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arXiv:2004.10515

On Bit Commitment and Oblivious Transfer in Measurement-Device Independent settings

Jérémy Ribeiro, Stephanie Wehner

Published Apr 22, 2020• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Among the most studied tasks in Quantum Cryptography one can find Bit Commitment (BC) and Oblivious Transfer (OT), two central cryptographic primitives. In this paper we propose for the first time protocols for these tasks in the measurement-device independent (MDI) settings and analyze their security. We analyze two different cases: first we assume the parties have access to perfect single photon sources (but still in the presence of noise and losses), and second we assume that they only have imperfect single photon sources. In the first case we propose a protocol for both BC and OT and prove their security in the Noisy Quantum Storage model. Interestingly, in the case where honest parties do not have access to perfect single photon sources, we find that BC is still possible, but that it is "more difficult" to get a secure protocol for OT: We show that there is a whole class of protocols that cannot be secure. All our security analyses are done in the finite round regime.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2004.10515

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Among the most studied tasks in Quantum Cryptography one can find Bit Commitment (BC) and Oblivious Transfer (OT), two central cryptographic primitives. In this paper we propose for the first time protocols for these tasks in the measurement-device independent (MDI) settings and analyze their security. We analyze two different cases: first we assume the parties have access to perfect single photon sources (but still in the presence of noise and losses), and second we assume that they only have imperfect single photon sources. In the first case we propose a protocol for both BC and OT and prove their security in the Noisy Quantum Storage model. Interestingly, in the case where honest parties do not have access to perfect single photon sources, we find that BC is still possible, but that it is "more difficult" to get a secure protocol for OT: We show that there is a whole class of protocols that cannot be secure. All our security analyses are done in the finite round regime.
Oblivious transfer (OT) and bit commitment (BC) are two-party cryptographic protocols which play crucial roles in the construction of various cryptographic protocols. We propose three practical quantum cryptographic protocols in this paper. We first construct a practical quantum random oblivious transfer (R-OT) protocol based on the fact that non-orthogonal states cannot be reliably distinguished. Then, we construct a fault-tolerant one-out-of-two oblivious transfer ( O T 1 2 ) protocol based on the quantum R-OT protocol. Afterwards, we propose a quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol which executes the fault-tolerant O T 1 2 several times. Mayers, Lo and Chau (MLC) no-go theorem proves that QBC protocol cannot be unconditionally secure. However, we find that computing the unitary transformation of no-go theorem attack needs so many resources that it is not realistically implementable. We give a definition of physical security for QBC protocols and prove that the practical QBC we proposed is physically secure and can be implemented in the real world.
The noisy-storage model of quantum cryptography allows for information-theoretically secure two-party computation based on the assumption that a cheating user has at most access to an imperfect, noisy quantum memory, whereas the honest users do not need a quantum memory at all. In general, the more noisy the quantum memory of the cheating user, the more secure the implementation of oblivious transfer, which is a primitive that allows universal secure two-party and multiparty computation. For experimental implementations of oblivious transfer, one has to consider that also the devices held by the honest users are lossy and noisy, and error correction needs to be applied to correct these trusted errors. The latter are expected to reduce the security of the protocol, since a cheating user may hide themselves in the trusted noise. Here we leverage entropic uncertainty relations to derive tight bounds on the security of oblivious transfer with a trusted and untrusted noise. In particular, we discuss noisy storage and bounded storage, with independent and correlated noise.
There are various practical obstacles in quantum cryptography. These include the problems that arise in implementing quantum cryptographic protocols with current and near-term technology, and those that come with the development and security analysis of new protocols. In this work, we examine a few of these obstacles and, for each one, we highlight an approach that aims to mitigate it. We start by examining the setting of device-independence, with oblivious transfer in the bounded-quantum-storage-model as the primitive of interest. The typical approach to enabling device-independence is the use of a Bell-inequality violation, which requires a strict non-communication assumption that is practically difficult to enforce. We develop and analyze the security of a device-independent oblivious transfer protocol that replaces the Bell-inequality violation approach with a computational assumption, thereby relaxing the non-communication assumption. Our second topic examines the problem of noise in a quantum money scheme. We show how to achieve noise-tolerance in the public-key setting. Our scheme can be seen as a generalization of the [AC12] scheme: a valid banknote is now a subspace state possibly affected by noise, and verification is performed by using classical oracles to check for membership in "larger spaces." Additionally, a banknote in our scheme is minted by preparing conjugate coding states and applying a unitary. For our last topic, we consider the general task of proving security against a specious adversary, which is the quantum analogue of the classical semi-honest adversary. A useful feature of specious adversaries is that security against them can guarantee security against stronger adversaries [DNS12]. This motivates the search for a canonical specious adversary, where proving security against such an adversary guarantees security against the entire class of specious adversaries. Within a restricted setting, we define a particular specious adversary and show that it satisfies our definition of canonical.
Assuming post-quantum one-way functions, we construct device-independent oblivious transfer and bit commitment that tolerate independent honest faults at a constant rate and adaptive, bidirectional quantum leakage between the laboratories at a constant rate. Honest parties use trusted classical computation to operate untrusted quantum devices, which may share arbitrary entanglement and perform joint measurements without assumptions of independence or identical distribution. Security is simulation-based against quantum polynomial-time adversaries and composes sequentially with efficient simulators. For security parameter λλλ and a prescribed total leakage budget ℓ\ellℓ, one complete one-bit oblivious transfer uses Θ(ℓ+log⁡2λ)Θ(\ell+\log^2λ)Θ(ℓ+log2λ) device coordinates in at most three single-use device windows, including preprocessing, and polynomial classical computation and communication. The leakage budget is shared across these windows. The commitment has efficient simulators against both parties and yields device-independent coin tossing with abort; each uses one window. Completeness of oblivious transfer gives device-independent secure computation with abort for every efficiently computable classical functionality on a fixed number of parties, against static corruption of any proper subset, provided each reached call to oblivious transfer satisfies the device and budget conditions. The construction combines short selectors with code-based choice masking, a global audit, and error correction across field symbols. The commitment extractor changes a classical code coset while leaving the device execution and its leakage unchanged. Sender security uses a global Fourier analysis and a selector-aware Magic Square repetition bound derived from the two-round threshold theorem of Kundu and Tan (2023).
We show how to implement cryptographic primitives based on the realistic assumption that quantum storage of qubits is noisy. We thereby consider individual-storage attacks, i.e. the dishonest party attempts to store each incoming qubit separately. Our model is similar to the model of bounded-quantum storage, however, we consider an explicit noise model inspired by present-day technology. To illustrate the power of this new model, we show that a protocol for oblivious transfer (OT) is secure for any amount of quantum-storage noise, as long as honest players can perform perfect quantum operations. Our model also allows the security of protocols that cope with noise in the operations of the honest players and achieve more advanced tasks such as secure identification.
It was shown that cryptographic primitives can be implemented based on the assumption that quantum storage of qubits is noisy. In this work we analyze a protocol for the universal task of oblivious transfer that can be implemented using quantum-key-distribution (QKD) hardware in the practical setting where honest participants are unable to perform noise-free operations. We derive trade-offs between the amount of storage noise, the amount of noise in the operations performed by the honest participants and the security of oblivious transfer which are greatly improved compared to the results in \cite{prl:noisy}. As an example, we show that for the case of depolarizing noise in storage we can obtain secure oblivious transfer as long as the quantum bit-error rate of the channel does not exceed 11% and the noise on the channel is strictly less than the quantum storage noise. This is optimal for the protocol considered. Finally, we show that our analysis easily carries over to quantum protocols for secure identification.