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arXiv:2103.14510

Limitations on Uncloneable Encryption and Simultaneous One-Way-to-Hiding

Christian Majenz, Christian Schaffner, Mehrdad Tahmasbi

Published Mar 26, 2021• 18 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We study uncloneable quantum encryption schemes for classical messages as recently proposed by Broadbent and Lord. We focus on the information-theoretic setting and give several limitations on the structure and security of these schemes: Concretely, 1) We give an explicit cloning-indistinguishable attack that succeeds with probability $\frac12 + μ/16$ where $μ$ is related to the largest eigenvalue of the resulting quantum ciphertexts. 2) For a uniform message distribution, we partially characterize the scheme with the minimal success probability for cloning attacks. 3) Under natural symmetry conditions, we prove that the rank of the ciphertext density operators has to grow at least logarithmically in the number of messages to ensure uncloneable security. 4) The \emph{simultaneous} one-way-to-hiding (O2H) lemma is an important technique in recent works on uncloneable encryption and quantum copy protection. We give an explicit example which shatters the hope of reducing the multiplicative "security loss" constant in this lemma to below 9/8.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2103.14510

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We study uncloneable quantum encryption schemes for classical messages as recently proposed by Broadbent and Lord. We focus on the information-theoretic setting and give several limitations on the structure and security of these schemes: Concretely, 1) We give an explicit cloning-indistinguishable attack that succeeds with probability 12+μ/16\frac12 + μ/1621​+μ/16 where μμμ is related to the largest eigenvalue of the resulting quantum ciphertexts. 2) For a uniform message distribution, we partially characterize the scheme with the minimal success probability for cloning attacks. 3) Under natural symmetry conditions, we prove that the rank of the ciphertext density operators has to grow at least logarithmically in the number of messages to ensure uncloneable security. 4) The \emph{simultaneous} one-way-to-hiding (O2H) lemma is an important technique in recent works on uncloneable encryption and quantum copy protection. We give an explicit example which shatters the hope of reducing the multiplicative "security loss" constant in this lemma to below 9/8.
In this note, we consider the setting of uncloneable encryption satisfying uncloneable indistinguishability, a form of symmetric key encryption that prevents the cloning of ciphertexts in a very strong sense. Our goal is to minimize the assumptions under which (many-time secure) uncloneable encryption is known to exist, assuming the existence of an information-theoretic "uncloneable bit", i.e. a one-time secure uncloneable encryption scheme for one-bit messages. We observe that if a t -> t' uncloneable bit exists, then the following implications hold. 1. If many-time secure symmetric key encryption exists, then many-time secure t -> t' uncloneable encryption for arbitrary-length messages exists. Since many-time secure uncloneable encryption implies many-time secure symmetric key encryption, this result is tight. 2. If pseudorandom unitaries exist, then many-time secure t -> t' uncloneable encryption for arbitrary-length messages with identical copy security exists. These results together show that many-time secure uncloneable encryption may follow from concrete assumptions in "microcrypt", the world of unstructured quantum cryptography that plausibly exists even if P = NP.
We give an unconditional construction of information-theoretically secure one-time private-key unclonable encryption for one-bit messages, with efficient encryption and decryption and exponentially small unclonable-indistinguishability advantage. Previous work by Bhattacharyya and Culf (Nature Physics, 2026) and Bhattacharyya, Broadbent, and Culf (arXiv:2603.08916) either only showed inverse-polynomial security loss or required inefficient encryption/decryption operations; we avoid both of these caveats. Our scheme's key is a uniformly random non-identity phase-free Pauli on nnn qubits, and bit aaa is encrypted as a random (−1)a(-1)^a(−1)a eigenstate of that Pauli. We prove that the probability that both receivers recover the bit is at most 1/2+O(2−n/2).1/2 + O\left(2^{-n/2}\right).1/2+O(2−n/2). By a lower bound due to Broadbent, Culf, and Rochette (arXiv:2510.00903), this is the best probability bound achievable with nnn-qubit ciphertexts while ensuring perfect correctness (up to the constant hidden in the O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅)).
