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arXiv:1907.10095 · Physical Review A

Frauchiger-Renner argument and quantum histories

Marcelo Losada, Roberto Laura, Olímpia Lombardi

Published Nov 20, 2019• 41 citations
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Abstract

In this article, we reconstruct the Frauchiger and Renner argument, taking into account that the assertions of the argument are made at different times. To do this, we use a formalism of quantum histories, namely the Theory of Consistent Histories. We show that the supposedly contradictory conclusion of the argument requires computing probabilities in a family of histories that does not satisfy the consistency condition, i.e., an invalid family of histories for the theory.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.100.052114

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Kent Replies:

Adrian Kent

It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections $P$ and $Q$, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that $PQ = QP = 0$ and $P \neq 1 -Q$. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences $P$ and $Q$ where $P = 1 - Q$. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.

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In this article, we reconstruct the Frauchiger and Renner argument, taking into account that the assertions of the argument are made at different times. To do this, we use a formalism of quantum histories, namely the Theory of Consistent Histories. We show that the supposedly contradictory conclusion of the argument requires computing probabilities in a family of histories that does not satisfy the consistency condition, i.e., an invalid family of histories for the theory.
It was pointed out recently [A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78 (1997) 2874] that the consistent histories approach allows contrary inferences to be made from the same data. These inferences correspond to projections PPP and QQQ, belonging to different consistent sets, with the properties that PQ=QP=0PQ = QP = 0PQ=QP=0 and P≠1−QP \neq 1 -QP=1−Q. To many, this seems undesirable in a theory of physical inferences. It also raises a specific problem for the consistent histories formalism, since that formalism is set up so as to eliminate contradictory inferences, i.e. inferences PPP and QQQ where P=1−QP = 1 - QP=1−Q. Yet there seems to be no sensible physical distinction between contradictory and contrary inferences. It seems particularly hard to defend the asymmetry, since (i) there is a well-defined quantum histories formalisms which admits both contradictory and contrary inferences, and (ii) there is also a well-defined formalism, based on ordered consistent sets of histories, which excludes both. In a recent comment, Griffiths and Hartle, while accepting the validity of the examples given in the above paper, restate their own preference for the consistent histories formalism. As this brief reply explains, in so doing, they fail to address the arguments made against their approach to quantum theory.
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the Frauchiger–Renner paradox (2018), a significant thought experiment that demonstrates a logical contradiction arising when standard quantum mechanics is applied to nested observers. Building on Wigner’s friend scenario, it examines the formal setup, derives the contradiction from assumptions of universality, the Born rule, and self-consistency in multi-agent reasoning, and evaluates proposed resolutions across major interpretations of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen, Everettian/many-worlds, relational, QBism, decoherent histories, and objective collapse theories). The work explores historical context, epistemological implications for observation, objectivity, and intersubjectivity, as well as recent experimental probes and theoretical refinements. It argues that the paradox reveals deep tensions in applying quantum theory to complex, self-referential scenarios involving observers (2026).
The Frauchiger-Renner argument aims to show that `quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself': in many-party settings where agents are themselves subject to quantum experiments, agents may make predictions that contradict observations. Here, we introduce a simplified setting using only three agents, that is independent of the initial quantum state, thus eliminating in particular any need for entanglement, and furthermore does not need to invoke any final measurement and resulting collapse. Nevertheless, the predictions and observations made by the agents cannot be integrated into a single, consistent account. We propose that the existence of this sort of \emph{Rashomon effect}, i.e. the impossibility of uniting different perspectives, is due to failing to account for the limits put on the information available about any given system as encapsulated in the notion of an \emph{epistemic horizon}.