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arXiv:1908.05584

Quantum preprocessing for information-theoretic security in two-party computation

Li Zhi Yu

Published Aug 15, 2019• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In classical two-party computation, a trusted initializer who prepares certain initial correlations, known as one-time tables, can help make the inputs of both parties information-theoretically secure. We propose some bipartite quantum protocols with possible aborts for approximately generating such bipartite classical correlations with varying degrees of privacy, without introducing a third party. Under some weak requirements for the parties, the security level is nontrivial for use in bipartite computation. We show that the security is sometimes dependent on the noise level, but we propose a method for dealing with noise. The security is "forced security", which implies that the probability that some useful one-time tables are generated can approach $1$ in the noiseless case under quite weak assumptions about the parties, although the protocols allow aborts. We show how to use the generated one-time tables to achieve nontrivial information-theoretic security in generic two-party classical or quantum computation tasks, including (interactive) quantum homomorphic encryption. Our methods provide check-based implementations of some no-signaling correlations, including the PR-box type, with the help of communication which carry no information about the inputs in the generated correlations.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1908.05584

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In classical two-party computation, a trusted initializer who prepares certain initial correlations, known as one-time tables, can help make the inputs of both parties information-theoretically secure. We propose some bipartite quantum protocols with possible aborts for approximately generating such bipartite classical correlations with varying degrees of privacy, without introducing a third party. Under some weak requirements for the parties, the security level is nontrivial for use in bipartite computation. We show that the security is sometimes dependent on the noise level, but we propose a method for dealing with noise. The security is "forced security", which implies that the probability that some useful one-time tables are generated can approach 111 in the noiseless case under quite weak assumptions about the parties, although the protocols allow aborts. We show how to use the generated one-time tables to achieve nontrivial information-theoretic security in generic two-party classical or quantum computation tasks, including (interactive) quantum homomorphic encryption. Our methods provide check-based implementations of some no-signaling correlations, including the PR-box type, with the help of communication which carry no information about the inputs in the generated correlations.
One-time tables are a class of two-party correlations that can help achieve information-theoretically secure two-party (interactive) classical or quantum computation. In this work we propose a bipartite quantum protocol for generating a simple type of one-time tables (the correlation in the Popescu-Rohrlich nonlocal box) with partial security. We then show that by running many instances of the first protocol and performing checks on some of them, asymptotically information-theoretically secure generation of one-time tables can be achieved. The first protocol is adapted from a protocol for semi-honest quantum oblivious transfer, with some changes so that no entangled state needs to be prepared, and the communication involves only one qutrit in each direction. We show that some information tradeoffs in the first protocol are similar to that in the semi-honest oblivious transfer protocol. We also obtain two types of inequalities about guessing probabilities in some protocols for generating one-time tables, from a single type of inequality about guessing probabilities in semi-honest quantum oblivious transfer protocols.
A fundamental task in modern cryptography is the joint computation of a function which has two inputs, one from Alice and one from Bob, such that neither of the two can learn more about the other's input than what is implied by the value of the function. In this Letter, we show that any quantum protocol for the computation of a classical deterministic function that outputs the result to both parties (two-sided computation) and that is secure against a cheating Bob can be completely broken by a cheating Alice. Whereas it is known that quantum protocols for this task cannot be completely secure, our result implies that security for one party implies complete insecurity for the other. Our findings stand in stark contrast to recent protocols for weak coin tossing and highlight the limits of cryptography within quantum mechanics. We remark that our conclusions remain valid, even if security is only required to be approximate and if the function that is computed for Bob is different from that of Alice.
