In this letter, we point to three widely accepted challenges that the quantum theory, quantum information, and quantum foundations communities are currently facing: indeterminism, the semantics of conditional probabilities, and the spooky action at a distance. We argue that these issues are fundamentally rooted in conflations commonly made between causal dependencies, counterfactual dependencies, and statistical dependencies. We argue that a simple, albeit somewhat uncomfortable shift of viewpoint leads to a way out of the impossibility to extend the theory beyond indeterminism, and towards the possibility that sound extensions of quantum theory, possibly even deterministic yet not super-deterministic, will emerge in the future. The paradigm shift, which we present here, involves a non-trivial relaxation of the commonly accepted mathematical definition of free choice, leading to non-Nashian free choice, more care with the choice of probabilistic notations, and more rigorous use of vocabulary related to causality, counterfactuals, and correlations, which are three concepts of a fundamentally different nature.
In this letter, we point to three widely accepted challenges that the quantum theory, quantum information, and quantum foundations communities are currently facing: indeterminism, the semantics of conditional probabilities, and the spooky action at a distance. We argue that these issues are fundamentally rooted in conflations commonly made between causal dependencies, counterfactual dependencies, and statistical dependencies. We argue that a simple, albeit somewhat uncomfortable shift of viewpoint leads to a way out of the impossibility to extend the theory beyond indeterminism, and towards the possibility that sound extensions of quantum theory, possibly even deterministic yet not super-deterministic, will emerge in the future. The paradigm shift, which we present here, involves a non-trivial relaxation of the commonly accepted mathematical definition of free choice, leading to non-Nashian free choice, more care with the choice of probabilistic notations, and more rigorous use of vocabulary related to causality, counterfactuals, and correlations, which are three concepts of a fundamentally different nature.
The fundamental deterministic nature of quantum mechanics (QM) is mathematically demonstrated by the modeling of the quantum (multiple) slit experiments; hence this paper is written from a deterministic perspective (DP) in quantum mechanics. Due to approximately 90 years of indeterminism and probabilistic statistical results, the theory consists of many interpretations and is often regarded as counterintuitive. The latter is in the deterministic perspective not the case and is illustrated with some examples. After a brief historic perspective, ‘invisible’ i.e. invisible entities of reality in mathematical treatment, are introduced. These entities are handled by mathematics indirectly i.e. are described in a transformed domain without variables violating the Heisenberg relation. In nature, i.e. on micro and macro levels, causality is fully ‘entangled’ with energy, information - in the meaning of ordering or coding - as well as time. In contrast with the macro scale with many forms and types of memory functions, without a memory property of quanta, causality is the bearer of information symmetry on the quantum scale. Further on in this DP paper: mathematical and philosophical consequences and influences in several paragraphs, regarding subjects such as ‘free will’ and expected ‘threats to science’, the Bell inequalities, Alice and Bob & entanglement, causality, information, retro-causality, spooky action, encryption and computing, teleportation, and in general interpretations rooted in indeterminacy in QM as well as associated topics on independence, fine-tuning. The last paragraph outlines the mathematical treatment of QM more extensively and may clarify references to the above-mentioned topics of discussion in QM further.
The non-extensibility of quantum theory into a theory with improved predictive power is based on a strong assumption of independent free choice, in which the physicists pick a measurement axis independently of anything that couldn't have been caused by their decision. Independent free choice is also at the core of the Nash equilibrium and classical game theory. A more recent line of game-theoretical research based on weakening free choice leads to non-trivial solution concepts with desirable properties such as at-most uniqueness, Pareto optimality, and contextuality. We show how introducing contingent free choice in the foundations of quantum theory yields a class of deterministic and contextual theories with an improved predictive power, and contrast them with the pilot-wave theory. Specifically, we suggest that quantum experiments, such as the EPR experiment, involving measurements located in spacetime, can be recast as dynamic games with imperfect information involving human agents and the universe. The underlying idea is that a physicist picking a measurement axis and the universe picking a measurement outcome are two faces of the same physical contingency phenomenon. The classical, Nashian resolution of these games based on independent free choice is analogous to local hidden variable theories, constrained by the Bell inequalities. On the other hand, in a setup in which agents are rational and omniscient in all possible worlds, under contingent free choice, the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium provides a contextual resolution, based on the iterated elimination of inconsistent worlds, towards an at-most unique possible world, in which the outcomes of measurements that actually are carried out, and only them, are deterministically defined.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is our most successful and versatile account of the basic constituents of matter, of their interaction and of their compounds. We introduce the theory via a sketch of its history and lay out its mathematical structure in some detail. Before this background we address the important and controversial question of how to interpret that structure. We contextualise our own position, which is linked to our account of ontological emergence as detailed in Chap. 2 , and which is mathematically best expressed in the Heisenberg picture of quantum dynamics. Indeterminism and irreversible processes are fundamental for our approach. We discuss the dialectics of the deterministic challenge to our position and argue that indeterminism in the form of quantum randomness has turned from a philosophical riddle to a technological resource. This claim is supported by a discussion of quantum information science, including some of its basic protocols. Towards the end of the chapter we argue that agency and quantum mechanics come as a package deal. For one, quantum mechanics describes the world as offering open possibilities for the future at a fundamental physical level, which is needed for real higher-order organisation, including agency. Of course, this does not in any way show that the actual existence of agents in our world is guaranteed. But it does show that general agency scepticism has no basis in physics. Second, we show that quantum mechanics is best understood as a theory that describes our agential interactions with nature, and not as a theory that represents nature from the point of view of an inert, detached observer.
