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arXiv:1911.07860 · npj Quantum Information

Numerical finite-key analysis of quantum key distribution

Darius Bunandar, Luke C. G. Govia, Hari Krovi, Dirk Robert Englund

Published Dec 18, 2020• 61 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for secure communications safe against attacks by quantum computers. QKD protocols are performed by sending a sizeable, but finite, number of quantum signals between the distant parties involved. Many QKD experiments, however, predict their achievable key rates using asymptotic formulas, which assume the transmission of an infinite number of signals, partly because QKD proofs with finite transmissions (and finite-key lengths) can be difficult. Here we develop a robust numerical approach for calculating the key rates for QKD protocols in the finite-key regime in terms of two semi-definite programs (SDPs). The first uses the relation between conditional smooth min-entropy and quantum relative entropy through the quantum asymptotic equipartition property, and the second uses the relation between the smooth min-entropy and quantum fidelity. The numerical programs are formulated under the assumption of collective attacks from the eavesdropper and can be promoted to withstand coherent attacks using the postselection technique. We then solve these SDPs using convex optimization solvers and obtain numerical calculations of finite-key rates for several protocols difficult to analyze analytically, such as BB84 with unequal detector efficiencies, B92, and twin-field QKD. Our numerical approach democratizes the composable security proofs for QKD protocols where the derived keys can be used as an input to another cryptosystem.

