Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:2006.10641

Shannon meets Myerson: Information Extraction from a Strategic Sender

Anuj S. Vora, Ankur A. Kulkarni

Published Jun 18, 2020• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We study a setting where a receiver must design a questionnaire to recover a sequence of symbols known to strategic sender, whose utility may not be incentive compatible. We allow the receiver the possibility of selecting the alternatives presented in the questionnaire, and thereby linking decisions across the components of the sequence. We show that, despite the strategic sender and the noise in the channel, the receiver can recover exponentially many sequences, but also that exponentially many sequences are unrecoverable even by the best strategy. We define the growth rate of the number of recovered sequences as the information extraction capacity. A generalization of the Shannon capacity, it characterizes the optimal amount of communication resources required. We derive bounds leading to an exact evaluation of the information extraction capacity in many cases. Our results form the building blocks of a novel, noncooperative regime of communication involving a strategic sender.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2006.10641

Related papers

Information Extraction from a Strategic Sender: The Zero Error Case.

Anuj S. Vora, Ankur A. Kulkarni

We introduce a setting where a receiver aims to perfectly recover a source known privately to a \textit{strategic} sender over a possibly noisy channel. The sender is endowed with a utility function and sends signals to the receiver with the aim of maximizing this utility. Due to the strategic nature of the sender not all the transmitted information is truthful, which leads to question: how much true information can be recovered by the receiver from such a sender? We study this question in this paper. We pose the problem as a game between the sender and receiver, where the receiver tries to maximize the number of sequences that can be recovered perfectly and the sender maximizes its utility. We show that, in spite of the sender being strategic and the presence of noise in the channel, there is a strategy for the receiver by which it can perfectly recover an \textit{exponentially} large number of sequences. Our analysis leads to the notion of the \textit{information extraction capacity} of the sender which quantifies the growth rate of the number of recovered sequences with blocklength, in the presence of a noiseless channel. We identify cases where this capacity is equal to its theoretical maximum, and also when it is strictly less than maximum. In the latter case, we show that the capacity is sandwiched between the independence number and the Shannon capacity of a suitably defined graph. These results lead to an exact characterization of the information extraction capacity in large number of cases. We show that in the presence of a noisy channel, the rate of information extraction achieved by the receiver is the minimum of the zero-error capacity of the channel and the information extraction capacity of the sender. Our analysis leads to insights into a novel regime of communication involving strategic agents.

•Jun 18, 2020•4 citations

Information Extraction from a Strategic Sender over a Noisy Channel

Anuj S. Vora, Ankur A. Kulkarni

We consider a setting where a receiver tries to perfectly recover a source signal privately known to a sender who can send messages via a noisy channel. However, the sender is compromised and may have an incentive to lie about its information. We formulate the problem as a game between the sender and the receiver and show that there is a strategy for the receiver in which it can recover an exponential number of signals. We define a notion of a sender graph and the information extraction capacity of the sender which quantifies the maximum amount of information that can be extracted from the sender. We also show that the rate of information extraction is given by the minimum of the information extraction capacity of the sender and the zero-error capacity of the noisy channel.

IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)•Dec 14, 2020•17 citations

Value of Information in Games With Multiple Strategic Information Providers

Raj Kiriti Velicheti, Melih Baştopçu, Tamer Başar

In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with the single sender case. However, if the objectives of the information providers are different from that of the estimator, this might result in interesting strategic interactions and outcomes. In this work, we consider a hierarchical signaling game between multiple senders (information designers) and a single receiver (decision maker) each having their own, possibly misaligned, objectives. The senders lead the game by committing to individual information disclosure policies simultaneously, within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game among themselves. This is followed by the receiver's action decision. With Gaussian information structure and quadratic objectives (which depend on the underlying state and receiver's action) for all the players, we show that in general the equilibrium is not unique. We hence identify a set of equilibria and further show that linear noiseless policies can achieve a minimal element of this set. Additionally, we show that competition among the senders is beneficial to the receiver, as compared with cooperation among the senders. Further, we extend our analysis to a dynamic signaling game of finite horizon with Markovian information evolution. We show that linear memoryless policies can achieve equilibrium in this dynamic game. We also consider an extension to a game with multiple receivers having coupled objectives. We provide algorithms to compute the equilibrium strategies in all these cases. Finally, via extensive simulations, we analyze the effects of multiple senders in varying degrees of alignment among their objectives.

arXiv:2306.14886•IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control•Jan 10, 2025•5 citations

Message Identification for Task-Oriented Communications: Exploiting an Exponential Increase in the Number of Connected Devices