We introduce information-theoretically private quantum protocols for two-party Hamming distance when both parties must output the same estimate. Classically, for input length nnn, information-theoretic protocols require Ω(n)Ω(\sqrt{n})Ω(n​) error under pure differential privacy and Ω(n/log⁡n)Ω(\sqrt{n}/\log n)Ω(n​/logn) error under strong approximate differential privacy, whereas computational security permits O(1)O(1)O(1) error. In Klauck's honest, nonpreemptive, message-preserving model, we give an O(n)O(n)O(n)-communication quantum protocol with pure ε\varepsilonε quantum differential privacy (QDP) and expected error at most 2sinh⁡ε+γ\frac{2}{\sinh \varepsilon}+γsinhε2​+γ, for every γ>0γ>0γ>0. For approximate (ε,δ)(\varepsilon, δ)(ε,δ) QDP, an exact hockey-stick divergence calculation yields strictly smaller error, while preserving the O(1)O(1)O(1)-versus-Ω(n/log⁡n)Ω(\sqrt{n}/\log n)Ω(n​/logn) separation for δ=o(1/n)δ=o(1/n)δ=o(1/n). Thus, quantum communication achieves O(1)O(1)O(1) information-theoretic error, matching the accuracy available classically only under computational assumptions. The main construction uses a guarded coherent round trip and an equal-Gram rigidity principle that prevents an honest player from retaining input-dependent complementary information. We separate this model from weaker prescribed-channel privacy, which already admits an exact classical realization, and from fully retention-robust security, against which measurement-and-abort attacks remain possible. Therefore, we identify preservation of non-orthogonal quantum messages as a resource for privacy.
Most proposed protocols for multi-party computation are designed to be secure either against information-theoretic or against computational adversaries.Each setting has its known advantages and disadvantages.In the computational setting we can achieve nonrobust MPC for up to t < n corrupted parties, but relying on unproven intractability assumptions.In the information-theoretic setting we do not have any unproven assumptions, but only t < n/2 corrupted parties can be tolerated.In [Cha89] Chaum sketches a hybrid protocol that brings together the best of both worlds: Information-theoretic security with abort (i.e.privacy and correctness, but no fairness or robustness) is achieved for t < n/2 corrupted parties.Beyond this threshold, for t < n corrupted parties, the protocol achieves computational security with abort.In this work, we first formalize the protocol idea described in [Cha89] and prove its security.In a second step, we extend the protocol to provide fairness and robustness.Whereas fairness comes "for free", robustness requires a trade-off similar to the one in [IKLP06].Then, we describe a construction for realizing the protocol in the universallycomposable setting as proposed in [Can01].For his protocol, Chaum assumed that a broadcast channel is given.In the last part of this work we discuss the implications of dropping this assumption, and obtain an interesting new result: It is possible to achieve the same bounds as in [Cha89], extended with fairness, without a broadcast channel.
Efficient models for secure computation often rely on offline preprocessed correlations, which subsequently enable private online computation from minimal assumptions. Within these models, the study of secure non-interactive reductions (SNIR) formalizes when one classical correlation can be non-interactively transformed into another, while guaranteeing information-theoretic simulation-based privacy. In this work, we introduce quantum secure non-interactive reductions (QSNIR), a natural extension of SNIR, in which the source and target resource are each a bipartite quantum state. Specifically, when the target resource is classical, our framework enables us to analyze the problem of disseminating private correlations from entanglement, in addition to classical resources. Our primary technical result is that QSNIR privacy in this context can be computed exactly via a semidefinite program (SDP) pair that quantifies an error operationally rooted in a simulation-based cheating advantage. We prove that QSNIR privacy is lower-bounded by a decision problem related to minimum-error state discrimination (MED), and use both definitions to compute exact one-shot privacy errors for universal two-party computation (2PC) preprocessing correlations.
XOR oblivious transfer is a universal cryptographic primitive that can be related to linear polynomial evaluation. We firstly introduce some bipartite quantum protocols for XOR oblivious transfer, which are not secure if one party cheats, and some of them can be combined with a classical XOR homomorphic encryption scheme for evaluation of linear polynomials modulo 2 with hybrid security. We then introduce a general protocol using modified versions of the XOR oblivious transfer protocols to evaluate linear polynomials modulo 2 with partial information-theoretic security. When combined with the ability to perform arbitrary quantum computation, this would lead to deterministic interactive two-party computation which is quite secure in the information-theoretic sense when the allowed set of inputs is large. For the task of classical function evaluation, although the quantum computation approach is still usable, we also discuss purely classical post-processing methods based on the proposed linear polynomial evaluation protocols.