Of what are experimental quantum propositions primary bearers? As it is widely accepted in the modern literature, rather than being bearers of truth and falsity, these entities are bearers of probability values. Consequently, their truth values can be regarded as no more than degenerate probabilities (i.e., ones that have only the values 0 and 1). The mathematical motivation for precedence of probabilistic semantics over propositional semantic for the logic of experimental quantum propositions is Gleason's theorem. It proves that the theory of probability measures on closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (which represent experimental quantum propositions) does not admit any probability measure having only the values 0 and 1. -- By contrast, in the present paper, it is proclaimed that experimental propositions about quantum systems are primary bearers of truth values. As this paper demonstrates, algebraic properties of separable Hilbert spaces of finite dimension equal or greater than 2 do not allow in valuations (that is, truth assignments) which are dispersion-free, i.e., total functions from the set of atomic propositions to the set of two objects, true and false. Providing a probability function can be interpreted as a measure of the (un)certainty in the assignment of truth values, the fact that valuations cannot be dispersion-free gives rise to probabilistic semantics for the logic of experimental quantum propositions.
Of what are experimental quantum propositions primary bearers? As it is widely accepted in the modern literature, rather than being bearers of truth and falsity, these entities are bearers of probability values. Consequently, their truth values can be regarded as no more than degenerate probabilities (i.e., ones that have only the values 0 and 1). The mathematical motivation for precedence of probabilistic semantics over propositional semantic for the logic of experimental quantum propositions is Gleason's theorem. It proves that the theory of probability measures on closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (which represent experimental quantum propositions) does not admit any probability measure having only the values 0 and 1. -- By contrast, in the present paper, it is proclaimed that experimental propositions about quantum systems are primary bearers of truth values. As this paper demonstrates, algebraic properties of separable Hilbert spaces of finite dimension equal or greater than 2 do not allow in valuations (that is, truth assignments) which are dispersion-free, i.e., total functions from the set of atomic propositions to the set of two objects, true and false. Providing a probability function can be interpreted as a measure of the (un)certainty in the assignment of truth values, the fact that valuations cannot be dispersion-free gives rise to probabilistic semantics for the logic of experimental quantum propositions.
The thesis investigates the possibility of a classical semantics for quantum propositional structures. A classical semantics is defined as a set of mappings each of which is (i) bivalent, i.e., the value 1 (true) or 0 (false) is assigned to each proposition, and (ii) truth-functional, i.e., the logical operations are preserved. In addition, this set must be "full", i.e., any pair of distinct propositions is assigned different values by some mapping in the set. When the propositions make assertions about the properties of classical or of quantum systems, the mappings should also be (iii) "state-induced", i.e., values assigned by the semantics should accord with values assigned by classical or by quantum mechanics. In classical propositional logic, (equivalence classes of) propositions form a Boolean algebra, and each semantic mapping assigns the value 1 to the members of a certain subset of the algebra, namely, an ultrafilter, and assigns 0 to the members of the dual ultraideal, where the union of these two subsets is the entire algebra. The propositional structures of classical mechanics are likewise Boolean algebras, so one can straightforwardly provide a classical semantics, which also satisfies (iii). However, quantum propositional structures are non-Boolean, so it is an open question whether a semantics satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) can be provided. Von Neumann first proposed (1932) that the algebraic structures of the subspaces (or projectors) of Hilbert space be regarded as the pro-positional structures PQM of quantum mechanics. These structures have been formalized in two ways: as orthomodular lattices which have the binary operations "and", "or", defined among all elements, compatible [symbol omitted] and incompatible [symbol omitted]; and as partial-Boolean algebras which have the binary operations defined among only compatible elements. In the thesis, two basic senses in which these structures are non-Boolean are discriminated. And two notions of truth-functionality are distinguished: truth-functionality [symbols omitted] applicable to the PQM lattices; and truth-functionality [symbol omitted] applicable to both the lattices and partial-Boolean algebras. Then it is shown how the lattice definitions of "and", "or", among incompatibles rule out a bivalent, truth-functional [symbols omitted] semantics for any lattice containing incompatible, elements. In contrast, the Gleason and Kochen-Specker proofs of the impossibility of hidden-variables for quantum mechanics show the impossibility of a bivalent, truth-functional [symbol omitted] semantics for three-or-higher dimensional Hilbert space structures; and the presence of incompatible elements is necessary but is not sufficient to rule out such a semantics. As for (iii), each quantum state-induced expectation-function on a PQM truth-functionally assigns 1 and 0 values to the elements in a ultrafilter and dual ultraideal of PQM³ where, in general the union of an ultrafilter and its dual ultraideal is smaller than the entire structure. Thus it is argued that each expectation-function is the quantum analog of a classical semantic mapping, even though the domain where each expectation-function is bivalent and truth-functional is usually a non-Boolean substructure of PQM. The final portion of the thesis surveys proposals for the introduction of hidden variables into quantum mechanics, proofs of the impossibility of such hidden-variable proposals, and criticisms of these impossibility proofs. And arguments in favour of the partial-Boolean algebra, rather than the orthomodular lattice, formalization of the quantum propositional structures are reviewed.
