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arXiv:2006.04522 · ACM Transactions on Quantum Computing

Client-server Identification Protocols with Quantum PUF

Mina Doosti, Niraj Kumar, Mahshid Delavar, Elham Kashefi

Published Sep 30, 2021• 33 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recently, major progress has been made towards the realisation of quantum internet to enable a broad range of classically intractable applications. These applications such as delegated quantum computation require running a secure identification protocol between a low-resource and a high-resource party to provide secure communication. In this work, we propose two identification protocols based on the emerging hardware-secure solutions, the quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs). The first protocol allows a low-resource party to prove its identity to a high-resource party and in the second protocol, it is vice versa. Unlike existing identification protocols based on Quantum Read-out PUFs that rely on the security against a specific family of attacks, our protocols provide provable exponential security against any Quantum Polynomial-Time adversary with resource-efficient parties. We provide a comprehensive comparison between the two proposed protocols in terms of resources such as quantum memory and computing ability required in both parties as well as the communication overhead between them.

DOI
10.1145/3484197

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Recently, major progress has been made towards the realisation of quantum internet to enable a broad range of classically intractable applications. These applications such as delegated quantum computation require running a secure identification protocol between a low-resource and a high-resource party to provide secure communication. In this work, we propose two identification protocols based on the emerging hardware-secure solutions, the quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs). The first protocol allows a low-resource party to prove its identity to a high-resource party and in the second protocol, it is vice versa. Unlike existing identification protocols based on Quantum Read-out PUFs that rely on the security against a specific family of attacks, our protocols provide provable exponential security against any Quantum Polynomial-Time adversary with resource-efficient parties. We provide a comprehensive comparison between the two proposed protocols in terms of resources such as quantum memory and computing ability required in both parties as well as the communication overhead between them.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a powerful cryptographic tool for various applications due to their inherent physical uniqueness and unclonability. However, the advent of quantum computers has posed significant threats to classical PUFs. In response, Quantum PUFs (QPUFs), which exploit the principles of quantum mechanics, have been introduced as a robust alternative. This paper analyzes two key applications of QPUFs utilizing their distinctive output: secure storage and identification, from an information theoretic perspective. We establish achievability under different constraints and derive the secure storage capacity and a doubly exponential identification rate, even in the presence of an active adversary attempting to deceive the system by exploiting publicly stored data. We further demonstrate that within the quantum domain, we achieve higher rates compared to classical counterparts.
Abstract This paper, for the first time, addresses the questions related to the connections between quantum pseudorandomness and quantum hardware assumptions, specifically quantum physical unclonable functions (qPUFs). Our results show that efficient pseudorandom quantum states (PRS) are sufficient to construct the challenge set for universally unforgeable qPUFs, improving the previous existing constructions based on the Haar-random states. We also show that both the qPUFs and the quantum pseudorandom unitaries (PRUs) can be constructed from each other, providing new ways to obtain PRS from the hardware assumptions. Moreover, we provide a sufficient condition (in terms of the diamond norm) that a set of unitaries should have to be a PRU in order to construct a universally unforgeable qPUF, giving yet another novel insight into the properties of the PRUs. Later, as an application of our results, we show that the efficiency of an existing qPUF-based client–server identification protocol can be improved without losing the security requirements of the protocol.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) leverage inherent, nonclonable physical randomness to generate unique input-output pairs, serving as secure fingerprints for cryptographic protocols like authentication. Quantum PUFs (QPUFs) extend this concept by using quantum states as input-output pairs, offering advantages over classical PUFs, such as challenge reusability via public channels and eliminating the need for trusted parties due to the no-cloning theorem. Recent work introduced a generalized mathematical framework for QPUFs. It was shown that random unitary QPUFs cannot achieve existential unforgeability against quantum polynomial time (QPT) adversaries. Security was possible only with additional uniform randomness. To avoid the cost of external randomness, we propose a novel measurement-based scheme. Here, the randomness naturally arises from quantum measurements. Additionally, we introduce a second model where the QPUF functions as a nonunitary quantum channel, which guarantees existential unforgeability. These are the first models in the literature to demonstrate a high level of provable security. Finally, we show that the quantum phase estimation (QPE) protocol, applied to a Haar random unitary, serves as an approximate implementation of the second type of QPUF by approximating a von Neumann measurement on the unitary's eigenbasis. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
