Abstract I argue that Bohmian mechanics (or any similar pilot-wave theory) cannot reasonably be claimed to be a deterministic theory. If one assumes the “quantum equilibrium distribution” provided by the wave function of the universe, Bohmian mechanics requires an external random oracle in order to describe the (Kolmogorov–Levin–Chaitin) algorithmic randomness properties of typical outcome sequences of long runs of repeated identical experiments (which provably follow from the Born rule). This oracle lies beyond the scope of Bohmian mechanics (or any deterministic extension thereof), including the impossibility of explaining the randomness property in question from “random” initial conditions. Thus the advantages of Bohmian mechanics over other interpretations of quantum mechanics, if any, must lie at an ontological level, and in its potential to derive the quantum equilibrium distribution and hence the Born rule.
Abstract I argue that Bohmian mechanics (or any similar pilot-wave theory) cannot reasonably be claimed to be a deterministic theory. If one assumes the “quantum equilibrium distribution” provided by the wave function of the universe, Bohmian mechanics requires an external random oracle in order to describe the (Kolmogorov–Levin–Chaitin) algorithmic randomness properties of typical outcome sequences of long runs of repeated identical experiments (which provably follow from the Born rule). This oracle lies beyond the scope of Bohmian mechanics (or any deterministic extension thereof), including the impossibility of explaining the randomness property in question from “random” initial conditions. Thus the advantages of Bohmian mechanics over other interpretations of quantum mechanics, if any, must lie at an ontological level, and in its potential to derive the quantum equilibrium distribution and hence the Born rule.
This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or 't Hooft's Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, and review the notion of 1-randomness \nintroduced by Kolmogorov, Chaitin, Martin-Lo"f, Schnorr, and others.
Abstract This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or ’t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In three appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, review the notion of 1-randomness (or algorithmic randomness) that in various guises was investigated by Kolmogorov and others and treat Bell’s (Physics 1:195–200, 1964) Theorem and the Free Will Theorem with their implications for randomness.
We compare and contrast two distinct approaches to understanding the Born rule in de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory, one based on dynamical relaxation over time (advocated by this author and collaborators) and the other based on typicality of initial conditions (advocated by the 'Bohmian mechanics' school). It is argued that the latter approach is inherently circular and physically misguided. The typicality approach has engendered a deep-seated confusion between contingent and law-like features, leading to misleading claims not only about the Born rule but also about the nature of the wave function. By artificially restricting the theory to equilibrium, the typicality approach has led to further misunderstandings concerning the status of the uncertainty principle, the role of quantum measurement theory, and the kinematics of the theory (including the status of Galilean and Lorentz invariance). The restriction to equilibrium has also made an erroneously-constructed stochastic model of particle creation appear more plausible than it actually is. To avoid needless controversy, we advocate a modest 'empirical approach' to the foundations of statistical mechanics. We argue that the existence or otherwise of quantum nonequilibrium in our world is an empirical question to be settled by experiment.
Bohmian mechanics, also known as pilot-wave theory or de Broglie-Bohm theory, is a formulation of mechanics whose fundamental axioms are not about what observers will see if they perform an experiment but about what happens in reality. It is therefore called a quantum theory without observers, alongside with collapse theories and many-worlds theories and in contrast to orthodox mechanics. It follows from these axioms that in a universe governed by Bohmian mechanics, observers will see outcomes with exactly the probabilities specified by the usual rules of mechanics for empirical predictions. Specifically, Bohmian mechanics asserts that electrons and other elementary particles have a definite position at every time and move according to an equation of motion that is one of the fundamental laws of the theory and involves a wave function that evolves according to the usual Schr\odinger equation. Bohmian mechanics is named after David Bohm (1917-1992), who was, although not the first to consider this theory, the first to realize (in 1952) that it actually makes correct predictions.
Bohmian mechanics, also known as pilot-wave theory or de Broglie-Bohm theory, is a formulation of quantum mechanics whose fundamental axioms are not about what observers will see if they perform an experiment but about what happens in reality. It is therefore called a "quantum theory without observers," alongside with collapse theories and many-worlds theories and in contrast to orthodox quantum mechanics. It follows from these axioms that in a universe governed by Bohmian mechanics, observers will see outcomes with exactly the probabilities specified by the usual rules of quantum mechanics for empirical predictions. Specifically, Bohmian mechanics asserts that electrons and other elementary particles have a definite position at every time and move according to an equation of motion that is one of the fundamental laws of the theory and involves a wave function that evolves according to the usual Schrödinger equation. Bohmian mechanics is named after David Bohm (1917-1992), who was, although not the first to consider this theory, the first to realize (in 1952) that it actually makes correct predictions.
In order to make the right empirical predictions Bohmian mechanics requires a special statistical boundary condition -- the distribution postulate -- but it is unclear how best to understand this condition. We show how one might use the theory of algorithmic randomness to formulate the distribution postulate as an objective constraining law. The framework requires us to say something about admissible quantum-mechanical states and measurements. In return, algorithmic Bohmian mechanics (aBM) guarantees the standard Born statistics for a collection of canonical quantum experiments in the limit, not just with high probability. The algorithmic distribution postulate provides a sharp typicality condition, clarifies the status of quantum probabilities in the deterministic theory, and provides a concrete example of how notions provided by the theory of algorithmic randomness can aid in specifying the content of a physical law.