DOI
10.1038/s41534-020-00322-w

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Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for secure communications safe against attacks by quantum computers. QKD protocols are performed by sending a sizeable, but finite, number of quantum signals between the distant parties involved. Many QKD experiments, however, predict their achievable key rates using asymptotic formulas, which assume the transmission of an infinite number of signals, partly because QKD proofs with finite transmissions (and finite-key lengths) can be difficult. Here we develop a robust numerical approach for calculating the key rates for QKD protocols in the finite-key regime in terms of two semi-definite programs (SDPs). The first uses the relation between conditional smooth min-entropy and quantum relative entropy through the quantum asymptotic equipartition property, and the second uses the relation between the smooth min-entropy and quantum fidelity. The numerical programs are formulated under the assumption of collective attacks from the eavesdropper and can be promoted to withstand coherent attacks using the postselection technique. We then solve these SDPs using convex optimization solvers and obtain numerical calculations of finite-key rates for several protocols difficult to analyze analytically, such as BB84 with unequal detector efficiencies, B92, and twin-field QKD. Our numerical approach democratizes the composable security proofs for QKD protocols where the derived keys can be used as an input to another cryptosystem.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be proved to be secure by laws of quantum mechanics. In this thesis, we review security proof methods in Renner's framework and discuss numerical methods to calculate asymptotic and finite key rates. These methods are highly versatile and applicable to general device-dependent QKD protocols. We also discuss analytical tools that extend the applicability of these numerical methods. We then present the asymptotic security proof against collective attacks for a variant of the twin-field QKD protocol, which can overcome the repeaterless secret-key capacity bound. Our variant reduces the sifting cost and uses non-phase-randomized coherent states as both signals and test states. We confirm the loss scaling of this protocol. Another important family of protocols that we investigate here are discrete-modulated continuous-variable QKD protocols. They are interesting due to their experimental simplicity and their great potential for massive deployment in the quantum-secured networks. Our security proof method can provide tight asymptotic key rates. We demonstrate that the postselection of data in combination with reverse reconciliation can improve the key rates. We analyze both untrusted and trusted detector noise scenarios. Our results in the trusted detector noise scenario show that we can thus cut out most of the effect of detector noise and obtain asymptotic key rates similar to those had we access to ideal detectors. Finally, we present several simple examples to illustrate our newly developed method for the numerical finite-key analysis against the most general attacks via the entropy accumulation theorem.
We compare three proof techniques for composable finite-size security of quantum key distribution under collective attacks, with emphasis on how the resulting secret-key rates behave at practically relevant block lengths. As a benchmark, we consider the BB84 protocol and evaluate finite-size key-rate estimates obtained from entropic uncertainty relations (EUR), from the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP), and from a direct finite-block analysis based on the conditional min-entropy, which we refer to as the finite-size min-entropy (FME) approach. For BB84 we show that the EUR-based bound provides the most favorable performance across the considered parameter range, while the AEP bound is asymptotically tight but can become overly pessimistic at moderate and small block sizes, where it may fail to certify a positive key. The FME approach remains effective in this small-block regime, yielding nonzero rates in situations where the AEP estimate vanishes, although it is not asymptotically optimal for BB84. These results motivate the use of FME-type analyses for continuous-variable protocols in settings where tight EUR-based bounds are unavailable, notably for coherent-state schemes where current finite-size analyses typically rely on AEP-style corrections.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure information exchange with untrusted quantum links between remote communication parties. A central task in the studies of QKD protocols is security analysis, which aims at deriving the length of the final key such that it is secure regardless of the eavesdropper's computational power. In literature, the security analysis has been done both analytically and numerically. Compared to analytical methods which tend to require techniques specific to each QKD protocol, numerical ones are more general since they can be directly applied to many QKD protocols with little adaptation. However, current numerical methods are carried out based on some assumptions such as working in the asymptotic limit and collective attacks from eavesdroppers. In this work, we remove these assumptions and develop a numerical finite-size security analysis against general attacks for a large class of QKD protocols. We also give an example of applying the method to the recent phase-matching QKD protocol with a simplified protocol design. Our result shows that the finite-size key rate can surpass the linear key-rate bound with a practical QKD system operated for only several hours.
This thesis is concerned with rigorous security analyses of practical Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols, using a variety of modern proof techniques. The main results are as follows. First, we establish a security proof for variable-length QKD protocols against IID collective attacks, and extend this result to coherent attacks using the postselection technique. In doing so, we resolve a long-standing flaw in the application of the postselection technique to QKD, thereby placing it on a rigorous mathematical footing. Second, we develop a method to bound phase error rates in entropic uncertainty relation-based and phase error rate-based proofs, using only the observed statistics of the protocol, even when detectors are imperfect and only approximately characterized. This removes a key assumption of identical detector behaviour and enables these techniques to be applied in realistic settings. Third, we present a very general security analysis based on the marginal-constrained entropy accumulation theorem. The resulting framework can be readily adapted to practical imperfections and side channels, and is suitable for certification efforts. Finally, we show that the security of QKD protocols under realistic authentication assumptions can be reduced to the standard idealized setting, where authentication is assumed to behave honestly, with only minor protocol modifications. A distinctive feature of this thesis is its unified presentation of several major QKD security proof frameworks using consistent protocol descriptions and notation. Consequently, this thesis is intended not only as a collection of new technical results, but also as a useful reference for understanding rigorous security analysis in quantum key distribution.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a reliable solution to communication problems that require long-term data security. For its widespread use, however, the rate and reach of QKD systems must be improved. Twin-field (TF) QKD is a step forward toward this direction, with early demonstrations suggesting it can beat the current rate-versus-distance records. A recently introduced variant of TF-QKD is particularly suited for experimental implementation, and has been shown to offer a higher key rate than other variants in the asymptotic regime, where users exchange an infinite number of signals. Here, we extend the security of this protocol to the finite-key regime, showing that it can overcome the fundamental bounds on point-to-point QKD with ~1010 transmitted signals. In many practical regimes of interest, our analysis offers higher key rates than those of alternative variants. Moreover, some of the techniques we develop are applicable to the finite-key analysis of other QKD protocols.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) represents a revolutionary approach in the field of cryptography, offering the potential for unconditional security by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This paper addresses the crucial issue of calculating secure key rates in entanglement based QKD systems. We present a method of key rate calculations that is independent of an eavesdropper's quantum system, relying solely on the quantum states shared between two communicating parties under the assumption of a worst-case attack. We undertake a comparison of asymptotic key rates with those observed in the finite regime, in which only a limited number of quantum states are exchanged. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of entanglement distillation on the achievable key rates. By identifying the numerically optimal number of entanglement distillation iterations based on the initial fidelity and the number of exchanged quantum states, we demonstrate how to achieve a balance between the quantity and quality of entangled states, thereby maximizing the secure key rate. Our results show that there is a unique optimum within a defined search range. Moreover, we determine the minimum number of exchanged quantum states necessary to attain a positive key rate and to obtain a desired number of secure key bits, which are both contingent upon the quality of the communication channel. It is anticipated that the insights gained from this work will prove instrumental in the development of optimal routing strategies in quantum communication networks.