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arXiv:2007.13229 · Physical Review Research

Systems of random variables and the free will theorem

Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov, Janne V. Kujala

Published Nov 30, 2020• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The title refers to the Free Will Theorem by Conway and Kochen whose flashy formulation is: if experimenters possess free will, then so do particles. In more modest terms, the theorem says that individual pairs of spacelike separated particles cannot be described by deterministic systems provided their mixture is the same for all choices of measurement settings. We reformulate and generalize the Free Will Theorem theorem in terms of systems of random variables, and show that the proof is based on two observations: (1) some compound systems are contextual (non-local), and (2) any deterministic system with spacelike separated components is non-signaling. The contradiction between the two is obtained by showing that a mixture of non-signaling deterministic systems, if they exist, is always noncontextual. The "experimenters' free will" (independence) assumption is not needed for the proof: it is made redundant by the assumption (1) above, critical for the proof. We next argue that the reason why an individual pair of particles is not described by a deterministic system is more elementary than in the Free Will Theorem. A system, contextual or not and deterministic or not, includes several choices of settings, each of which can be factually used without changing the system. An individual pair of particles can only afford a single realization of random variables for a single choice of settings. With this conceptualization, the "free will of experimenters" cannot be even meaningfully formulated, and the choice between the determinism and "free will of particles" becomes arbitrary and inconsequential.

DOI
10.1103/physrevresearch.2.043288

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The title refers to the Free Will Theorem by Conway and Kochen whose flashy formulation is: if experimenters possess free will, then so do particles. In more modest terms, the theorem says that individual pairs of spacelike separated particles cannot be described by deterministic systems provided their mixture is the same for all choices of measurement settings. We reformulate and generalize the Free Will Theorem theorem in terms of systems of random variables, and show that the proof is based on two observations: (1) some compound systems are contextual (non-local), and (2) any deterministic system with spacelike separated components is non-signaling. The contradiction between the two is obtained by showing that a mixture of non-signaling deterministic systems, if they exist, is always noncontextual. The "experimenters' free will" (independence) assumption is not needed for the proof: it is made redundant by the assumption (1) above, critical for the proof. We next argue that the reason why an individual pair of particles is not described by a deterministic system is more elementary than in the Free Will Theorem. A system, contextual or not and deterministic or not, includes several choices of settings, each of which can be factually used without changing the system. An individual pair of particles can only afford a single realization of random variables for a single choice of settings. With this conceptualization, the "free will of experimenters" cannot be even meaningfully formulated, and the choice between the determinism and "free will of particles" becomes arbitrary and inconsequential.
The concept of 'super-indeterminism' captures the notion that the free choice assumption of orthodox quantum mechanics necessitates only the following requirement: an agent's free-choice performance in the selection of measurement settings must not represent an exception to the rule of irreducible quantum indeterminism in the physical universe (i.e, "universal indeterminism"). Any additional metaphysical speculation, such as to whether quantum indeterminism, i.e., intrinsic randomness, implicates the reality of experimenter "freedom", "free will", or "free choice", is redundant in relation to the predictive success of orthodox quantum mechanics. Accordingly, super-indeterminism views as redundant also, from a technical standpoint, whether an affirmative or a negative answer is claimed in reference to universal indeterminism as a necessary precondition for experimenter freedom. Super-indeterminism accounts, for example, for the circular reasoning which is implicit in the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen [1,2]. The concept of super-indeterminism is of great assistance in clarifying the often misunderstood meaning of the concept of "free variables" as used by John Bell [3]. The present work argues that Bell sought an operational, effective free will theorem , one based upon the notion of "determinism without predetermination", i.e., one wherein "free variables" represent universally uncomputable variables. In conclusion, the standard interpretation of quantum theory does not answer, and does not need to answer in order to ensure the predictive success of orthodox theory, the question of whether either incompatibilism or compatibilism is valid in relation to free-will metaphysics and to the free-will phenomenology of experimenter agents in quantum mechanics.
This article contains a review of Nelson's analysis of Bell's theorem. It shows that Bell's inequalities can be violated with a theory of local random variables if one accepts that the outcomes of these variables are not predetermined prior to measurement. The article describes the relation between Bell's theorem and the Strong Free Will theorem of Conway and Kochen. Then, the original articles of Bell are analyzed in detail. Following an article of Faris, it is explained that Bell's work on the hidden variable question in fact describes two separate theorems. Bell's first theorem says that there can be no model for the singlet state where an outcome does not depend locally on the settings of the detector where the outcome was measured. Bell's second theorem shows that Bell's inequalities can be violated by a theory that is either not deterministic, or violates causality in the sense of relativity or the free will assumption of the experimenters. It is shown in detail where Bell implicitly makes the various locality assumptions that Nelson has shown to be necessary for deriving Bell's inequality. The article closes by relating the various assumptions needed to derive Bell's theorem with the reality criterion of EPR
Bell inequalities may only be derived, if hidden variables do not depend on the experimental settings. The stochastic independence of hidden and setting variables is called: freedom of choice, free will, measurement independence or no conspiracy. By imbedding the Bell causal structure in a larger causal network the authors correctly prove, that one can explain and quantify possible violation of measurement independence without evoking the super-determinism. They assume the independence of the variables that causally determine the settings and investigate how they might become correlated with hidden variables. Using their extended causal networks they derive a contextual probabilistic model on which their further correct results are based. The authors seem to ignore that contextual probabilistic model may be derived directly using only probabilistic concepts and incorporating correctly setting dependent variables describing measuring instruments. In these contextual probabilistic models experimenters freedom of choice is not compromised and the results of Bell Tests including an apparent violation of Einsteinian nonsignaling may be explained in a locally causal way. Talking about freedom of choice is misleading and is rooted in incorrect understanding of Bayes Theorem. We explain why freedom of choice should be called noncontextuality and why its violation in Bell Tests confirms only the contextual character of quantum observables. Therefore, contextuality and not experimenters freedom of choice are important resources in quantum information.
Modal quantum theory (MQT) is a simplified cousin of ordinary Hilbert space quantum theory. We show that two important theorems of actual quantum theory, the Kochen-Specker theorem excluding non-contextual hidden variables and the Conway-Kochen "free will theorem" about entangled systems, have direct analogues in MQT. The proofs of these analogue theorems are similar to, but much simpler than, the originals. We also show that the structure of possible measurement results for an entangled system in MQT cannot be represented by probability assignments satisfying the no-signaling principle, such as those given by ordinary quantum theory.
Conway and Kochen have presented a "free will theorem" (Notices of the AMS 56, pgs. 226-232 (2009)) which they claim shows that "if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles." In a more precise fashion, they claim it shows that for certain quantum experiments in which the experimenters can choose between several options, no deterministic or stochastic model can account for the observed outcomes without violating a condition "MIN" motivated by relativistic symmetry. We point out that for stochastic models this conclusion is not correct, while for deterministic models it is not new.