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arXiv:1905.09055 · Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science

Ontological models for quantum theory as functors

Alexandru Gheorghiu, Chris Heunen

Published Apr 30, 2020• 10 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We interpret ontological models for finite-dimensional quantum theory as functors from the category of finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces and bounded linear maps to the category of measurable spaces and Markov kernels. This uniformises several earlier results, that we analyse more closely: Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph's result rules out monoidal functors; Leifer and Maroney's result rules out functors that preserve a duality between states and measurement; Aaronson et al's result rules out functors that adhere to the Schr\"odinger equation. We also prove that it is possible to have epistemic functors that take values in signed Markov kernels.

DOI
10.4204/eptcs.318.12

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We interpret ontological models for finite-dimensional quantum theory as functors from the category of finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces and bounded linear maps to the category of measurable spaces and Markov kernels. This uniformises several earlier results, that we analyse more closely: Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph's result rules out monoidal functors; Leifer and Maroney's result rules out functors that preserve a duality between states and measurement; Aaronson et al's result rules out functors that adhere to the Schr"odinger equation. We also prove that it is possible to have epistemic functors that take values in signed Markov kernels.
Ontological models of quantum theory seek to realize quantum theory as a statistical theory over underlying degrees of freedom, whose measurement statistics are described by classical probability theory. Harrigan and Spekkens (2010) proposed a distinction between ontological models in which pure quantum states represent states of reality (ψ-ontic) or knowledge about reality (ψ-epistemic) depending on whether their associated probability distributions overlap, subsequently formalized into measure-theoretic form by Leifer (2014). In this thesis, I examine whether this ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction truly captures the intended difference between ontic and epistemic conceptions of pure states. I consider some mathematical alternatives relating to different notions of non-overlap between probability measures and compare them. I discuss the implications of these results for quantum ontology theorems – theorems that rule out ψ-epistemic readings of pure states under certain assumptions about the ontological model – such as the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph Theorem (2012).
Since the famous debates of Einstein & Bohr, physicists have argued about the nature of the quantum state. Is it best thought of as describing the-way-things-are out there in the world, or merely as a description of our knowledge of such things? In more recent years, this has been termed the ψ-epistemic/ψ-ontic debate, and that distinction has been given a mathematical definition within the ontological models formalism. This formalism is a framework for describing a large class of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we show that consideration of sequential measurements, and the fact that the quantum state changes during measurements, has been a neglected topic in this area as it places nontrivial restrictions on the structure of ψ-epistemic ontological models. \n \nWe do this by finding a general restriction on the structure of ψ-epistemic models, although not one that is strong enough to rule them out categorically. We then apply this restriction to all of the known examples of ψ-epistemic ontological models and show that they can’t represent sequential measurements. We also present a new version of the ontological models formalism, based on hidden Markov models, which we develop briefly and describe how it may be useful for either proving a no-go theorem (i.e. ‘ψ-epistemic models can’t exist’) or for learning more about the structure of ψ-epistemic models and how to construct them.
This thesis aims at connecting the two research programs known as Categorical Quantum Mechanics and Dynamic Quantum Logic. This is achieved in three steps. First we define a procedure to extract a Modal Logic frame from a small category and a functor into the category of sets and relations. Second, we extend such methodology to locally small categories. Third, we apply it to the category of finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces to recover the semantics of Dynamic Quantum Logic. This process prompts new lines of research. At a general level, we study some logics arising from wide classes of small categories. In the case of Hilbert spaces, we investigate how to obtain richer semantics, containing probabilistic information. We design a logic for this semantics and prove that, via translation, it preserves the validities of Dynamic Quantum Logic.
Previously we have shown that the topos approach to quantum theory of Doering and Isham can be generalised to a class of categories typically studied within the monoidal approach to quantum theory of Abramsky and Coecke. In the monoidal approach to quantum theory H*-algebras provide an axiomatisation of states and observables. Here we show that H*-algebras naturally correspond with the notions of states and observables in the generalised topos approach to quantum theory. We then combine these results with the dagger-kernel approach to quantum logic of Heunen and Jacobs, which we use to prove a structure theorem for H*-algebras. This structure theorem is a generalisation of the structure theorem of Ambrose for H*-algebras the category of Hilbert spaces.
Ψ-epistemic models of quantum mechanics imply that the quantum state does not correspond to physical reality, but instead reflects the observer's knowledge of the underlying quantum system. The epistemic view of the quantum state has the potential to shed light on several foundational problems of quantum theory and has attracted considerable attention in the literature. On the other hand, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem demonstrated that broad classes of ψ-epistemic models must lead to predictions that deviate from those of quantum mechanics. Although the original theorem involved entangled joint measurements on composite systems, alternative no-go theorems involving measurements on single quantum systems were developed shortly thereafter. Experimental investigations of the deviations predicted by ψ-epistemic models from quantum mechanics are still ongoing. So far, such tests have been performed within the framework of non-relativistic quantum mechanics and predominantly rely on quantum information based measurement procedures. In this work, we show that ψ-epistemic models can give rise to deviations from standard quantum field-theoretic predictions through modifications of polarized scattering cross sections and decay widths. Our results do not require a relativistic formulation of ontological models or of the Harrigan-Spekkens criterion; the essential assumption is merely that measurements implemented through relativistic processes can still be represented within the ontological framework by well-defined response functions and probabilities. The present work constitutes a proof-of-principle study demonstrating that particle physics tests of the ontological status of the quantum state are possible and that ψ-epistemic models may exhibit experimentally distinguishable signatures in particle phenomenology.