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arXiv:2006.04107 · Applied Physics Letters

Backflashes from fast-gated avalanche photodiodes in quantum key distribution

A. Koehler-Sidki, J. F. Dynes, T. K. Paraïso, M. Lucamarini, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, A. J. Shields

Published Apr 13, 2020• 10 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

InGaAs single-photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are key enablers for high-bit rate quantum key distribution. However, the deviation of such detectors from ideal models can open side-channels for an eavesdropper, Eve, to exploit. The phenomenon of backflashes, whereby APDs reemit photons after detecting a photon, gives Eve the opportunity to passively learn the information carried by the detected photon without the need to actively interact with the legitimate receiver, Bob. While this has been observed in slow-gated detectors, it has not been investigated in fast-gated APDs where it has been posited that this effect would be lessened. Here, we perform the first experiment to characterize the security threat that backflashes provide in a GHz-gated self-differencing APD using the metric of information leakage. We find that, indeed, the information leakage is lower than that reported for slower-gated detectors, and we show that its effect on the secure key rate is negligible. We also relate the rate of backflash events to the APD dark current, thereby suggesting that their origin is the InP multiplication region in the APD.

DOI
10.1063/1.5140548

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Applied Physics Letters•Oct 25, 2006•0 citations
InGaAs single-photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are key enablers for high-bit rate quantum key distribution. However, the deviation of such detectors from ideal models can open side-channels for an eavesdropper, Eve, to exploit. The phenomenon of backflashes, whereby APDs reemit photons after detecting a photon, gives Eve the opportunity to passively learn the information carried by the detected photon without the need to actively interact with the legitimate receiver, Bob. While this has been observed in slow-gated detectors, it has not been investigated in fast-gated APDs where it has been posited that this effect would be lessened. Here, we perform the first experiment to characterize the security threat that backflashes provide in a GHz-gated self-differencing APD using the metric of information leakage. We find that, indeed, the information leakage is lower than that reported for slower-gated detectors, and we show that its effect on the secure key rate is negligible. We also relate the rate of backflash events to the APD dark current, thereby suggesting that their origin is the InP multiplication region in the APD.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with information theoretic security by encoding information on single photons. This security is based on the laws of physics and as such can never be broken in theory. However, in practice, components do not always behave according to their theoretical models and these deviations can be exploited by an eavesdropper. In recent years, exposing loopholes in QKD systems, known as quantum hacking, has attracted significant attention. The components most susceptible to being hacked are the single-photon detectors, often avalanche photodiodes (APDs), as they are directly exposed to the optical channel. Whilst measurement-device-independent QKD removes detector vulnerability from the system, secure key rates with this technique can be much lower than point-to-point links. As such, mitigating attacks on QKD systems is a pressing challenge in QKD. In this thesis, the focus is on a special class of detectors, self-differencing APDs (SD-APDs), which have facilitated state-of-the art demonstrations of QKD. The susceptibility of SD-APDs to blinding attacks, the most explored and successful attack to date, was investigated and it was shown that by following best practice for their operation, such an attack would be unsuccessful. We have also proposed and developed a countermeasure such that the onus for appropriate operation could be removed from the user. We have also explored an arguably more dangerous attack, in the form of the after-gate attack. We have shown that delayed detection events, ordinarily considered detrimental in QKD, can provide inherent protection against this attack. Finally, backflashes in GHz-gated APDs were investigated for the first time and it was shown that threat they pose to QKD security is negligible. These results highlight the inherent protection to a number of attacks that self-differencing APDs possess. We stress that the findings presented in this thesis are also applicable to other types of fast-gated InGaAs APDs that don't possess self-differencing circuitry.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic secure key as long as the device performs as assumed in the theoretical model. One of the assumptions is an absence of information leakage about individual photon detection outcomes of the receiver unit. Here we investigate the information leakage from a QKD receiver due to photon emission caused by detection events in single-photon detectors (backflash). We test commercial silicon avalanche photodiodes and a photomultiplier tube, and find that the former emit backflashes. We study the spectral, timing and polarization characteristics of these backflash photons. We experimentally demonstrate on a free-space QKD receiver that an eavesdropper can distinguish which detector has clicked inside it, and thus acquire secret information. A set of countermeasures both in theory and on the physical devices are discussed.