Quantum mechanics has achieved unparalleled success as an operational theory, describing a wide range of experiments to remarkable accuracy. However, the physical foundations on which it rests remain as puzzling as they were a century ago, and a concise statement of the physical principles that underlie quantum mechanics is still outstanding. One promising approach holds that these principles should be formulated in terms of information, since many of the counter-intuitive effects in quantum theory concern questions such as what one can know about a quantum system and how the information encoded therein can be processed and distributed between parties. Another challenging feature of quantum theory is its incompatibility with the other cornerstone of modern physics, general relativity. In order to reconcile the two, one must identify and retain only the essential concepts and principles of each theory, and in the case of general relativity, causality has been identified as such a concept. This raises the question of how our classical understanding of causality must change when quantum theory is taken into account. In order to address these questions about information, knowledge and causality, I turn to the framework of causal models. In classical statistics, causal models explain the relations among a set of variables in terms of causal influences, which makes them a powerful tool for structuring our knowledge about complex systems and developing strategies for interacting with them. More importantly, the framework provides the conceptual underpinnings and mathematical methods for addressing questions about causation, information and knowledge in a rigorous manner. In this thesis, I develop a version of the classical causal models framework that is compatible with quantum theory and explore its physical implications. \n \n \nA first step is to define quantum versions of fundamental elements such as variables, conditionals and belief propagation rules. This allows one to consider the question of what one can come to know about a quantum variable from the point of view of causal modelling. The conditionals relating quantum variables are found to have a richer structure than their classical counterparts, which can be exploited for the task of discerning causal relations given limited data -- a central problem in classical causal modelling. The mathematical properties of quantum conditionals also establish a correspondence between various classes of two-party correlations, such as bound and distillable entanglement, and the types of causal structures that can give rise to them, which may become a useful tool for entanglement theory and quantum information processing. In the context of open quantum systems dynamics, quantum causal models provide a clear physical explanation of not completely positive maps and, more broadly, of non-Markovian quantum dynamics. Finally, I consider the possibility of non-classical effects in the way that different causal mechanisms are combined -- that is, non-classical causal structures. For the simple case of two causally ordered variables, I propose indicators that witness different classes of combinations of causal mechanisms, including a non-classical mixture, and describe an experiment realizing examples of the different classes. \n \n \nAs these results illustrate, the framework of quantum causal models provides both greater conceptual clarity and a comprehensive mathematical formalism for studying a diverse set of problems, ranging from foundational questions to applications in open systems dynamics and the exploration of non-classical causal structures, which are likely to feature in a future theory of quantum gravity. The material presented in this thesis is intended as a foundation and inspiration for further applications of quantum causal models.
In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.
This note proposes a paradigm and coordinate system that extends flat, four-dimensional Minkowski spacetime to a broader framework that identifies an event not only in space and in time, but also in terms of possible world, with a third category of coordinates called ``hap'' modelling contingency and counterfactuals. Semantically, hap is based on a Bohmian-like configuration space, in which initial conditions at a specific moment in time uniquely identify a trajectory. This framework can be used to support reasonings that rigorously distinguish between causal dependencies (through time), statistical dependencies (through space) and counterfactual dependencies (through hap). As an example, we use this framework to show that the assumption of free choice is not absolute, but rather depends on the chosen frame of reference: while Alice may see a choice made freely, which is formally a unilateral, single-coordinate translation in hap, Bob sitting in another reference frame might see this same choice not made freely and observe instead a translation in hap jointly across multiple coordinates, which indicates a counterfactual dependency. The framework is agnostic regarding which flavour of the De-Broglie-Bohm theory is considered, as it only makes general assumptions on the set of trajectories that are commonly accepted in the Bohmian mechanics community. It is also general enough to support reasoning on theories for which the separation between possible worlds might also depend on the frame of reference, i.e., two observers might disagree on whether two spacetimehap events happen in the same world or not.