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arXiv:2203.13342 · Philosophy of Physics

Information is Physical: Cross-Perspective Links in Relational Quantum Mechanics

Emily Adlam, Carlo Rovelli C

Published Jan 1, 2023• 113 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on the idea that quantum states do not describe an absolute property of a system but rather a relationship between systems. There have recently been some criticisms of RQM pertaining to issues around intersubjectivity. In this article, we show how RQM can address these criticisms by adding a new postulate which requires that all of the information possessed by a certain observer is stored in physical variables of that observer and thus is accessible by measurement to other observers. This makes it possible for observers to reach intersubjective agreement about quantum events that have occurred in the past. We suggest a possible ontology for a version of RQM employing this postulate; this ontology upholds the principle that quantum states are always relational, but it also postulates a set of quantum events that are not strictly relational. We show that the new postulate helps address the preferred basis problem in RQM.

DOI
10.31389/pop.8

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Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on the idea that quantum states do not describe an absolute property of a system but rather a relationship between systems. There have recently been some criticisms of RQM pertaining to issues around intersubjectivity. In this article, we show how RQM can address these criticisms by adding a new postulate which requires that all of the information possessed by a certain observer is stored in physical variables of that observer and thus is accessible by measurement to other observers. This makes it possible for observers to reach intersubjective agreement about quantum events that have occurred in the past. We suggest a possible ontology for a version of RQM employing this postulate; this ontology upholds the principle that quantum states are always relational, but it also postulates a set of quantum events that are not strictly relational. We show that the new postulate helps address the preferred basis problem in RQM.
Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interesting alternative to the standard responses to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. But it suffers from a distinctive kind of epistemic solipsism: an observer can’t in principle know anything beyond their immediate present experience. This makes RQM self-undermining: it takes away the evidence we have for believing in quantum mechanics in the first place. Recently, Adlam and Rovelli have proposed a solution to this problem in the form of a new postulate they call cross-perspective links. Here I argue that this postulate does indeed solve the skeptical problem, but it also removes those aspects of RQM that make it distinctively relational. Nevertheless, the result of equipping RQM with cross-perspective links is an interesting interpretation in its own right.
This paper examines the metaphysical foundations of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM), with special attention to its compatibility with scientific realism. We argue that RQM faces a dilemma. In its original formulation, RQM secures a sparse ontology of relative quantum events, but lacks the world-building structure needed to explain how these events jointly constitute a single, coherent reality of the kind presupposed by scientific realism. Recent discussions have already emphasized the difficulties that RQM faces concerning intersubjective agreement, communication, and the emergence of stable facts. Our contribution is to diagnose these difficulties as symptoms of a deeper metaphysical problem: RQM provides relative facts, but no clear account of what makes them facts of one world. We then assess the revised formulation proposed by Adlam and Rovelli, centered on the Cross-Perspective Links (CPL) principle. While CPL aims to restore intersubjective agreement by guaranteeing consistency across perspectives, we argue that it does so at a significant cost. It introduces observer-independent facts, persistent information-bearing structures, and global consistency constraints that sit uneasily with the relational spirit of the original interpretation. Thus, RQM either remains thoroughly relational but metaphysically too weak to support robust scientific realism, or it repairs this weakness by compromising its own relational foundations.
We discuss the status of relative facts - the central concept of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) - in the context of the new amendment to RQM called cross-perspective links postulate. The new axiom states that by a proper measurement one learns the value of the relative outcome/fact earlier obtained by another observer-system. We discuss a Wigner-Friend-type scenario in which, without cross-perspective links postulate, relative facts have no predictive or causal power, whereas including cross-perspective links makes them effectively hidden variables, which causally determine outcomes of specific measurements. However, cross-perspective links axiom invalidates the other axiom of RQM, the one which states that in a Wigner-Friend scenario, RQM assigns an entangled state to the Friend and System after the unitary transformation of their interaction, despite the appearance of the relative fact for the Friend. This quantum mechanical state according to RQM properly describes the situation for Wigner. From this we show that RQM with cross-perspective links axiom is an internally inconsistent hidden variable theory and therefore cannot be treated as an interpretation of quantum mechanics in any sense.
Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) purportedly resolves the measurement problem by the postulate that physical variables can take determinate values that are relational in the sense that they are indexed to particular systems. Physical variables take on relational definite values if and only if two systems interact. The discrete nature of interactions required creates an ambiguity as to whether quantum events take place in the context of weak and continuous measurements and interactions. We provide a careful analysis of this problem, explain what a full solution to this problem would require, and then analyse certain proposed resolutions - finding all of them to be insufficient in their present form. Since ‘interactions’ (and the quantum events they underpin) are central to all versions of RQM, no version of RQM presented in the literature so far resolves the measurement problem.
The relational interpretation (or RQM, for Relational Quantum Mechanics) solves the measurement problem by considering an ontology of sparse relative events, or "facts". Facts are realized in interactions between any two physical systems and are relative to these systems. RQM's technical core is the realisation that quantum transition amplitudes determine physical probabilities only when their arguments are facts relative to the same system. The relativity of facts can be neglected in the approximation where decoherence hides interference, thus making facts approximately stable.
The relational approach to quantum states asserts that the physical description of quantum systems is always relative to something or someone. In relational quantum mechanics (RQM) it is relative to other quantum systems, in the (neo-)Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory to measurement contexts, and in QBism to the beliefs of the agents. In contrast to the other two interpretations, in RQM any interaction between two quantum systems counts as a "measurement", and the terms "observer" and "observed system" apply to arbitrary systems. We show, in the form of a no-go theorem, that in RQM the physical description of a system relative to an observer cannot represent knowledge about the observer in the conventional sense of this term. The problem lies in the ambiguity in the choice of the basis with respect to which the relative states are to be defined in RQM. In interpretations of quantum theory where observations play a fundamental role, the problem does not arise because the experimental context defines a preferred basis.