HYBRID CLASSICAL-POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR BLOCKCHAIN: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE GAP BETWEEN PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR FORMAL SECURITY PROOFS
Shaina Mahajan, Parveen Sadotra, Kailash Thakur
Blockchain systems authorize transactions with elliptic-curve signatures whose security collapses under Shor's algorithm, and their ledgers are permanent and public, so a future quantum adversary can act on signatures published today. Hybrid constructions, which combine a classical primitive with a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) primitive so that security survives the failure of either, have become the consensus transition strategy across standards bodies and blockchain roadmaps. This review asks a narrower question than existing surveys: for the hybrid constructions actually proposed and deployed, what has in fact been proven, and in which model? Following a PRISMA-style protocol over six databases and three standards sources, we screened 371 de-duplicated records and synthesized 50. We find a systematic asymmetry. Hybrid key-encapsulation combiners rest on a mature theory with explicit robustness proofs, and the standalone NIST primitives now have quantum-random-oracle-model (QROM) and in some cases machine-checked proofs. Hybrid signature combiners do not: standard EU-CMA is insufficient for them because it does not exclude separability and cross-protocol recombination attacks, the stronger notions that do are recent and cover few constructions, and only one hybrid signature scheme has a machine-checked EUF-CMA proof. > Blockchain-facing proposals sit at the far end of this gap, typically presenting a construction with no stated security notion. We contribute a proof-coverage audit matrix over ten representative constructions, classified against explicit, source-checkable criteria; correct several recurring claims, including the standardization status of FN-DSA and the role of quantum collision-finding in SLH-DSA parameter selection; and identify the proof obligations a blockchain-deployable hybrid signature must discharge, including a security model for the permanent public disclosure of signatures.
Advances in Computer Science and Engineering•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations