In his seminal work on recording quantum queries [Crypto 2019], Zhandry studied interactions between quantum query algorithms and the quantum oracle corresponding to random functions. Zhandry presented a framework for interpreting various states in the quantum space of the oracle as databases of the knowledge acquired by the algorithm and used that interpretation to provide security proofs in post-quantum cryptography. In this paper, we introduce a similar interpretation for the case when the oracle corresponds to random permutations instead of random functions. Because both random functions and random permutations are highly significant in security proofs, we hope that the present framework will find applications in quantum cryptography. Additionally, we show how this framework can be used to prove that the success probability for a k-query quantum algorithm that attempts to invert a random N-element permutation is at most O(k^2/N).
In his seminal work on recording quantum queries [Crypto 2019], Zhandry studied interactions between quantum query algorithms and the quantum oracle corresponding to random functions. Zhandry presented a framework for interpreting various states in the quantum space of the oracle as databases of the knowledge acquired by the algorithm and used that interpretation to provide security proofs in post-quantum cryptography. In this paper, we introduce a similar interpretation for the case when the oracle corresponds to random permutations instead of random functions. Because both random functions and random permutations are highly significant in security proofs, we hope that the present framework will find applications in quantum cryptography. Additionally, we show how this framework can be used to prove that the success probability for a k-query quantum algorithm that attempts to invert a random N-element permutation is at most O(k^2/N).
We propose a generalization of Zhandry's compressed oracle method to random permutations, where an algorithm can query both the permutation and its inverse. We show how to use the resulting oracle simulation to bound the success probability of an algorithm for any predicate on input-output pairs, a key feature of Zhandry's technique that had hitherto resisted attempts at generalization to random permutations. One key technical ingredient is to use strictly monotone factorizations to represent the permutation in the oracle's database. As an application of our framework, we show that the one-round sponge construction is unconditionally preimage resistant in the random permutation model. This proves a conjecture by Unruh.
We prove near-optimal lower bounds for preprocessing attacks on quantum cryptography in the random oracle model. Specifically, we show that a T-query adversary with S qubits of non-uniform advice can recover a random key k from the n-qubit binary phase state ∣ψk⟩∝∑xR(k,x)∣x⟩ with probability at most O(NT2+ST) for N=2n. In contrast, the best known bound for post-quantum one-way functions is O(NT2+ST), with a trivial attack at S=N. This demonstrates a new advantage of quantum cryptography over classical cryptography: n qubits of communication suffice for security against preprocessing attacks with space up to N2 rather than N. Our methodology is simple: express the optimal preprocessing attack as the operator norm of a random matrix, and bound this value in expectation over the random oracle via the trace-moment method. These trace moments have a natural interpretation using compressed oracles [Zhandry, Crypto 2019], which we then analyze. This can be viewed as a simplification and generalization of the approach of Liu [Eurocrypt 2023] for proving the security of post-quantum cryptography against preprocessing attacks. We also prove the following results: (1) We tighten Liu's analysis of post-quantum PRGs in QROM, achieving a distinguishing advantage bound of O(NT2+NST). (2) For unitary synthesis, we extend the one-query lower bound of Lombardi-Ma-Wright [STOC 2024] to hold against adversaries that can make one arbitrary function query along with polynomially many (adaptive) queries to the random oracle, either before or after the function query. This also interprets the original LMW24 result in terms of compressed oracles. (3) Finally, we prove a tight O(NS) bound for the pseudorandomness of random binary phase states against space S distinguishers.
A central challenge in quantum algorithms and cryptography is reasoning about algorithms with oracle access to a random group element (e.g. a random function, permutation, or unitary). Can we efficiently simulate such algorithms? Can we determine what they know after t queries? A classical tool for this is lazy sampling: the oracle does not commit to the full group element upfront, but rather samples partial information about it on the fly. We study a quantum analog of lazy sampling: compressed oracles (or recording oracles). These are quantum data structures that allow on-the-fly simulation for quantum queries, originally introduced by Zhandry (CRYPTO '19) for random functions, and generalized to unitaries by Ma-Huang (STOC '25) and permutations by Carolan (STOC '26), and used to great effect in security proofs and lower bounds due to their interpretability.
