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arXiv:2202.05314 · IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

Mosaics of Combinatorial Designs for Semantic Security on Quantum Wiretap Channels

Holger Boche, Minglai Cai, Moritz Wiese

Published Jun 26, 2022• 4 citations
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Abstract

We study semantic security for classical-quantum channels. Our security functions are functional forms of mosaics of combinatorial designs. We extend methods in [25] from classical channels to classical-quantum channels to demonstrate that mosaics of designs ensure semantic security for classical-quantum channels, and are also capacity achieving coding schemes. An advantage of these modular wiretap codes is that we provide explicit code constructions that can be implemented in practice for every channel, given an arbitrary public code.

DOI
10.1109/isit50566.2022.9834543

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We study security functions which can serve to establish semantic security for privacy amplification in secret key generation. The security functions are functional forms of mosaics of combinatorial designs, more precisely, of group divisible designs and balanced incomplete block designs. Every member of a mosaic corresponds to a unique key value. We give explicit examples which have an optimal or nearly optimal tradeoff of seed size, given by the size of the block index set of the mosaics, versus key rate. We also derive bounds for the security performance in privacy amplification of security functions given by functional forms of mosaics of designs.
With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, perfect (i.e. information-theoretic) security can now be achieved for distribution of a cryptographic key. QKD systems and similar protocols use classical error-correcting codes for both error correction (for the honest parties to correct errors) and privacy amplification (to make an eavesdropper fully ignorant). From a coding perspective, a good model for such a setting is the wire tap channel system introduced by Wyner in 1975. In this paper, we study fundamental limits and coding methods for wire tap channel systems. We provide a novel proof for the secrecy capacity theorem for wire tap channels and show how capacity achieving codes can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. We also consider binary erasure channel and binary symmetric channel special cases for the wiretap channel system and propose specific practical codes. In some cases our designs achieve the secrecy capacity and in others the codes provide complete security at rates below secrecy capacity in some specific cases.
With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, perfect (i.e. information-theoretic) security can now be achieved for distribution of a cryptographic key. QKD systems and similar protocols use classical errorcorrecting codes for both error correction (for the honest p arties to correct errors) and privacy amplification (to make an eavesdropper fully ignorant). From a coding perspective, a good model for such a setting is the wire tap channel introduced by Wyner in 1975. In this paper, we study fundamental limits and coding methods for wire tap channels. We provide a novel proof for the secrecy capacity theorem for wire tap channels and show how capacity achieving codes can be used to achieve the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel. We also consider binary erasure channel and binary symmetric channel special cases for the wiretap channel and propose specific practical codes. In some cases our designs achieve the secrecy capacity and in others the codes provide complete security at rates below secrecy capacity in some specific cases.