In quantum logic, i.e., within the structure of the Hilbert lattice imposed on all closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space, the assignment of truth values to quantum propositions (i.e., experimentally verifiable propositions relating to a quantum system) is unambiguously determined by the state of the system. So, if only pure states of the system are considered, can a probability measure mapping the probability space for truth values to the unit interval be assigned to quantum propositions? In other words, is a probability concept contingent or emergent in the logic of quantum propositions? Until this question is answered, the cause of probabilities in quantum theory cannot be completely understood. In the present paper it is shown that the interaction of the quantum system with its environment causes the irreducible randomness in the relation between quantum propositions and truth values.
The structure of a complete lattice formed by closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space (i.e., a Hilbert lattice) entails some unreasonable consequences from the physical point of view. Specifically, this structure seems to contradict to the localized variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem according to which the bivaluation of a proposition represented by a closed linear subspace that does not belong to a Boolean algebra shared by the state, in which a quantum-mechanical system is prepared, must be value indefinite. For this reason, the Hilbert lattice structure seems to be too strong and needs to be weakened. The question is, how should it be weakened so that to support the quantum uncertainty principle and the Kochen-Specker theorem? Which logic will a weakened structure identify? The present paper tries to answer these questions.
Quantum mechanics is usually described in the terminology of probability theory even though the properties of the probability spaces associated with it are fundamentally different from the standard ones of probability theory. For example, Kolmogorov's axioms are not general enough to encompass the non-commutative situations that arise in quantum theory. There have been many attempts to generalise these axioms to meet the needs of quantum mechanics. The focus of these attempts has been the observation, first made by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), that the propositions associated with a quantum-mechanical system do not form a Boolean σ-algebra. There is almost universal agreement that the probability space associated with a quantum-mechanical system is given by the set of subspaces of a separable Hilbert space, but there is disagreement over the algebraic structure that this set represents. In the most popular model for the probability space of quantum mechanics the propositions are assumed to form an orthocomplemented lattice (Mackey (1963), Jauch (1968)). The fundamental concept here is that of a partial order, that is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive but not symmetric. The partial order is interpreted as embodying the logical concept of implication in the set of propositions associated with the physical system. Although this model provides an acceptable mathematical expression of the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics in that the subspaces of a separable Hilbert space give a representation of an ortho-complemented lattice, it has several deficiencies which will be discussed later.
Quantum Logic Distributivity And The Algebraic Structure Of Propositions As with many subatomic particles, the question of under what conditions the electron behaves as a particle or as a wave continues to be the subject of research. It was necessary to employ appropriate logic to organise the propositions describing the behaviour of such an object at the subatomic scale into a precise from and to establish coherent relationships between them. Quantum logic, which can be regarded as an interpretation of quantum mechanics, arose from this need. In classical mechanics, the state and properties of a system are described using the propositions of classical logic, which is based on Boolean algebra. In quantum mechanics, however, the fact that the operators representing the measured quantities do not commute has shown that quantum phenomena cannot be described using the propositions of classical logic. It is therefore necessary to have a formal framework suited to the propositions describing quantum phenomena. In our study, we highlight the various differences between classical logic and quantum logic, examine the distributive property and discuss, from the perspective of Birkhoff and von Neumann, the algebraic structure to which quantum logic might correspond. At the conclusion of our research, we find that, in order to assert that all experimental propositions logically equivalent to a given experimental proposition constitute a physical property, the operators corresponding to the measured quantities must commute with one another. Boolean algebra has an algebraic structure that allows classical logic to be formalised. In such algebra, the distributive property holds; thus, distributivity does not pose a problem for classical logic. Consequently, the distributive property does not always hold in quantum logic and quantum systems can be modelled using orthomodular lattices associated with closed subspaces of Hilbert space. We believe that this model must evolve in parallel with the discovery of new quantum phenomena and that it provides a framework conductive to this evolution. Keywords: Quantum logic; distributivity; partially order sets (posets); lattice; orthomodular lattice; Hilbert space; Boolean algebra.
The semantics underlying the propositional structure of Hilbert space quantum mechanics involves an inherent ambiguity concerning the impossibility of assigning definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen-Specker contradiction. Although the preceding Kochen-Specker result forbids a global, absolute assignment of truth values to quantum mechanical propositions, it does not exclude ones that are contextual. In this respect, the Bub-Clifton “uniqueness theorem” is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a suitable “preferred” observable. It is suggested that the most natural choice of the latter, especially for confronting the problem of truth valuation in quantum mechanics, results in the determinateness of the observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The resulting account of truth is compatible with a realist conception of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature.