this work we extend the idea of intermediate determinism from properties to measurements. Under this extension intermediate determinism follows from the structure of quantum effects for separable Hilbert spaces of any dimension, including dimension two. Then, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for a general probabilistic theory to obey intermediate determinism. We show that, although related, both the no-restriction hypothesis and a Gleason-type theorem are neither necessary nor sufficient for intermediate determinism.

DOI
10.1088/1751-8121/aca0d0

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Abstract Quantum theory is indeterministic, but not completely so. When a system is in a pure state there are properties it possesses with certainty, known as actual properties. The actual properties of a quantum system (in a pure state) fully determine the probability of finding the system to have any other property. We will call this principle, wherein the deterministic elements of a theory completely characterise the probabilistic elements, intermediate determinism. In dimensions of at least three, intermediate determinism in quantum theory is guaranteed by the structure of its lattice of properties. This observation follows from Gleason’s theorem, which is why it fails to hold in dimension two. In this work we extend the idea of intermediate determinism from properties to measurements. Under this extension intermediate determinism follows from the structure of quantum effects for separable Hilbert spaces of any dimension, including dimension two. Then, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for a general probabilistic theory to obey intermediate determinism. We show that, although related, both the no-restriction hypothesis and a Gleason-type theorem are neither necessary nor sufficient for intermediate determinism.
The postulates of quantum theory are rather abstract in comparison with those of other physical theories such as special relativity. This thesis considers two tools for investigating this discrepancy and makes a connection between them. The first of these tools, Gleason-type theorems, illustrates the interplay between postulates concerning observables, states and probabilities of measurement outcomes, demonstrating that they need not be entirely independent. Gleason’s original and remarkable result applied to observables described by projection-valued measures; however, the theorem does not hold in dimension two. Busch generalised the idea to observables described by positive operator measures, proving a result which holds for all separable Hilbert spaces. We show that Busch’s assumptions may be weakened without affecting the result. The manner in which we weaken the assumptions brings them closer to Gleason’s original treatment of projection-valued measures. We will then demonstrate the connection between Gleason-type theorems and Cauchy’s functional equation, a connection which yields an alternative proof of Busch’s result. The second tool we consider is the family of general probabilistic theories which offers a means of comparing quantum theory with reasonable alternatives. We identify a general probabilistic theory which reproduces the set of non-local correlations achievable in quantum theory, a property often thought to be particular to quantum theory. Finally, we connect these two tools by determining the class of general probabilistic theories which admit a Gleason-type theorem.
In quantum physics the tests of most properties do not have predetermined outcomes. The latter have nevertheless well-defined probabilities of being realized during a test. Following Popper we interpret these probabilities as physical propensities. A first purpose of the present article is to formalize the propensity interpretation in the framework of state-property structures. Next, Gleason’s theorem asserts that in the Hilbert space there exists a unique propensity function (i.e., one probability measure for each state vector); the propensities are thus uniquely determined by the state vector. Conversely, we prove that if the state-property structure admits one and only one propensity function, then the set ℒ of all properties is a complete atomic orthomodular lattice. We point out that according to our assumption the probabilistic aspect of the system is entirely determined by its deterministic aspect. Assuming furthermore that each property can be ideally tested, it follows that ℒ is isomorphic to the direct union of Hilbertian space lattices. We recover thus the purely classical and purely quantum frameworks as the two extreme cases. The intermediate cases correspond to quantum mechanics with—possibly continuous—superselection variables. Finally, we prove that a system is classical, i.e., all properties are mutually compatible, if and only if the propensity function is dispersion free. In our approach the quantum probabilities appear thus as a generalization of classical determinism rather than a generalization of classical probabilities.
Gleason-type theorems for quantum theory allow one to recover the quantum state space by assuming that (i) states consistently assign probabilities to measurement outcomes and that (ii) there is a unique state for every such assignment. We identify the class of general probabilistic theories which also admit Gleason-type theorems. It contains theories satisfying the no-restriction hypothesis as well as others which can simulate such an unrestricted theory arbitrarily well when allowing for post-selection on measurement outcomes. Our result also implies that the standard no-restriction hypothesis applied to effects is not equivalent to the dual no-restriction hypothesis applied to states which is found to be less restrictive.
Abstract Is the world deterministic and can we ever know whether it is or is not so? This chapter critically evaluates recent results that bear on these issues, and points out the relation to probabilities. While results from classical physics are neither fully relevant nor conclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism beyond doubt. However, whether the quantum world is indeterministic crucially depends on how the measurement problem is solved. There are both deterministic and indeterministic contenders in this field, some of them empirically equivalent to another one. This is shown using the deterministic Bohm theory and Nelsonsion mechanics, which is indeterministic. Two arguments that purport to establish indeterminism and that rely on Gleason's theorem and on Conway and Kochen's recent Free Will Theorem are shown to be wanting.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.
Chapter 1: On the existence of quantum representations for two dichotomic measurements. Under which conditions do outcome probabilities of measurements possess a quantum-mechanical model? This kind of problem is solved here for the case of two dichotomic von Neumann measurements which can be applied repeatedly to a quantum system with trivial dynamics. The solution uses methods from the theory of operator algebras and the theory of moment problems. The ensuing conditions reveal surprisingly simple relations between certain quantum-mechanical probabilities. It also shown that generally, none of these relations holds in general probabilistic models. This result might facilitate further experimental discrimination between quantum mechanics and other general probabilistic theories. Chapter 2: Possibilistic Physics. I try to outline a framework for fundamental physics where the concept of probability gets replaced by the concept of possibility. Whereas a probabilistic theory assigns a state-dependent probability value to each outcome of each measurement, a possibilistic theory merely assigns one of the state-dependent labels "possible to occur" or "impossible to occur" to each outcome of each measurement. It is argued that Spekkens' combinatorial toy theory of quantum mechanics is inconsistent in a probabilistic framework, but can be regarded as possibilistic. Then, I introduce the concept of possibilistic local hidden variable models and derive a class of possibilistic Bell inequalities which are violated for the possibilistic Popescu-Rohrlich boxes. The chapter ends with a philosophical discussion on possibilistic vs. probabilistic. It can be argued that, due to better falsifiability properties, a possibilistic theory has higher predictive power than a probabilistic one. Chapter 3: The quantum region for von Neumann measurements with postselection. It is determined under which conditions a probability distribution on a finite set can occur as the outcome distribution of a quantum-mechanical von Neumann measurement with hyphenation given that the scalar product between the initial and the final state is known as well as the success probability of the postselection. An intermediate von Neumann measurement can enhance transition probabilities between states such that the error probability shrinks by a factor of up to 2. Chapter 4: A presentation of the category of stochastic matrices. This chapter gives generators and relations for the strict monoidal category of probabilistic maps on finite cardinals (i.e., stochastic matrices). Chapter 5: Convex Spaces: Definition and Examples. We try to promote convex spaces as an abstract concept of convexity which was introduced by Stone as "barycentric calculus''. A convex space is a set where one can take convex combinations in a consistent way. By identifying the corresponding Lawvere theory as the category from chapter 4 and using the results obtained there, we give a different proof of a result of Swirszcz which shows that convex spaces can be identified with algebras of a finitary version of the Giry monad. After giving an extensive list of examples of convex sets as they appear throughout mathematics and theoretical physics, we note that there also exist convex spaces that cannot be embedded into a vector space: semilattices are a class of examples of purely combinatorial type. In an information-theoretic interpretation, convex subsets of vector spaces are probabilistic, while semilattices are possibilistic. Convex spaces unify these two concepts.