Uncloneable encryption is a cryptographic primitive which encrypts a classical message into a quantum ciphertext, such that two quantum adversaries are limited in their capacity of being able to simultaneously decrypt, given the key and quantum side-information produced from the ciphertext. Since its initial proposal and scheme in the random oracle model by Broadbent and Lord [TQC 2020], uncloneable encryption has developed into an important primitive at the foundation of quantum uncloneability for cryptographic primitives. Despite sustained efforts, however, the question of unconditional uncloneable encryption (and in particular of the simplest case, called an uncloneable bit) has remained elusive. Here, we propose a candidate for the unconditional uncloneable bit problem, and provide strong evidence that the adversary's success probability in the related security game converges quadratically as 1 / 2 + 1 / ( 2 K ) , where K represents the number of keys and 1 / 2 is trivially achievable. We prove this bound's validity for K ranging from 2 to 7 and demonstrate the validity up to K = 17 using computations based on the NPA hierarchy. We furthemore provide compelling heuristic evidence towards the general case. In addition, we prove an asymptotic upper bound of 5 / 8 and give a numerical upper bound of ∼ 0.5980 , which to our knowledge is the best-known value in the unconditional model.
We establish quantum uncloneable encryption with unconditional security, preventing two non-communicating adversaries from simultaneously decrypting a single ciphertext −-− even when both are given the key. Our construction achieves security that approaches the ideal limit at a rate that is exponentially small in the security parameter, without employing any assumptions. Our proof invokes unitary invariance of the shared entangled state and simplifies the adversarial strategies by enforcing this symmetry. Crucially, it then rules out the sender being highly correlated with two non-communicating adversaries at once by an approximation property that we develop, for such unitarily invariant states, which yields a near-optimal bound on the probability of cloning. Consequently, no coordinated strategy beats random guessing of the encrypted bit, establishing unconditional uncloneability. This reveals the existence of an uncloneable bit in Nature and delineates a fundamental, physically enforced cryptographic primitive unavailable in classical settings.
Quantum information is well-known to achieve cryptographic feats that are unattainable using classical information alone. Here, we add to this repertoire by introducing a new cryptographic functionality called uncloneable encryption. This functionality allows the encryption of a classical message such that two collaborating but isolated adversaries are prevented from simultaneously recovering the message, even when the encryption key is revealed. Clearly, such functionality is unattainable using classical information alone. We formally define uncloneable encryption, and show how to achieve it using Wiesner's conjugate coding, combined with a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF). Modelling the qPRF as a quantum random oracle, we show security by adapting techniques from the quantum one-way-to-hiding lemma, as well as using bounds from quantum monogamy-of-entanglement games.
The unclonable bit question asks whether quantum encryption can prevent an adversary from producing two systems that both reveal the plaintext once the key is disclosed. We introduce and study Pauli Encodings, a simple class of one-bit encryption schemes whose ciphertexts are normalized eigenspace projectors of Pauli strings. For every Pauli Encoding with K Pauli strings, we prove a universal lower bound 1/2+1/(2K)1/2+1/(2\sqrt{K})1/2+1/(2K​) on the optimal monogamy-of-entanglement winning probability, together with sharper bounds for several structured families. We then establish two limitations of natural approaches to unclonable security. First, if the Pauli strings are restricted to strings of X and Z of length n, the encoding is not secure. Second, we identify a universal 3/4 obstruction showing that arguments based only on pairwise guessing marginals cannot establish unclonable-indistinguishable security. When the Pauli strings all pairwise anticommute, the protocol becomes the one studied in [Quantum 10, 2157 (2026)]. We exploit the symmetry of this protocol to solve the third level of the natural semidefinite programming relaxation obtaining an asymptotic upper bound of approximately 0.5556 on the winning probability. Finally, we prove strong unclonable-indistinguishable security against bounded-local-dimension adversaries and strong indistinguishability security for several efficient Pauli families. First-level NPA computations provide additional numerical evidence towards the strong unclonable-indistinguishable security.