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arXiv:2003.12225 · IEEE Transactions on Communications

Asymptotically Secure Network Code for Active Attacks

Masahito Hayashi, Ning Cai

Published Feb 6, 2021• 10 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

When there exists a malicious attacker in the network, we need to be careful of eavesdropping and contamination. This problem is crucial for network communication when the network is realized by a partially trusted relay of quantum key distribution. We discuss the asymptotic rate in a linear network with the secrecy and robustness conditions when the above type of attacker exists. Also, under the same setting, we discuss the asymptotic rate in a linear network when we impose the secrecy condition alone.

DOI
10.1109/tcomm.2021.3057112

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InTech eBooks•Jan 1, 2010•1 citation
When there exists a malicious attacker in the network, we need to be careful of eavesdropping and contamination. This problem is crucial for network communication when the network is realized by a partially trusted relay of quantum key distribution. We discuss the asymptotic rate in a linear network with the secrecy and robustness conditions when the above type of attacker exists. Also, under the same setting, we discuss the asymptotic rate in a linear network when we impose the secrecy condition alone.
In network coding, we discuss the effect of sequential error injection on information leakage. We show that there is no improvement when the operations in the network are linear operations. However, when the operations in the network contains non-linear operations, we find a counterexample to improve Eve's obtained information. Furthermore, we discuss the asymptotic rate in a linear network under the secrecy and robustness conditions as well as under the secrecy condition alone. Finally, we apply our results to network quantum key distribution, which clarifies the type of network that enables us to realize secure long distance communication via short distance quantum key distribution.
We consider the secure quantum communication over a network with the presence of a malicious adversary who can eavesdrop and contaminate the states. The network consists of noiseless quantum channels with the unit capacity and the nodes which applies noiseless quantum operations. As the main result, when the maximum number m1of the attacked channels over the entire network uses is less than a half of the network transmission rate m0(i.e., m10/2), our code implements secret and correctable quantum communication of the rate m0- 2m1by using the network asymptotic number of times. Our code is universal in the sense that the code is constructed without the knowledge of the specific node operations and the network topology, but instead, every node operation is constrained to the application of an invertible matrix to the basis states. Moreover, our code requires no classical communication. Our code can be thought of as a generalization of the quantum secret sharing.
Quantum networks are communication networks in which adjacent nodes enjoy perfectly secure channels thanks to quantum key distribution (QKD). Drawing end- to-end security from QKD-supported point-to-point security can be done by virtue of multipath transmission. This concept buys security at the cost of strongly connected networks and perfect routing. Particularly the latter is hard to ensure, since congestions or (passive) may cause QKD key- buffers to run empty, thus enforcing local re-routing of packets. Hence, the adversary may use not to extract information, but to redirect the information flow towards a relay-node that he controls. Such attacks can readily invalidate the stringent requirements of multipath transmission protocols and thus defeat any formal arguments for perfect secrecy. Moreover, this form of indirect eavesdropping seems to be unconsidered in the literature so far. We investigate whether or not unconditional security in a quantum network with non- reliable routing is possible. Using Markov-chains, we derive various sufficient criteria for retaining perfect secrecy under imperfect packet relay. In particular, we explicitly do not assume trusted relay or quantum repeaters available. Keywords-Quantum Cryptography, Markov-Chain, Secure
We consider the secure quantum communication over a network with the presence of the malicious adversary who can eavesdrop and contaminate the states. The network consists of the noiseless quantum channels with unit capacity and the nodes which applies noiseless quantum operations. As the main result, when the maximum number m1of the attacked channels over the entire network uses is less than a half of network transmission rate m0(i.e., m10/2), our protocol implements secret and correctable quantum communication of rate m0- 2m1by using the network asymptotic number of times. Our protocol requires no classical communication and no knowledge of network structure, but instead, a node operation is limited to the application of an invertible matrix to the basis states. Our protocol can be thought of as a generalization of honest-dealer verifiable quantum secret sharing. A full version of this paper is accessible at: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.03306.pdf.