Luis Torres-Figueroa, Roberto Ferrara, Christian Deppe +1 more

The increase in the amount of data sent through the Internet is expected to scale up and accelerate in the coming years, along with the increasing number of connected devices. Current data rates via optical fiber communication channels are approaching the channel capacity and eventually, wireless communication will follow a similar trend. This means that message transmission may not be able to keep up with traffic demand in the future. Optimizing communication tasks and reducing the needed number of utilized radio resources will thus play a crucial role in goal-oriented communications. The latest theoretical and experimental works on message identification, a post-Shannon communication scheme, show promising results for addressing this problem. Under this scheme, the objective at the receiver is no longer to retrieve the content of the transmitted message, but to verify whether the sender is transmitting a specific message, in which the receiver may be interested or not. The sender does not know in advance which message the receiver is interested in. By using local randomness at the encoder, this allows for an exponential gain in the number of messages in identification compared to the available messages in classical transmission, potentially saving radio resources. In this paper, we review the pros and cons of identification and discuss its potential applications for task-oriented communications.

IEEE Internet of Things Magazine•Dec 1, 2023•12 citations

Strategic Information Design in Quadratic Multidimensional Persuasion Games with Two Senders

Raj Kiriti Velicheti, Melih Baştopçu, Tamer Başar

In the classical communication setting, multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver, in general, leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver. However, if the objectives of the information providers are different from that of the estimator, this might result in interesting strategic interactions. In this work, we consider a hierarchical signaling game between two senders (information designers) and a single receiver (decision maker) each having their own, possibly misaligned, objectives. The senders lead the game by committing to individual information disclosure policies simultaneously, within the framework of a Nash game among themselves. This is followed by the receiver's action decision. With Gaussian information structure and quadratic objectives (which depend on underlying state and receiver's action) for all the players, we show that in general the equilibrium is not unique. While we show that full revelation of the state is always an equilibrium, we propose an algorithm to achieve non trivial equilibria. Through simulations we show that misalignment between senders' objectives is beneficial for the receiver.

Proceedings of the ... American Control Conference/Proceedings of the American Control Conference•May 31, 2023•6 citations

Zero-Error Channel Capacity and Simulation Assisted by Non-Local Correlations

Toby S. Cubitt, Debbie Leung, William Matthews +1 more

The theory of zero-error communication is re-examined in the broader setting of using one classical channel to simulate another exactly in the presence of various classes of nonsignalling correlations between sender and receiver i.e., shared randomness, shared entanglement and arbitrary nonsignalling correlations. When the channel being simulated is noiseless, this is zero-error coding assisted by correlations. When the resource channel is noiseless, it is the reverse problem of simulating a noisy channel exactly by a noiseless one, assisted by correlations. In both cases, separations between the power of the different classes of assisting correlations are exhibited for finite block lengths. The most striking result here is that entanglement can assist in zero-error communication. In the large block length limit, shared randomness is shown to be just as powerful as arbitrary nonsignalling correlations for exact simulation, but not for asymptotic zero-error coding. For assistance by arbitrary nonsignalling correlations, linear programming formulas for the asymptotic capacity and simulation rates are derived, the former being equal (for channels with nonzero unassisted capacity) to the feedback-assisted zero-error capacity derived by Shannon. Finally, a kind of reversibility between nonsignalling-assisted zero-error capacity and exact simulation is observed, mirroring the usual reverse Shannon theorem.

