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arXiv:1910.08770 · Computer Communications

A channel perceiving attack and the countermeasure on long-range IoT physical layer key generation

Yang Lu, Yansong Gao, Junqing Zhang, Seyit Ahmet Camtepe, Dhammika Jayalath

Published Apr 29, 2022• 10 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/j.comcom.2022.04.027

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The attacker can manipulate a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) to jamming attack to break the channel reciprocity, resulting in an increasing key disagreement rate (KDR) to interrupt the physical layer key generation (PKG). In this letter, a countermeasure for PKG is proposed to resist the RIS jamming attack. The proposed countermeasure includes the atomic norm minimization (ANM)-based multipath separation algorithm and statistic feature-based path detection algorithm, which can reconstruct the reciprocal channel without needing a wide frequency band. Simulation results show that the proposed countermeasure can significantly reduce KDR from 0.33 to 0.03 when SNR is 10 dB and achieve an excellent key generation rate (KGR) compared with existing schemes.
Due to the capability of controlling wireless environments, reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) can be exploited to assist radio channel-based physical-layer key generation (PKG). However, this may also pose great security threats to PKG when it is controlled by an attacker. To this end, this letter studies a RIS leakage (RISL) attack that assists the attacker to manipulate the generated keys between the legitimate ends in PKG systems. Specifically, in block fading environments, by alternatingly adapting the RIS reflection coefficients to all 0s and 1s in each block, the received signal strength (RSS) at the legitimate ends is likely to be boosted and attenuated regularly across time, causing predictable 0s and 1s in the quantized bits. To resist this attack, we propose a countermeasure based on dynamic private pilots (CDPP) and prove that the RISL success probability can be significantly reduced by CDPP. Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed attack and countermeasure, highlighting the importance of introducing artificial randomness for secret key security in block fading channels.
Physical layer secret key (PLSK) attracts much research interest in recent years due to its lightweight properties and potential to be used in real internet-of-things (IoT) applications. However, most existing works focus on PLSK generation between pairwise users under passive eavesdropping and lack of design for group key generation especially when active attacks may exist. In this paper, the RObust and LIghtweight Group key generation Against Active Attack (ROLIG3A) scheme is proposed to achieve reliable, efficient, and secure group secret key generation (GSKG) against various malicious attack patterns. In ROLIG3A, adaptive channel listening and dual code channel transmission are designed to avoid legitimate users from jamming signals. Comparing with the exiting GSKG schemes, more proactive countermeasures, back interference cancellation, and ECC-based information sharing are involved to realize the identification and cancellation of malicious attacks. Simulation results show that ROLIG3A has better security performance than the state-of-the-art GSKG schemes in the face of both sabotage attacks and manipulative attacks. In addition, ROLIG3A can provide an acceptable key generation rate and it is reliable even in low signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) environments.