Abstract Authentication is a fundamental building block of secure quantum networks, essential for quantum cryptographic protocols and often debated as a key limitation of quantum key distribution in security standards. Most quantum-safe authentication schemes rely on small pre-shared keys or post-quantum computational assumptions. In this work, we introduce a new authentication approach that combines hardware assumptions, particularly physical unclonable functions (PUFs), along with fundamental quantum properties of non-local states, such as local indistinguishability, to achieve provable security in entanglement-based protocols. We propose two protocols for different scenarios in entanglement-enabled quantum networks. The first protocol, referred to as the offline protocol, requires pre-distributed entangled states but no quantum communication during the authentication phase. It enables a server to authenticate clients at any time with only minimal classical communication. The second, an online protocol, requires quantum communication but only necessitates entangled state generation on the Prover ’s side. For this, we introduce a novel hardware module, the hybrid entangled PUF. Both protocols use weakly secure, off-the-shelf classical PUFs as their hardware module, yet we prove that quantum properties such as local indistinguishability enable exponential security for authentication, even in a single round. We provide full security analysis for both protocols and establish them as the first entanglement-based extension of hardware-based quantum authentication. These protocols are suitable for implementation across various platforms, particularly photonics-based ones, and offer a practical and flexible solution to the long-standing challenge of authentication in quantum communication networks.
We present an information-theoretic framework for secure storage and message identification utilizing fully quantum physically unclonable functions (QPUFs). Extending prior models rooted in classical and hybrid classical-quantum PUFs, we propose a fully quantum setting that enables robust identification protocols in the presence of a powerful quantum wiretapper holding correlated side information. We derive achievable second-order identification rates under stringent privacy leakage constraints and show that secure identification is feasible whenever a positive secret key rate can be extracted from the QPUF output—establishing a quantum analogue of the classical dichotomy theorem. Furthermore, we demonstrate that augmenting the system with an auxiliary public quantum source enhances identification capacity without increasing privacy leakage. Our results provide a rigorous theoretical foundation for quantum-secure identification and storage, with implications for next-generation communication systems and adversarial environments requiring low-latency, energy-efficient quantum-secure storage protocols.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are physical structures that are hard to clone and have a unique challenge-response behavior. The term PUF was coined by Pappu et al. in 2001. That work triggered a lot of interest, and since then a substantial number of papers has been written about the use of a wide variety of physical structures for different security purposes such as identification, authentication, read-proof key storage, key distribution, tamper evidence, anti-counterfeiting, software-to-hardware binding and trusted computing. In this paper we propose a new security primitive: the quantum-readout PUF (QR-PUF). This is a classical PUF, without internal quantum degrees of freedom, which is challenged using a quantum state, e.g. a single-photon state, and whose response is also a quantum state. By the no-cloning property of unknown quantum states, attackers cannot intercept challenges or responses without noticeably disturbing the readout process. Thus, a verifier who sends quantum states as challenges and receives the correct quantum states back can be certain that he is probing a specific QR-PUF without disturbances, even if the QR-PUF is far away "in the field" and under hostile control. For PUFs whose information content is not exceedingly large, all currently known PUF-based authentication and anti-counterfeiting schemes require trusted readout devices in the field. Our quantum readout scheme has no such requirement. Furthermore, we show how the QR-PUF authentication scheme can be interwoven with quantum key exchange (QKE), leading to an authenticated QKE protocol between two parties. This protocol has the special property that it requires no a priori secret shared by the two parties, and that the quantum channel is the authenticated channel, allowing for an unauthenticated classical channel. We provide security proofs for a limited class of attacks. The proofs depend on the physical unclonability of PUFs and on the practical infeasibility of building a quantum computer.