It is argued that although quantum theory isn't an absolutely deterministic theory, it is partially deterministic. The approach followed here is in the framework of the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics without any additional assumption or alternative interpretation. The argument is based on the conceptual meaning of determinism and by means of some well-known phenomena in the quantum world (measurement of a quantum particle spin, energy values and spatial states of an electron in atoms, the so-called wavefunction collapse problem) which are usually considered in rejecting determinism.
It is argued that although quantum theory isn't an absolutely deterministic theory, it is partially deterministic. The approach followed here is in the framework of the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics without any additional assumption or alternative interpretation. The argument is based on the conceptual meaning of determinism and by means of some well-known phenomena in the quantum world (measurement of a quantum particle spin, energy values and spatial states of an electron in atoms, the so-called wavefunction collapse problem) which are usually considered in rejecting determinism.
Determinism is related to other fundamental concepts such as causality. However, with the growth of quantum physics, determinism became a scientific "dilemma" and has created many challenges in various contemporary sciences. Most of modern physicists chose elimination of determinism. The basic question is: Is determinism completely removable? To answer this question, this paper is to investigate this concept analytically. At first we consider different aspects of the terminology and definition of determinism. Particularly, we pay attention to different kinds of determinism including global/local domain, complete/incomplete form, and the main factor in the formation of events. It is discussed that although determinism took a complete and universal form in classical physics, because of some philosophical ideas, determinism changed into a different concept, even as a problem and an undesirable element, in the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics. It is explained that determinism is a complex concept with a number of aspects and characteristics. Prediction, the world accessibility, and connection between the past and the future are the characteristics of the concept of determinism which cannot be set aside from the science. The final result is that, without any pre-assumption or alternative interpretation as what is done in already known realistic and deterministic theories as Bohmian quantum mechanics and/or many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, determinism cannot be completely denied in the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics.
Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').
Abstract We discuss the possibilities of determinism in reality, taking under consideration both quantum and classical physics. We present this firstly by questioning the supposed nature of quantum physics as non-deterministic, following the proposal of Penrose: the collapse of the wavefunction interpreted as particular measurements which seem to indicate certain contingency does not actually give the full picture of the reality of the former. In addition to what Penrose suggests, we consider this collapse as part of a bigger deterministic picture. Secondly, we analyse the distinction between this microphysical scenario and our macrophysical experience, in the light of determinism as well. We suggest that this experience can be understood as particular “measurements” similar to what happens in quantum mechanics. For instance, the image of a person with certain identity features is a highlight or particularization of all the possibilities the identity of this person experienced, experiences and will experience through time. The “collapse” is thus linked to individuation, not less real, but incomplete of reality. By linking the domain of quantum physics in a deterministic fashion to the phenomenological or macrophysical realm, we aim to show that a non-contingent character of reality is possible when accepting measurements or particular instances of things as forms of comprehension given by the physical world (thus not just mere subjective interventions). We argue that the complete picture (closer to the wavefunction) cannot give distinctive information (understanding this as differentiation of elements, such as particles in the microphysical domain and a certain colour in the macrophysical one).
A deterministic quantum mechanics theory is presented in a series of papers starting with the present one. The proposed theory is shown to be consistent with the current mainstream statistical quantum theory as well as with classical physics. It produces solutions, which demonstrate that causality, physical reality, and determinism are restored and can explain in simple form concerns that are raised by results from the current mainstream statistical quantum theory. The meaning of particle- wave duality and complementarity, the possibility of a particle, like the electron, to cross through the nucleus as it does when the angular momentum of the electron is zero at the ground state of the hydrogen atom, the possibility of a point-size particle to have an “intrinsic spin”, the possibility of “quantum jumps” as the electron transitions instantaneously from one stable orbital to another without passing through the space in between the orbitals and does that at irregular time intervals, and the natural collapse of the wave function as part of the solution are some of the results that emerge from the proposed deterministic quantum mechanics theory. The phenomenon of entanglement is shown to be consistent with the proposed deterministic quantum mechanics theory. The Bohr-Schrödinger energy levels leading to the experimentally confirmed spectral lines, as well as the fine structure constant emerge directly from the solution of the equations governing theproposed deterministic quantum mechanics presented in Part II of these series of papers.
Quantum mechanics is perceived as a theory that is difficult to understand with strange philosophical consequences. This is due to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. On the basis of the knowledge accumulated in modern computer simulations of many-particle problems, a different approach is presented that is purely deterministic. To arrive at this simpler picture, it is sufficient to treat nuclear motion classically. It is argued that this is justified by the different nature of nuclear motion compared to electronic structure, which must be described quantum-mechanically. The underlying approximation leads directly to the theory that is mainly used nowadays to simulate chemical reactions. As a result, electronic structure develops with time without any wavefunction collapse.
Quantum mechanics under the Copenhagen interpretation is one of the most experimentally well verified formalisms. However, it is known that the interpretation makes explicit reference to external observation or "measurement." One says that the Copenhagen interpretation suffers from the measurement problem. This deficiency of the interpretation excludes it as a viable fundamental formalism and prevents the use of standard quantum mechanics in discussions of quantum cosmology. Numerous alternative interpretations have been developed with the goals of reproducing its predictive success while obviating the measurement problem. While several interpretations make distinct, falsifiable, predictions, many claim to precisely reproduce the results of standard quantum mechanics. The sheer number of interpretations raises several issues. If the experimental predictions are identical, how are they to be assessed? On what grounds can an interpretation be said to trump another? Without recourse to experimental findings, one may continue to assess an interpretation on its logical structure, self-consistency, and simplicity (number and plausibility of its assumptions). We argue, and where possible, demonstrate, that all common interpretations have unresolved deficiencies. Among these deficiencies are failures to resolve the measurement problem, fine-tuning problems, logical/mathematical inconsistencies, disagreement with experiment, and others. Shortcomings as severe as these call into question the viability of any of the common interpretations. When appropriate, we indicate where future work may resolve some of these issues.