arXiv:1003.3195•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Aug 1, 2011•97 citations
We study a setting where a receiver must design a questionnaire to recover a sequence of symbols known to strategic sender, whose utility may not be incentive compatible. We allow the receiver the possibility of selecting the alternatives presented in the questionnaire, and thereby linking decisions across the components of the sequence. We show that, despite the strategic sender and the noise in the channel, the receiver can recover exponentially many sequences, but also that exponentially many sequences are unrecoverable even by the best strategy. We define the growth rate of the number of recovered sequences as the information extraction capacity. A generalization of the Shannon capacity, it characterizes the optimal amount of communication resources required. We derive bounds leading to an exact evaluation of the information extraction capacity in many cases. Our results form the building blocks of a novel, noncooperative regime of communication involving a strategic sender.
We introduce a setting where a receiver aims to perfectly recover a source known privately to a \textit{strategic} sender over a possibly noisy channel. The sender is endowed with a utility function and sends signals to the receiver with the aim of maximizing this utility. Due to the strategic nature of the sender not all the transmitted information is truthful, which leads to question: how much true information can be recovered by the receiver from such a sender? We study this question in this paper. We pose the problem as a game between the sender and receiver, where the receiver tries to maximize the number of sequences that can be recovered perfectly and the sender maximizes its utility. We show that, in spite of the sender being strategic and the presence of noise in the channel, there is a strategy for the receiver by which it can perfectly recover an \textit{exponentially} large number of sequences. Our analysis leads to the notion of the \textit{information extraction capacity} of the sender which quantifies the growth rate of the number of recovered sequences with blocklength, in the presence of a noiseless channel. We identify cases where this capacity is equal to its theoretical maximum, and also when it is strictly less than maximum. In the latter case, we show that the capacity is sandwiched between the independence number and the Shannon capacity of a suitably defined graph. These results lead to an exact characterization of the information extraction capacity in large number of cases. We show that in the presence of a noisy channel, the rate of information extraction achieved by the receiver is the minimum of the zero-error capacity of the channel and the information extraction capacity of the sender. Our analysis leads to insights into a novel regime of communication involving strategic agents.
We consider a setting where a receiver tries to perfectly recover a source signal privately known to a sender who can send messages via a noisy channel. However, the sender is compromised and may have an incentive to lie about its information. We formulate the problem as a game between the sender and the receiver and show that there is a strategy for the receiver in which it can recover an exponential number of signals. We define a notion of a sender graph and the information extraction capacity of the sender which quantifies the maximum amount of information that can be extracted from the sender. We also show that the rate of information extraction is given by the minimum of the information extraction capacity of the sender and the zero-error capacity of the noisy channel.
In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with the single sender case. However, if the objectives of the information providers are different from that of the estimator, this might result in interesting strategic interactions and outcomes. In this work, we consider a hierarchical signaling game between multiple senders (information designers) and a single receiver (decision maker) each having their own, possibly misaligned, objectives. The senders lead the game by committing to individual information disclosure policies simultaneously, within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game among themselves. This is followed by the receiver's action decision. With Gaussian information structure and quadratic objectives (which depend on the underlying state and receiver's action) for all the players, we show that in general the equilibrium is not unique. We hence identify a set of equilibria and further show that linear noiseless policies can achieve a minimal element of this set. Additionally, we show that competition among the senders is beneficial to the receiver, as compared with cooperation among the senders. Further, we extend our analysis to a dynamic signaling game of finite horizon with Markovian information evolution. We show that linear memoryless policies can achieve equilibrium in this dynamic game. We also consider an extension to a game with multiple receivers having coupled objectives. We provide algorithms to compute the equilibrium strategies in all these cases. Finally, via extensive simulations, we analyze the effects of multiple senders in varying degrees of alignment among their objectives.
The increase in the amount of data sent through the Internet is expected to scale up and accelerate in the coming years, along with the increasing number of connected devices. Current data rates via optical fiber communication channels are approaching the channel capacity and eventually, wireless communication will follow a similar trend. This means that message transmission may not be able to keep up with traffic demand in the future. Optimizing communication tasks and reducing the needed number of utilized radio resources will thus play a crucial role in goal-oriented communications. The latest theoretical and experimental works on message identification, a post-Shannon communication scheme, show promising results for addressing this problem. Under this scheme, the objective at the receiver is no longer to retrieve the content of the transmitted message, but to verify whether the sender is transmitting a specific message, in which the receiver may be interested or not. The sender does not know in advance which message the receiver is interested in. By using local randomness at the encoder, this allows for an exponential gain in the number of messages in identification compared to the available messages in classical transmission, potentially saving radio resources. In this paper, we review the pros and cons of identification and discuss its potential applications for task-oriented communications.
In the classical communication setting, multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver, in general, leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver. However, if the objectives of the information providers are different from that of the estimator, this might result in interesting strategic interactions. In this work, we consider a hierarchical signaling game between two senders (information designers) and a single receiver (decision maker) each having their own, possibly misaligned, objectives. The senders lead the game by committing to individual information disclosure policies simultaneously, within the framework of a Nash game among themselves. This is followed by the receiver's action decision. With Gaussian information structure and quadratic objectives (which depend on underlying state and receiver's action) for all the players, we show that in general the equilibrium is not unique. While we show that full revelation of the state is always an equilibrium, we propose an algorithm to achieve non trivial equilibria. Through simulations we show that misalignment between senders' objectives is beneficial for the receiver.
The theory of zero-error communication is re-examined in the broader setting of using one classical channel to simulate another exactly in the presence of various classes of nonsignalling correlations between sender and receiver i.e., shared randomness, shared entanglement and arbitrary nonsignalling correlations. When the channel being simulated is noiseless, this is zero-error coding assisted by correlations. When the resource channel is noiseless, it is the reverse problem of simulating a noisy channel exactly by a noiseless one, assisted by correlations. In both cases, separations between the power of the different classes of assisting correlations are exhibited for finite block lengths. The most striking result here is that entanglement can assist in zero-error communication. In the large block length limit, shared randomness is shown to be just as powerful as arbitrary nonsignalling correlations for exact simulation, but not for asymptotic zero-error coding. For assistance by arbitrary nonsignalling correlations, linear programming formulas for the asymptotic capacity and simulation rates are derived, the former being equal (for channels with nonzero unassisted capacity) to the feedback-assisted zero-error capacity derived by Shannon. Finally, a kind of reversibility between nonsignalling-assisted zero-error capacity and exact simulation is observed, mirroring the usual reverse Shannon theorem.