We define and analyze a general-purpose and interpretable path-recording oracle, derived from first principles, that perfectly simulates random elements of any closed subgroup of U(N). Our oracle stores, in superposition, t input-output pairs, with updates described in terms of the commutant of the group's tensor power representation. This transparently records the information the algorithm has learned. Our oracle builds on recent work of Grinko-Yoshida (QIP '26), who gave a different general-purpose compressed oracle without clear interpretability.
One interesting application of our path-recording is allowing direct comparisons between compressed oracles of different groups, giving a new technique for proving pseudorandomness results. For example, comparing SN and U(N) yields what is arguably the simplest construction to date of pseudorandom unitaries: the product PC of a pseudorandom permutation and a random Clifford, improving on the prior PFC construction (Metger-Poremba-Sinha-Yuen, FOCS '24; Ma-Huang, STOC '25).
The analysis of quantum algorithms which query random, invertible permutations has been a long-standing challenge in cryptography. Many techniques which apply to random oracles fail, or are not known to generalize to this setting. As a result, foundational cryptographic constructions involving permutations often lack quantum security proofs. With the aim of closing this gap, we develop and prove soundness of a compressed permutation oracle. Our construction shares many of the attractive features of Zhandry's original compressed function oracle: the purification is a small list of input-output pairs which meaningfully reflect an algorithm's knowledge of the oracle.
Given a quantum adversary that queries a random oracle, how do we characterize the information that they "know"? The Compressed Oracle method of Zhandry (CRYPTO 2019) is one method that records the queries that the adversary makes; this recording serves as a representation of the information that is learned. However, a significant limitation of the Compressed Oracle method is that it may continue to store information that the adversary has "forgotten." This issue is especially pertinent in the space-bounded setting, where the adversary may uncompute information to free up space, while the information may still reside in the compressed oracle.
In this work, we present a simple and interpretable framework called "Compressed Oracle Duality," which extends the Compressed Oracle method for space-bounded algorithms. By applying an isometry to the memory of a quantum adversary, we obtain a pair of compressed oracles with identical marginal distributions and classical correlations which correspond to the knowledge the adversary retains. In fact, we show that the outcome of measuring the new compressed oracle database corresponds exactly to applying the pretty-good measurement on the adversary's memory.
As an application of our framework for collision search, we give a simplified proof of the recent T2S=Ω(NlogN) quantum time-space tradeoff for label-symmetric algorithms due to Magniez-Zur (arXiv:2609.10808); we also prove a stronger classical tradeoff of TS=Ω(NlogN) assuming label symmetry. The proofs under our framework do not require representation theory and instead bound the mutual information between the compressed oracle pairs. This highlights both how the label symmetry assumption bypasses known proof barriers as well as the challenges that remain in achieving unconditional quantum time-space tradeoffs.
The compressed permutation oracle has been used to analyze the quantum security of a number of cryptographic constructions which resisted prior techniques. However, these analyses were fundamentally limited by the poor soundness of the method: the technique was proven sound only up to O(N1/12) queries to permutations on N elements. We revisit this analysis, improving the soundness bound to a tight Ω(N1/2). In addition to being tighter, our proof is conceptually simpler and more direct, and gives the same bound in the ideal cipher model. The main technical idea is to construct the compression isometry from a simple POVM on the naive purification, a technique which may find wider applications.
As immediate applications, our results yield tight, concrete collision and pre-image lower bounds for the sponge hash construction underlying SHA3 and the Davies--Meyer compression function used in SHA1 and SHA2. More broadly, the improved soundness theorem provides a general-purpose tool for analyzing quantum security in settings where random permutations or ideal ciphers serve as the underlying primitive.