We study the significance of the common trusted relay assumption in quantum networks. While most practical implementations of quantum networks rely on trusted devices, the question of security without this assumption has been rarely addressed. Device independent security attempts to minimize the assumptions made on the quantum hardware, entanglement based methods try to avoid relays to the extent possible, and multipath transmission improves robustness and security by enforcing the attacker to conquer more than just a single intermediate node. Common to all these past studies is their focus on the physical layer and direct connections. We describe an attack from the networking and routing layer. Assuming at least one node that is not perfectly tamper-proof, meaning that an attacker has established a foothold to read traffic from the inside, we show how to exploit the eavesdropping detection mechanisms of the quantum key distribution (QKD) devices to cause traffic redirection over the vulnerable node, thus defeating security under the trusted node assumption. We experimentally demonstrate how the attack works on networks of different size and topology, and thereby further substantiate the significance of the trust assumptions for end-to-end security of QKD networks.
Decision Support Systems 392 1.1 The problem of perfect end-to-end secrecy Quantum cryptography claims to bring perfect secrecy to a given line, but speaking honestly, it is no more than this.Using a carrier that is sufficiently fragile to rule out copying it, naturally raises the question of how much distance can be bridged?In fact, nowadays available quantum cryptography allows for communication over a distance of up to 144 km, as demonstrated by Schmitt-Manderbach et al. (2007), but arbitrary distances can yet not be bridged.Although theoretical results due to Lo & Chau (1999) indicate that the noise problem can be overcome, making arbitrary ranges theoretically possible, building networks is inevitable for a global roll-out.Existing solutions mostly rely on trusted relay for that matter.However, why attack the quantum line, if attacking a relay node is fully sufficient?Under the assumption of perfectly protected lines, recent results indicate that without preexisting secrets that are exclusively known to the sender and the receiver, end-to-endsecurity is only achievable under hard constraints on the network topology.To be more precise, let G be a graph that models a network.Let V(G), E(G) be the sets of vertices and edges of G, and assume the sender s and receiver r to be parts of G, that is {s, r} ⊆ V(G).The adversary can be modelled by a set A ⊆ 2 V(G)\{s, r} (the powerset of V(G)\{s, r}), that is we assume that a selection of subsets of vertices can be compromised.If k such sets can become conquered simultaneously, then we face a k-active adversary.An infected vertex v is assumed fully under the adversary's control, so a message passing through v can be read, blocked or modified and v is free to create as many new messages as desired.There is no limitation on computational power or knowledge of the adversary.If removing from G the vertices in any k sets in the adversary structure A cannot disconnect s and r in G, then we call the graph A (k) (s,r)-subconnected.If, by doing so, the network cannot be disconnected at all, then the graph is said to be A (k) -subconnected.Referring to these notions, a network permits perfectly secure message delivery from s to r if and only if the graph G is A (2) (s,r)-subconnected.The reader may consult Ashwin Kumar et al. (2002) for a proof.Different, yet no less stringent requirements are imposed by Wang & Desmedt (2008): among related results, the following necessary condition best highlights the difficulty of achieving unconditional security in a real-life network: if for u ≥ 1, 3(ku) + 1 ≥ k + 1 directed node-disjoint paths from s to r exist, then a necessary condition for perfectly secure message transmission from s to r against a k-active adversary is that there are u directed node disjoint paths (these u paths are also disjoint from the 3(ku) + 1 paths from s to r) from r to s.The described adversary model applies to many situations, as for example machines running certain software may all suffer from the same security holes.Networks equipped with devices from different vendors may be considered vulnerable if one vendor's devices turn out to be insecure.A k-active adversary would correspond to k vendors cooperating, or equivalently arise, if k vendors obtained the same malicious module from a single fraudulent manufacturer, turning a heterogeneous set of products into a possible backdoor for an adversary. Decision theory and system securityMany results either guarantee or rule out perfectly secret communication, but this might not be satisfactory.If perfectly secure communication is not possible, then how much is achievable with the given resources?A variety of security metrics has been proposed, but a measure of security is yet missing.This work summarizes a decision-theoretic approach to quantifying risk in terms that can be specified to best suit the application at hand.www.intechopen.