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arXiv:1908.04703 · Physical Review A

Bounding passive light-source side channels in quantum key distribution via Hong-Ou-Mandel interference

Alexander Duplinskiy, Сыч Денис Васильевич

Published Jul 6, 2021• 18 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Passive side-channel attacks in quantum key distribution (QKD) aim at obtaining information about the quantum signals without disturbing them and hence compromise real-world QKD security. Currently, there are no reliable tools for the assessment of QKD signal generation imperfections. In this work we propose a generic experimental method which allows to upper-bound QKD light-source imperfections and directly integrate them into the modern security proofs. The method relies on Hong-Ou-Mandel interference between different emitted signals: the maximum interference visibility reveals overall signal distinguishability that could lead to passive side-channel information leakage. We apply it for the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol and calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate for realistic values of interference visibility. The method can be readily implemented in practical QKD setups and is especially relevant for multiple-laser QKD systems such as the one installed on the Micius satellite.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.104.012601

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Passive side-channel attacks in quantum key distribution (QKD) aim at obtaining information about the quantum signals without disturbing them and hence compromise real-world QKD security. Currently, there are no reliable tools for the assessment of QKD signal generation imperfections. In this work we propose a generic experimental method which allows to upper-bound QKD light-source imperfections and directly integrate them into the modern security proofs. The method relies on Hong-Ou-Mandel interference between different emitted signals: the maximum interference visibility reveals overall signal distinguishability that could lead to passive side-channel information leakage. We apply it for the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol and calculate a lower bound on the secret key rate for realistic values of interference visibility. The method can be readily implemented in practical QKD setups and is especially relevant for multiple-laser QKD systems such as the one installed on the Micius satellite.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the transmission of keys with unconditional security. Nevertheless, a discrepancy remains between the theoretical framework and the practical implementation, as device imperfections are frequently neglected in most QKD protocols. Some previous works proposed to use Hong-Ou-Mandel interference to quantify information leakage from side-channels. However, the security bound was relatively loose, resulting in poor performance. In this paper, we present an improved method for the security analysis of practical QKD protocols and provide a more precise parameter estimation. Furthermore, we apply it to several important QKD protocols, including BB84, measurement-device-independent, and twin-field, and carry out corresponding numerical simulations. Our work demonstrates significant improvements in both the key rate and the transmission distance compared to previous methods, representing a crucial step towards the practical implementation of QKD.
Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) can change the channel-loss dependence of key rates from $O(\ensuremath{\eta})$ to $O(\sqrt{\ensuremath{\eta}})$ and thus significantly increase the secure key rate compared with other existing quantum key distribution protocols. However, it does not take the source security into account in most present TF-QKD protocols. Here, we propose to employ the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference to characterize the source security, i.e., to use the interference visibility to quantify the information leakage from detectable side channels of sources. Furthermore, we establish a corresponding theoretical model and calculate the final key rate, by using the three-intensity decoy-state method and taking finite-data-size effects into account. Consequently, by employing our present scheme, the secure transmission distance can be longer than 100 km under current experimental conditions, significantly surpassing present device-independent QKD systems.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions. While its theoretical foundations are robust, practical implementations necessarily deviate from the idealized models assumed in security analyses, opening the door to side-channel attacks and implementation loopholes. In particular, most research to date has focused on mitigating vulnerabilities in the measurement devices, leading to the development of Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) and Twin-Field QKD (TF-QKD), which effectively close all receiver-side loopholes. By contrast, the security of the source has remained less explored, despite being critical for the overall integrity of QKD systems. The goal of this thesis is to develop security proofs that explicitly account for realistic imperfections in QKD sources. Special emphasis is placed on three main aspects: correlations between emitted pulses that violate independence assumptions, imperfect phase randomization arising from practical modulation schemes, and leakage of internal settings through passive or active side channels. By formulating rigorous methods to analyze these imperfections, the work aims to provide a framework that enables practitioners to quantify and mitigate implementation risks systematically. Additionally, this thesis seeks to clarify under which conditions the commonly used decoy-state method remains secure, and to what extent source assumptions can be relaxed without compromising performance. This thesis aims to advance the understanding of how real-world deviations impact QKD security and to contribute to the development of protocols and devices. Ultimately, this work is motivated by the ambition to help bring QKD from a theoretically promising idea to a mature technology deployable with confidence in practical scenarios.
While ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84 protocols either assume uniform phase randomization of Alice’s signals, which is compromised by practical limitations and attacks like injection locking, or rely on a (partially) characterized phase distribution. This work presents an experimental method to characterize the phase de-randomization from injection locking using a heterodyne detection setup, providing a lower bound on the degree of isolation required to protect QKD transmitters against injection-locking attacks. The methods presented are source-agnostic and can be used to evaluate general QKD systems against injection-locking attacks.
Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most widely adopted approach for overcoming the limitations of imperfect single-photon sources. However, existing security proofs typically either neglect important device imperfections or rely on assumptions that are difficult to justify in realistic high-speed implementations, such as the independent and identically distributed nature of the emitted signals. In this work, we combine and extend several recent theoretical advances to provide a comprehensive analytical finite-key security proof for decoy-state QKD that simultaneously incorporates multiple practically relevant transmitter and receiver imperfections, including state-preparation flaws, bit and basis side-channel leakage and correlations, setting-independent intensity fluctuations, and detection-efficiency mismatches.
Abstract Quantum digital signature (QDS) can guarantee the information-theoretical security of a signature with the fundamental laws of quantum physics. However, most current QDS protocols do not take source security into account, leading to an overestimation of the signature rate. In this paper, we propose to utilize Hong–Ou–Mandel interference to characterize the upper bound of the source imperfections, and further to quantify information leakage from potential side-channels. Additionally, we combine decoy-state methods and finite-size analysis in analyzing the signature rate. Simulation results demonstrate the performance and feasibility of our approach. Our current work can improve the practical security of QDS systems, thereby promoting their further networked applications.