Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a secret way to share keys between legitimate users which is guaranteed by the law of quantum mechanics. Most recently, the limitation of transmission distance without quantum repeaters was broken through by twin-field QKD [M. Lucamarini et al., Nature (London) 557, 400 (2018)]. Based on its main idea, sending or not-sending (SNS) QKD protocol was proposed [X. B. Wang et al. Phys. Rev. A 98, 062323 (2018)], which filled the remaining security loopholes and can tolerate large misalignment errors. In this paper, we give a more general model for SNS QKD, where two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, can possess asymmetric quantum channels. By applying the method present in the paper, the legitimate users can achieve dramatically increased key generation rates and transmission distances compared with compensating the channel asymmetry and utilizing the original symmetric protocol. Therefore, our present paper represents a further step along the progress of practical QKD.
Abstract The sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol of the twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) can tolerant large misalignment error and its key rate can exceed the linear bound of repeaterless QKD. The original SNS protocol and all variants of TF-QKD require perfect vacuum sources, but in the real world experiments there is no practical perfect vacuum source. Instead, experimenters use extremely weak sources to substitute vacuum sources, which may break the security of the protocol. Here we propose an SNS protocol with imperfect vacuum sources and give the non-asymptotic decoy-state analysis of this protocol. Our numerical simulation shows that when the imperfect vacuum sources are close to perfect vacuum sources, our protocol can obtain similar key rate as that with perfect vacuum sources. This is the first result that closes the potential security loophole due to imperfect vacuum of TF-QKD.
Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) has attracted considerable attention because it can exceed the basic rate-distance limit without quantum repeaters. Its variant protocol, sending or not-sending quantum key distribution (SNS-QKD), not only fixes the security vulnerability of TF-QKD, but also can tolerate large misalignment errors. However, the current SNS-QKD protocol is based on the active decoy-state method, which may lead to side channel information leakage when multiple light intensities are modulated in practice. In this work, we propose a passive decoy-state SNS-QKD protocol to further enhance the security of SNS-QKD. Numerical simulation results show that the protocol not only improves the security in source, but also retains the advantages of tolerating large misalignment errors. Therefore, it may provide further guidance for the practical application of SNS-QKD.
Sending-or-not sending twin-field quantum key distribution (SNS TF-QKD) has the advantage of tolerating large amounts of misalignment errors, and its key rate can exceed the linear bound of repeaterless quantum key distribution. However, the weak randomness in a practical QKD system may lower the secret key rate and limit its achievable communication distance, thus compromising its performance. In this paper, we analyze the effects of the weak randomness on the SNS TF-QKD. The numerical simulation shows that SNS TF-QKD can still have an excellent performance under the weak random condition: the secret key rate can exceed the PLOB boundary and achieve long transmission distances. Furthermore, our simulation results also show that SNS TF-QKD is more robust to the weak randomness loopholes than the BB84 protocol and the measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD). Our results emphasize that keeping the randomness of the states is significant to the protection of state preparation devices.
Based on the novel idea of twin-field quantum key distribution [TF-QKD; Lucamarini et al., Nature (London) 557, 400 (2018)], we present a protocol named the ``sending or not sending TF-QKD'' protocol, which can tolerate large misalignment error. A revolutionary theoretical breakthrough in quantum communication, TF-QKD changes the channel-loss dependence of the key rate from linear to square root of channel transmittance. However, it demands the challenging technology of long-distance single-photon interference, and also, as stated in the original paper, the security proof was not finalized there due to the possible effects of the later announced phase information. Here we show by a concrete eavesdropping scheme that the later phase announcement does have important effects and the traditional formulas of the decoy-state method do not apply to the original protocol. We then present our ``sending or not sending'' protocol. Our protocol does not take postselection for the bits in
Z-basis (signal pulses), and hence the traditional decoy-state method directly applies and automatically resolves the issue of security proof. Most importantly, our protocol presents a negligibly small error rate in
Z-basis because it does not request any single-photon interference in this basis. Thus our protocol greatly improves the tolerable threshold of misalignment error in single-photon interference from the original a few percent to more than
45. As shown numerically, our protocol exceeds a secure distance of 700, 600, 500, or 300 km even though the single-photon interference misalignment error rate is as large as
15, or
45.