I introduce a sequence which I call indefinite: a sequence every element of which has a successor but whose number of elements is bounded; this is no contradiction. I then consider the possibility of space and time being indefinitely divisible. This is theoretically possible and agrees with experience. If this is space and time’s structure, then even if the laws of nature are deterministic, the behaviour of physical systems will be probabilistic. This approach may also shed light on directionality in time, a source of the Uncertainty Principle, and the reality of chaos.
In present-day physics the fundamental dynamical laws are taken as a time-translation-invariant and time-reversal-invariant one-parameter groups of automorphisms of the underlying mathematical structure. In this context-independent and empirically inaccessible description there is no past, present or future, hence no distinction between cause and effect. To get the familiar description in terms of causes and effects, the time-reversal symmetry of the fundamental dynamics has to be broken. Thereby one gets two representations, one satisfying the generally accepted rules of retarded causality (no effect can precede its cause). The other one describes the strange rules of advanced causality. For entangled (but not necessarily interacting) quantum systems the arrow of time must have the same direction for all subsystems. But for classical systems, or for classical subsystems of quantum systems, this argument does not hold. As a cosequence, classical systems allow the conceptual possibility of advanced causality in addition to retarded causality. Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group of automorphisms of an enlarged mathematical structure which describes a fictitious hidden determinism. Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of determinism. The popular ideas that in quantum theory there are gaps in the causal chain which allow the accommodation of the freedom of human action are fantasies which have no basis in present-day quantum mechanics. Quantum events are governed by strict statistical laws. Freedom of action is a constitutive necessity of all experimental science which requires a violation of the statistical predictions of physics. We conclude that the presently adopted first principles of theoretical physics can neither explain the autonomy of the psyche nor account for the freedom of action necessary for experimental science.
Contemporary physics, with two Einstein's theories (called "relativity" what can be interpreted erroneously) and with Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy (better: "lack of epistemic determinism") are frequently interpreted as a removal of the causality from physics.We argue that this is wrong.There are no indications in physics, either classical or quantum, that physical laws are indeterministic, on the ontological level.On the other hand, both classical and quantum physics are, practically, indeterministic on the epistemic level: there are no means for us to predict the detailed future of the world.Additionally, essentially all physical principles, including the arrow of time and the conservation of energy could be, hypothetically, violated (with some exceptions in the world of heavier quarks, and probably, the cosmological arrow of time).However, in contrast to Hume's skepticism, we have no experimental evidence that the causality can be removed or even "hung on" in any case.The text contains some didactical-like issues, as well.
Abstract It is often claimed that quantum mechanics entails that there is indeterminacy in the world, in the sense that physical systems can lack a precise value for a property. Indeed, a radical form of indeterminacy, in which systems have almost none of the properties we normally attribute to them, can be shown to follow from a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics—the bare theory. However, the bare theory is shown to be incoherent. Still, a more limited form of indeterminacy can be located in spontaneous collapse, hidden variables, and many-worlds theories. This indeterminacy is unlike that which arises classically, having nothing to do with ordinary forms of vagueness or the composition of large objects out of smaller parts. Indeterminacy in quantum mechanics can perhaps be avoided, but there seems little reason to do so.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state
S with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state
S is a subset of a state space
S={Z}, such that
S always contains many elements
Z. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of
S cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements
Z, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of
S is described in terms of sequential time
n∈N, which is updated according to
n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time
n can be separated from relational time
t, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each
n, in which
t represents the knowledge at sequential time
n about the temporal relations between present and past events.
In classical physics, velocity follows from exact measurements of space and time intervals (i.e perfect resolution of both). Inertial mass follows from a resistance of an object to a force (push or pull). Momentum, however, which nonrelativistically is mv and should be associated with ideas of inertial mass, and space time resolution may be instead linked to the physical idea of an impulse. An impulse seems to be like a hit and does not appear to be linked directly to space time physically, although its consequences are i.e. a particle receiving the impulse moves in space and time. In classical mechanics, x(t) and so one considers either equally spaced dt intervals and corresponding dx(t) or vice versa (constant dx) if an integral only involves space dependent values. In quantum mechanics, one has two uncertainty principles, one related to E and t and the other to p and x. We argue that p is linked to the notion of an impulse which does not on the surface involve space or time. Given that p, even in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, is mv there should at least be some built in notion of dx and dt. From the uncertainty principles one sees that dx (i.e. the wavelength) is linked to hbar/p and dt to hbar/E. Thus neither dt nor dx are constants, but depend on the motion. In the high energy quantum limit dt —> W(x)W(x) dx →1/v(x) dx where v(x) is classical velocity and W(x) the bound state wavefunction. The bound state wavefunction, however, applies to the envelope of WW (not the actual crests and troughs) and so the dx-dt scheme which emerges is a smoothed over one and not the actual dx -dp of quantum mechanics. We try to examine some of these ideas in this note.