We report a demonstration of quantum key distribution (QKD) at gigahertz clock rates with InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) operating in a self-differencing mode. Such a mode of operation allows detection of extremely weak avalanches so that the detector afterpulse noise is sufficiently suppressed. The system is characterized by a secure bit rate of 2.37Mbit∕s at 5.6km and 27.9kbit∕s at 65.5km when the fiber dispersion is not compensated. After compensating the fiber dispersion, the QKD distance is extended to 101km, resulting in a secure key rate of 2.88kbit∕s. Our results suggest that InGaAs APDs are very well suited to gigahertz QKD applications.
Implementation of high-speed quantum key distribution (QKD) has become one of the major focuses in the field, which produces a high key-generation rate for applications. To achieve high-speed QKD, tailored techniques are developed and employed to quickly generate and detect quantum states. However, these techniques may introduce unique loopholes to compromise the security of QKD systems. In this paper, we investigate the loopholes of the self-differencing (SD) avalanche photodiode (APD) detector, typically used for high-speed detection in a QKD system, and demonstrate experimental testing of the SD APD detector under strong-pulse-illumination attack. This attack presents blinding stability and helps an eavesdropper to learn the secret key without introducing extra quantum bit rate error. Based on this testing, we propose a set of criteria for protecting SD APD detectors from the strong-pulse-illumination attack.
We have demonstrated quantum key distribution (QKD) over 100 km using single-photon detectors based on InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APDs). We implemented the differential phase shift QKD (DPS-QKD) protocol with electrically cooled and 2-GHz sinusoidally gated APDs. The single-photon detector has a dark count probability of 2.8 × 10(-8) (55 counts per second) with a detection efficiency of 6 %, which enabled us to achieve 24 kbit/s secure key rate over 100 km of optical fiber. The DPS-QKD system offers better performances in a practical way than those achieved using superconducting single-photon detectors. Moreover, the distance that secure keys against the general individual attacks can be distributed has been extended to 160 km.
We provide a direct comparison between the InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD) and the NbN superconducting single photon detector (SSPD) for applications in fiber-based quantum cryptography. The quantum efficiency and dark count rate were measured for each detector, and used to calculate the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and shared key rate for a QKD link. The results indicate that, despite low quantum efficiency, the speed of the SSPD makes it a superior detector for quantum information applications. Finally, we present results of an initial integration of an SSPD into a receiver node of the DARPA quantum network to perform quantum key distribution. Encoding quantum information on single photons has enabled the realization of a number of unique communication schemes such as the implementation of the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution 1 and quantum dense coding. 2 Furthermore, the implementation of these schemes using photons at telecommunication wavelengths has permitted their extension to fiber optic networks, 3,4 drastically increasing the practicality of quantum information processing. To date, the state of the art in commercially available single photon detection at telecommunication wavelengths (1550 nm) has been the thermo-electrically cooled InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD). The cooled InGaAs APD is generally operated at T = -60°C in the reverse-biased Geiger mode. Though these detectors have been successfully implemented in operating QKD links in optical fiber, the InGaAs APD suffers from afterpulsing effects that limit the key exchange rates. New SPD (single photon detector) technologies based on superconducting materials are emerging that hold tremendous promise for drastically increasing the photon counting rate and eliminating dark noise.57 The SSPD consists of a NbN thin film (t ∼ 5 nm) patterned into a narrow (w ∼ 100 nm) microstrip meander that is ∼ 500μm in length. The detector is cooled to T < 4K in a closed cycle refrigeration unit and a bias current I b is supplied to the device just below the superconducting critical current (I c ). When a photon is incident upon the microstrip superconductivity is broken in the region local to photon absorption and a normal state region is formed in the device. The current passing through the device causes a measurable voltage pulse in the detector that can be amplified and shaped to act as an input for traditional logic circuitry. Due to the unique electronic bandstructure in a superconducting material the intrinsic response time of the device is on the order of picoseconds, so that the repetition rate may be increased above 1 GHz 8 without being susceptible to afterpulsing effects that plague the InGaAs APD. 9 To make a direct comparison between the InGaAs APD and the SSPD both were placed in a SPD characterization testbed to measure quantum efficiency and dark count rate at a variety of bias conditions. The QBER for a QKD link is calculated from the measured parameters and then compared to requirements for a provably secure QKD link. Following detector characterization, one of the nodes of the DARPA Quantum Network operated by BBN Technologies 3 utilized an SSPD in the receiver to transmit key material. The demonstration provides an in situ comparison between the InGaAs APD, normally operated in the BBN link, and the SSPD.